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The aim of this dissertation is to advance the understanding of the relationship 
between comedy and politics, as well as the relationship between the cultural and the 
political parts of the public sphere. Its main research question is How can TV comedy 
thematising immigration contribute to public opinion formation on immigration in the 
larger public sphere? This is investigated through a text-focused, case based historical 
study of comedy shows, actors and events in the three Scandinavian countries – 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark. The concept immigration comedy is used to refer to 
the special kind of comedy in question, in order to refer not only to ethnic humour, but 
also to satire about immigration policy or xenophobia. Two of the case sets in the 
dissertation focus on comedy shows, while the two other case sets focus on comedy 
reception in the mass media.  
Drawing on insights from public sphere theory and humour theory, and with a 
broad orientation towards the Scandinavian immigration debates, it is argued that the 
cases analysed in this dissertation can be considered as manifestations of boundary 
struggles in various ways. Scandinavian immigration comedy, and the debates around 
it, have worked to preserve boundaries as moral guards against anti-immigrant 
positions in the public sphere; and to challenge boundaries by being means of access 
for immigrants. Furthermore, as attempts of politicisation of the issues of symbolic 
racism and the limits of humour, debates about immigration comedy have worked to 
both challenge and maintain boundaries. Finally, immigration comedy shows made by 
and for immigrants themselves, diaspora humour, have through their playful 
recognition of ethnic difference worked as alternative spaces beyond the borders of 
the more problem-oriented serious public sphere. 
The main theoretical contribution of the dissertation lies in pointing out how 
different forms of boundary work were all done through the special characteristics of 
the humorous mode, characteristics conceptualised as unsolvable and productive 
tensions. These tensions are between humour’s unseriousness and its use for serious 
means, between humour as conventional, conservative and suppressive and creative, 
radical and subversive, and finally between humour as a facilitator of both emotional 
investment and emotional detachment – which also includes a tension between positive 
 
 
and negative emotions. The most central argument is that humour is not inherently 
conservative nor inherently radical, but works politically through balancing these two 
aspects. 
The dissertation also makes a methodological contribution by advancing a 
textual-historical view of opinion formation. Departing from public sphere theory, it is 
argued that the bast way to understand how public opinion is shaped is by textual 
analysis, where texts should be read as interventions in specific, historically located 
debates. Furthermore, it is especially useful to investigate historical ruptures, moments 
when the relationship between different kinds of discourses in the public sphere, for 
example comedy and immigration debate, intersect and interact in new ways, in order 
to detect ways that texts who not explicitly are part of the day-to-day political debate 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
In 2019, the high school Stovner Videregående Skole, located in a suburb of the 
Norwegian capital Oslo, produced its first student revue in years. The revue, with a 
diverse cast mirroring the multicultural neighbourhood of Stovner, was widely 
acclaimed and acknowledged as important in the public sphere, but already on opening 
night, critical voices from the student body appeared on Facebook, claiming that the 
revue ridiculed Muslims and objecting to the use of blackface in one of the sketches. It 
took several weeks for these complaints to reach the national public sphere, but when 
some students eventually published an anonymously signed op-ed in the paper 
Dagbladet1, it sparked a massive debate involving the principal of the school, 
professional comedians, activists, academics (among them the writer of the present 
dissertation) and even national politicians.  
How could some sketches in a high school revue become a subject of national 
debate? Why is our view of humour, especially humour related to questions of 
ethnicity, race, and immigration, so laden with ideas of how it can do harm; but also 
with ideas of how it can do good? Such ideas were clearly central for respectively the 
critics of the revue and for those who stressed how important it was, but the latter 
rarely felt any need to substantiate why it was important. Both these views stem from a 
notion that humour has social and political impact. Most people would agree with this, 
but few can answer how humour has an impact. This question ultimately pertains to a 
larger question, which has been central in the humanities since Plato: Can the arts play 
a political role?  
This dissertation seeks to advance the discussion of this question by narrowing 
it down, to be able to handle it theoretically and empirically. The object of study is the 
relationship between the serious immigration debate in Scandinavia and professional 
comedy about immigration on stage and television, what I call immigration comedy: 
 
1 https://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/de-visste-at-vi-kom-til-a-bli-saret-men-valgte-likevel-a-bruke-
blackface/70947049 (Last checked February 11th, 2021).  
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Comedy – by immigrants or non-immigrants – that is about the immigration issue in 
one way or another. I will approach this from the perspective of public sphere theory, 
through a text-focused, case based historical study of shows, actors and events. This 
yields the following overarching research question: How can TV comedy thematising 
immigration contribute to public opinion formation on immigration in the larger 
public sphere? 
 
1.1 Aims and Scope 
 
This dissertation places itself within the framework of public sphere theory, where the 
arts/politics-problem can be formulated as a question of how the cultural and the 
political parts of the public sphere can be tied together in a meaningful way. This has 
been approached by many authors from many different angles (Balme, 2014; 
Benhabib, 1996; Dahlgren, 1995; Gripsrud, 2008; Hermes, 2005, 2006; McGuigan, 
1996, 2005; Nussbaum, 1995; Nærland, 2015, 2019a, 2019b; van Zoonen, 2005) with 
stronger or weaker links to different versions of public sphere theory, and with 
different conceptions of culture. Some of them have tried to make a general theory of 
how the cultural public sphere has a function in liberal democracies, while others 
concentrate on how different aspects of the arts, or expressive culture, as Gripsrud 
(2008, p. 197) calls it in order to include popular culture, can contribute to the 
workings of the political public sphere. The latter is also the aim of the present 
dissertation. Rather than to develop a complete theory of the relationship between the 
cultural and the political public sphere, I will write a historical study of how a certain 
cultural form, humour, has played a role in this relationship in certain contexts. I argue 
that humour can fulfil many different purposes, or functions, in the public sphere, but 
that they are all based on certain particularities, or affordances, of the humorous mode. 
These particularities allow humour and comedy to do things in the public sphere that 
other modes and genres cannot. Hence, my contribution to the scholarly debate on the 
cultural public sphere is not to offer a model, but to use a set of diverse historical cases 




Public sphere theory is not the go to perspective in research on humour and 
politics. In cultural studies, power-oriented perspectives inspired by the legacy of 
Althusser, Gramsci and Foucault have dominated (see for example Holm, 2017; 
Lockyer & Pickering, 2008; Pérez, 2013, 2016; Pickering & Lockyer, 2005; Weaver, 
2010, 2011), while scholars from quantitatively oriented communication studies have 
taken an interest in the politics of comedy in the later years (see Young, 2018 for a 
literature review.). Although these studies have provided important insights, a public 
sphere perspective is in my view the most fruitful way to go to understand the politics 
of humour, as it has better tools to conceptualise politics. In a cultural studies 
perspective, politics tend to mean any process where power relations are at play, 
including in how we make sense of and engage with the world (Holm, 2017, p. 12). 
While this extended conception of politics certainly has its merits, there is a risk that 
the phrase “everything is political” makes the concept of politics an empty one. There 
is a substantial difference between the politics of the dinner table and the politics of 
parliament, especially when it comes to the power politics has to create social change. 
However, what happens by the dinner table might both influence and be a concern of 
parliament. Ultimately, how this journey goes on is an empirical question, which 
public sphere theory has the theoretical tools to analyse.  
The essence of public sphere theory is the connection between democracy and 
discourse. Discourse is the central means of democratic participation used to reach 
political decisions that benefit the common good (Elster, 1986, pp. 127-128), and is by 
some even viewed as the core of the political in itself, as discourse is what constitutes 
human togetherness (Arendt, 1958, pp. 180-182). To put it briefly, what goes on in the 
public sphere has, and should have, an impact on democratic decision making 
(Habermas, 1996, pp. 298-299) – and a lot of what goes on in the public sphere is 
actually expressive culture (Gripsrud, 2008, pp. 197, 203), of which humour and 
comedy takes up a large part and is bestowed with high cultural value in late modern 
Western culture (Billig, 2005b, pp. 11-13; Holm, 2017, pp. 1-8; Pickering & Lockyer, 
2005, pp. 3-4). Following this, a public sphere-oriented study of political humour 
contributes not only to humour studies but also to public sphere theory: understanding 
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humour is necessary to fully understand the public sphere, which again is necessary in 
order to fully understand democracy. 
The relationship between humour and the public sphere is theoretically 
interesting for two reasons, echoing respectively Arendt’s view of the public sphere as 
the arena where human togetherness is created (a view that also has influenced 
Habermasian democratic theory), and Elster’s emphasis on how the public sphere 
ultimately has substantive decision-making as its end. The first reason pertains to how 
humorous discourse has an interesting social position. According to the barometer 
thesis of humour, jokes and comedy mirror society as a whole as they are very strong 
indicators of what preoccupies society at a given moment (Davies, 2011; Kuipers, 
2015, p. 123). A less strong version of the barometer thesis postulates that humour and 
comedy thrive on tensions and paradoxes regarding social norms (Douglas, 1968; Eco, 
1984; Frye, 1990, pp. 163-170). Humour becomes funny by playing with and 
transgressing such norms – “ [humour] closely approach a social or cultural boundary 
and gives it a little push” (Kuipers, 2015, p. 123). However, even transgressive 
humour must be viewed as appropriate, which according to humour sociologist 
Giselinde Kuipers is based on the humour regimes, complex “unwritten rules 
stipulating who can joke about what” (2011, p. 69), and humour styles (2015, pp. 102-
120), which are based on taste in a Bordieuan sense, thus also on social boundaries. 
Humour and comedy is thus indicative of the social conflict potential in any given 
time and culture (Gripsrud, 1990, p. 192; L. O. Larsen, 1998, p. 40), and can even 
serve as a public arena where social rifts are demarcated and played out (Lewis, 2006). 
At the same time, there seems to be no scholarly – or  popular, for that matter 
– agreement about the social functions of humour beyond it being a social barometer: 
Humour mirrors society, but can it also change it? Both the canon of classical humour 
theories and contemporary psychological, sociological and cultural research 
demonstrate the complex, and often paradoxical, social workings of humour. On the 
other hand, humour has a very simple rhetorical structure – a joke teller entertains a 
joke audience, poking fun at her joke material or butt – and a straightforward 
perlocution: mirth and laughter. For a communication scholar interested in expressive 
culture, it is thus a handy form where complexity and simplicity are married, preparing 
 
 5 
the ground for feasible yet rich research. To sum up, humour that appears in the 
cultural public sphere mirrors, in a particularly strong and accessible way, the social 
and cultural conflicts central to its participants, as well as the norms governing their 
discourse and the shared knowledge they are presupposed to have. The question from a 
public sphere perspective is if humour not only mirrors, but also plays a role in our 
creation of a shared world. It does indeed seem like humour has a great potential to be 
a forceful tool to “not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and 
influentially thematise them”, as Habermas (1996, p. 369) states are central functions 
of the public sphere. 
Second, politics is one of the most serious human activities that can be 
imagined – at least if we adhere to Elster’s emphasis on the goal-oriented nature of 
politics, where he also indeed often uses the word “serious” to characterise the 
workings of the public sphere (1986, pp. 126-127). Humour, on the other hand, seems 
to be the opposite of this, not only because of its uncivil sides like mockery and 
ridicule, but also – and more fundamentally – because of its character of non-
commitment and non-telos. Humour is a non-serious activity, since it has a loose 
relationship to truth or ‘real’ intentions – it is not bona fide (Mulkay, 1988, pp. 22-26; 
Raskin, 1985, p. 140). A joke rests on the premise that it is not to be taken seriously, as 
well as that it is being told just for its own sake. However, humour and comedy being 
non-serious forms of discourse is the basis that allows humour to be used for serious 
purposes (Mulkay, 1988, pp. 90-92). This tension between the purpose of the public 
sphere and the particularities of humour is the main reason for why we should research 
the relationship between the two. Do its particularities mean that humour can only be 
destructive from a public sphere perspective, or can it do good as well? Perhaps these 
particularities can even allow humour and comedy to do something in the public 
sphere that other genres and modalities cannot, following Habermas (2006b) later 
ideas about a wild public sphere where also speech acts that do not comply with the 
ordinary normative criteria of deliberative democracy can contribute to democracy? 




1.1.1. Three main arguments 
This thesis is composed of many case studies from three different countries, grouped 
together in chapters as they illuminate different aspects of the relationship between 
immigration comedy and the wider discourse on immigration. The cases are very 
diverse in various ways, and the role they play in the public sphere should be 
understood as highly contextual and contingent. They nevertheless form a whole 
through contributing to the three main arguments in this thesis, which are the 
dissertation’s main contributions: A methodological, an empirical and a theoretical 
argument.   
The methodological argument states that the relationship between the cultural 
and the political public sphere, when it comes to opinion formation, best can be 
analysed through historical studies that take the texts of the public sphere into account, 
what I call a textual-historical view of public opinion formation. Habermas’ bourgeoise 
public was a reading public (2002, pp. 34-41), and with the modern audio-visual mass 
media and the modern concept of text, modern publics are listening, watching, 
gaming, chatting, writing, sampling publics, to paraphrase Warner (2002, p. 89). It is 
through texts the actors of the public sphere have agency. To really understand public 
opinion formation, the study of texts is thus indispensable and even enjoys a privileged 
position. This does of course not mean that we should quit studying audiences or 
institutions, or that texts should be considered in some kind of social vacuum, but that 
studies paying attention to the content of what goes on in the public sphere, in other 
words text-oriented studies, have the strongest explanatory power when accounting for 
opinion formation. Paying attention to the text is also a strategy for understanding 
what texts of specific modes and genres, like humour and comedy, do differently than 
other texts and genres, thus being able to do analytical generalisations. That being said, 
my aim is not to conduct literary analysis for its own sake, but to understand how the 
texts were used to do things in the public sphere, how this was constrained by their 
context and how we can conceptualise any impact of the textual actions – in other 
words, a rhetorical and historical way of analysing texts. This also entails that I in 
some cases will be most concerned with the comedy texts themselves, in other cases 
with their reception – which of course also consists of texts. As these anticipatory 
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methodological remarks perhaps indicate, there will be few explicit mentions of this 
argument in the case studies. My hope is rather that the proof is in the pudding, and 
that the dissertation as a whole manages to defend this claim.   
The methodological argument is powered by the empirical argument, which 
states that Scandinavian immigration comedy at large has played an important role in 
the treatment of the immigration issue as a part of the contestation and negotiation of 
the boundaries of the public sphere. According to Midtbøen, Steen-Johnsen, and 
Thorbjørnsrud (2017), the public sphere and free speech are characterised by constant 
boundary struggles of different kinds. They use a threefold approach where they 
discuss how different types of speech acts are deemed illegitimate, how different 
exclusionary mechanisms limit the participation of social groups in the public sphere 
(akin to the revisionist critics of Habermas, see Fraser (1992)), and how individuals 
themselves draw up boundaries as parts of inclusion or exclusion in the public sphere 
(Midtbøen et al., 2017, pp. 25-26). I will show that all these processes are visible in 
my material, in very diverse forms. In addition, I will argue that the manners in which 
these comedy events have been a part of different boundary struggles have been 
significant, for two reasons. First, because comedy seems to be able to do things that 
are rarely done in the serious public sphere. Second, supporting the barometer thesis of 
humour, all these events have played out on the background of important dimensions 
of the immigration debate, as well as on the background of important historical 
changes in the public sphere as large. To put it briefly, even if it is hard to point 
towards causal consequences, it can be argued that comedy and the cultural public 
sphere mattered by seeing what kind of actions it did, by doing a special form of work 
in the public sphere.  
So, what is it that comedy can do that is so special? This leads me to the 
theoretical argument, which pertains to how humour in general works in the public 
sphere. Both academic and lay understandings of humour tend to label humour and 
comedy as either conservative or radical. My claim is that humour is both things at the 
same time, and that this is key to understand any special role it can play in the public 
sphere. This argument is based on the view of humour as essentially Janus faced: it 
thrives from a tension between the well-known, easily accessible, conventional, 
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accepted, conservative and perhaps even suppressive; and the novel, complex, 
creative, transgressive, radical and perhaps even subversive. It is impossible to 
succeed with a joke without basing it on the knowledge, and probably also values and 
attitudes, of your audience. On the other hand, the best jokes contain a real element of 
surprise. This again is based on a more fundamental tension between the unseriousness 
of humour as a communicative mode and how it through this is used to conduct 
serious actions in the world. Finally, these tensions bring with them a third tension 
between humour as emotional investment and as emotional detachment, which again is 
connected with how humour works both as a mediator of positive emotions, like joy 
and communitas, and as a mediator of negative emotions, like embarrassment and 
anger. Thus, it seems like humour is so diverse and complex that it can have many 
different functions in the public sphere, but that these functions typically are based on 
the interplay between humour’s conventional and creative aspects. What I aim to show 
is how immigration comedy often uses well known and hegemonic ideas and 
representations from the public discourse on immigration and twists them a little bit in 
order to do something new, which in turn can have consequences in the serious parts 
of the public sphere. That being said, the political and social force of purely 
conservative comedy cannot be negated. I will show that humour’s use of the well-
known carries a potential for a pure reproduction of it, and also that any newness 
humour brings into the world is far from radically new.  
 
1.1.2. The term “immigration comedy” and the dissertation’s relation to 
migration studies 
The object of study in this dissertation is immigration comedy. This is a concept I have 
coined myself and refers to comedy – by immigrants or non-immigrants – that is about 
the immigration issue in one way or another. Comedy should here be understood very 
broadly as an entertainment genre with humour as its dominating element. The reason 
I introduce a new concept, instead of using well-established terms like ethnic humour 
(Davies, 1990; Gillota, 2013) or racial humour (Lockyer & Pickering, 2008; Pérez, 
2013), is that the comic material I am looking at first and foremost is related to the late 
modern phenomenon of mass migration with everything that it entails. Thus, the jokes 
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are not only about ethnicity or race, but also about xenophobia, the government’s 
handling of immigration policy or well-meaning people from the majority who do not 
know how to behave around immigrants. This is also the background for why I from 
this point on (mainly) will use the word “immigration” instead of “migration”, as well 
as “immigrant” instead of “migrant”. Although migration and migrants are the 
preferred terms in both contemporary research and policy, and the terms that the UN 
body International Organization for Migration (IOM) advises to use, this has not been 
the case in Scandinavia’s contemporary history. Until recently, migration has been 
seen from the perspective of the receiving countries, and thus as im-migration – people 
migrating to arrive here. This is also mirrored in my material: there are very few jokes 
about transnational relocation, but a lot about what happens when migrants arrive and 
settle in the nation state. The word “immigrant” is also a common term used 
colloquially both by the majority population and by immigrants and is thus useful in a 
historical study like this. There are certainly many important insights that have been 
made in the study of ethnic and racial humour, as well as in ethnic studies and 
migration studies at large, which I will make use of in this dissertation. However, this 
is not a thesis in migration studies: it is first and foremost about humour’s role in the 
public sphere.  
That being said, the immigration issue is not randomly chosen. In addition to 
quantitatively being an important issue in the Scandinavian public spheres, it is 
interesting due to its complexity. It touches upon many aspects of both the lifeworld 
and the realm of professional politics, linking geopolitics, cultural politics, economic 
politics, human rights, welfare politics, city planning and law, as well as evoking many 
dilemmas and causing public engagement. This is also visible in the large amount of 
immigration comedy that has been produced in Scandinavia since the late 1960s. 
Furthermore, although immigration comedy in Scandinavia has been scarcely studied, 
foreign studies of ethnic and racial humour tend to place themselves in two camps: 
Humour optimists, claiming that this kind of humour is normatively good, and humour 
alarmists, claiming that this kind of humour is normatively bad, often even inherently 
racist. Hence, comedy, and especially immigration comedy, feeds into the unavoidable 
normative dimension of public sphere theory in its own particular way. Immigration is 
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thus an interesting issue to use as a case to understand the relationship between the 
cultural and the political public sphere, as well as to understand how modern, mediated 
public spheres at large handle complex issues. This is also the aim of the mother-
project this dissertation is a part of, SCANPUB, which aims at charting, analysing, and 
explaining the public discourse on immigration in the Scandinavian public spheres 
from 1970-2015 (Gripsrud, 2019).  
 
1.2. Research questions and research design 
 
The main research question of this dissertation is How can TV comedy thematising 
immigration contribute to public opinion formation on immigration in the larger 
public sphere? My central interest is what humour and comedy can do in the public 
sphere that other modes and genres cannot. The aim is thus not to empirically establish 
that immigration comedy had any causal consequence in processes of opinion 
formation, but to arrive at analytical generalisations of how humour and comedy can 
be used to do different kinds of work in the public sphere, which one theoretically can 
argue should be seen as contributions to processes of opinion formation. The word 
“how” is chosen as it points towards both the kind of work comedy can do, and how it 
can use the particularities of the humorous mode to do so. I will answer the main 
research question through a set of historical, text-oriented case studies of comedy and 
its reception in the three Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, and 
through the following sub-questions:  
 
1. How can comedy events be historicised as parts of changes in the public sphere and 
its treatment of the immigration issue in Denmark, Norway and Sweden? 
2. How are questions of immigration addressed and negotiated in the comedy texts 
that are part of such events? 
3. How are questions of immigration addressed and negotiated in the public comedy 




These three questions are thought of as complementary. The aim of RQ1 is to identify 
when comedy was a part of moments of change in the public sphere, which potentially 
influence the process of opinion formation as well. Such moments are therefore 
especially interesting cases for my purpose. RQ 2 and 3 are then aimed at 
understanding how respectively comedy texts and comedy reception have been used to 
intervene in the immigration discourse. Taken together, the questions show how 
comedy contribute to the public sphere as a part of various historical processes. 
Historicisation is a tool to provide a richer context than what can be done in a typical 
work of textual analysis, discourse analysis or rhetorical criticism. The question of 
how comedy’s interventions can be seen as contributions to opinion formation can 
hence be answered with more solid empirical and theoretical backing.   
   A comedy event should here be understood as similar to a discursive event 
(Foucault, 2002), where the instance of discourse, or enunciation, both stages and 
alters the discourse system itself. Ultimately, this can lead to ruptures, changes, in the 
discourse system. I do not, however, follow Foucault precisely here, as I see a comedy 
event as something existing on a higher level than the single enunciation, for example 
the advent of immigrant comedians into an until then ethnoculturally homogenous 
comedy scene. In order to answer RQ 1, such comedy events were identified, which 
also included interpreting them in order to understand what they meant as changes. 
This has been done by using knowledge of the historical context in order to establish 
how the changes in the immigration comedy also intersected with other changes in the 
public sphere, for example how the advent of immigrant comedians was a part of the 
larger process where immigrants gained a voice. This kind of hermeneutic circle was 
thus also the background for my selection of cases: Interpreting my primary material 
in relation to its historical context made it clear which of the comedy events that were 
theoretically most interesting. It should thus be emphasised that this is not the history 
of how TV comedy on immigration has played a role in the Scandinavian public 
spheres. Instead of giving a comprehensive survey or a linear history, I will rather 
write a history of probes: moments in history that can be used to think about the 
relationship between comedy and the serious immigration discourse with a foundation 
in theory, and thus be used for analytical generalisation. This kind of locally oriented 
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st – in terms of focusing both on a moment in history and on certain theoretical 
problems – oriented study is of course also a historical study (Kjeldstadli, 1999, pp. 
112-115): One can write history without writing a history. 
The rationale behind the historical dimension in the project is thus to detect 
changes in the public sphere and identify comedy events that one can argue were 
contributions to processes of opinion formation2. The original plan was to follow the 
SCANPUB project and start in 1970, but due to the character of my object of study, 
my first case is from 1989. Immigration comedy did exist in the 70s, actually in an 
interestingly large amount when taking the relatively low number of immigrants into 
account, but it was nevertheless a scattered affair, and this type of comedy became 
really visible in the public sphere from the late 80s. From this point, it is possible to 
spot significant comedy events across programmes and countries. Following this, the 
dissertation is structured in chapters that each discusses a set of similar cases that can 
be seen as such events, mainly one case from each of the three Scandinavian countries. 
Two sets of cases concentrate on the comedy shows themselves, while two 
other sets concentrate on reception of comedy shows. The first two sets answer RQ 2. 
Texts are here viewed rhetorically: they are a way of doing something in the public 
sphere. Immigration comedy addresses the ongoing negotiations of the immigration 
issue, and their meaning – in a narrow sense, but also their social meaning as a part of 
changes in the public sphere – should be understood by explaining how they are 
interventions in these negotiations (Skinner, 2002, pp. 114-115). Since the comedy 
shows are very diverse, I will not have an over-arching analytical strategy for their 
analysis. Textual analysis is at its most interesting when one takes the particularities of 
the text at hand as a starting point. This does of course not mean that I will read the 
texts in a naïve, theory-free way. I have already mentioned the core assumption of my 
analysis: that texts do something. My second core assumption is that this is done by 
means of the particularities of the humorous mode, and the natural emphasis in the 
analyses will be on the particularities relevant in the text at hand.  
 
2 The exception is the analysis of the controversy on Ali Reza and the Rezas in chapter 5, which rather 
serves as a counterexample to make clearer the importance of the two other events discussed in the 
same chapter.  
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RQ 3 will be answered by analysing the reception of selected comedy events. 
The rhetorical view of texts is employed here, too, as each single instance of comedy 
reception of course is an intervention into the treatment of the immigration issue in the 
same way as comedy texts themselves are. However, serious texts in the form of news 
and debate are less complex than comedy texts, and the sum of them is more 
interesting than its parts. I therefore employ a more uniform approach here, namely 
Potter and Wetherell’s notion interpretive repertoires, “a lexicon or register of terms 
and metaphors drawn upon to characterise and evaluate actions and events” (1987, p. 
138). At the same time, the particularities of humour are central also in the analysis of 
these cases, where I include more than just the rhetorical and aesthetical devices of 
comedy: the social and cultural views and understandings of humour are important 
constituents of the interpretive repertoires that are used in the reception of comedy.  
Regarding my material, television comedy is prioritised because it can be 
argued – as I do in the theory chapter – that the medium of television enjoyed a 
privileged position in Western, late modern national public spheres at least until 
around 2010. Comedy on TV does however not exist in a vacuum, and one of the 
chapters is mainly concerned with stage comedy. The material is drawn from the 
Scandinavian countries – Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. The aim is not to compare 
the three countries in a strict sense, but to use the small differences between the 
perhaps most similar nation-states in the world, both in terms of culture, political 
system and media system (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012; Gripsrud, 2019), as a tool 
to understand how fine-grained cultural and historical context matters for how the 
texts of the public sphere are put to work. In addition, the comparative dimension 
allows me to identify similar comedy events that have happened across different 
national contexts, and thus can be argued to be more significant. Finally, writing about 
my home country and two neighbouring countries is a fruitful strategy for handling my 
positionality as a researcher. Sweden and Denmark have the quality that 
anthropologists call strange: unfamiliar but not totally different. This produces more 
insight than what a focus solely on Norway would, as that would tap into my everyday 
life, habitus and silent knowledge to a much larger degree. It is easy to ignore the 
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obvious in cultural research, but distance might make what was once obvious 
conspicuous. 
 
1.3. A short introduction to Scandinavia’s political systems, media systems, 
immigration history, and comedy scenes 
 
The three Scandinavian countries – Norway, Sweden and Denmark – have a shared 
history as well as many political, social and cultural similarities. They are all based on 
the so-called Nordic Model, characterised by a comprehensive welfare state and a 
labour market with collective bargaining, a model shared with neighbouring countries 
Iceland and Finland. Unlike these latter countries, the Scandinavian countries also 
have mutually intelligible languages. The three countries are small (at the time of 
writing with populations between 5 and 10 million), constitutional monarchies with 
multiparty, unicameral systems. Social democratic and liberal-conservative parties 
have been the de facto leaders of their respective political wings all over Scandinavia, 
although the dynamics between the parties and across political wings differ between 
the countries – for example, the Social Democrats have more often formed minority 
governments and collaborated with the political centre in Denmark than in the two 
other countries (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012, p. 11; Gripsrud, 2019, p. 134). Worth 
noting in the context of this thesis is that all countries have a right-wing populist party 
profiling themselves on anti-immigration – Fremskrittspartiet (The Progress Party, 
Frp) in Norway, Fremskridtspartiet (The Progress Party) and later Dansk Folkeparti 
(Danish People’s Party, DF) in Denmark and Sverigedemokraterna (Swedish 
Democrats, SD) in Sweden, but these parties have very different histories and have 
played different roles. 
Scandinavia is characterised by a democratic corporatist media system (Hallin 
& Mancini, 2004), where particularly the high newspaper circulation and the strong 
position of the public service broadcasters – DR in Denmark, NRK in Norway and 
SR/SVT in Sweden – is important to mention. The tree broadcasters had monopoly 
until around 1990, so their television channels where until then practically the only 
choice for the majority of the population that had no access to satellite or cable 
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television. This indicates that the national public spheres of the three countries 
historically have been strong, as they were able to connect audiences from various 
social strata and make them into a national public – which also makes Scandinavia a 
good (albeit perhaps a bit too ideal to be representative) context to study the workings 
of the cultural public sphere. It should also be noted that humour and comedy has been 
an important part of public service television in the three countries, as it has been seen 
as a way to both attract audiences to the channels and to fulfil their public service 
missions of creating socially relevant programming (Bruun, 2011, pp. 127, 146-149; 
L. O. Larsen, 2001; Sjögren, 1997, pp. 19-23; Ytreberg, 2001, pp. 236-238, 253-257). 
When it comes to immigration history, we can spot some differences between 
the three Scandinavian countries. Both in terms of admittance and in terms of 
integration policy, Denmark has been more restrictive, Sweden more liberal, while 
Norway occupies a sort of middle position (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012, p. 4). This 
is also mirrored in the immigration discourse, as the Swedish press coverage appears 
most immigration friendly, Denmark least so – and Norway again in the middle 
(Gripsrud, 2019, p. 133). This is yet another reason for why Scandinavia is an 
interesting context for investigating immigration humour – as the three countries are 
so similar but nevertheless seem different when it comes to the public treatment of the 
immigration issue, both in discourse and material politics. That being said, the three 
countries also share many patterns here. This thesis is not the place to dig deep into 
these, but some need to be mentioned. Until WW2, all three countries were 
ethnoculturally very homogenous (ibid, p. 132), then labour immigration started to 
arrive in Sweden immediately after the war and to the two other countries from the 
mid 60s on. Yugoslavs and Finns were the major groups arriving in Sweden, while 
many Pakistanis arrived in Norway and many Turks in Denmark. In the 1970s, all 
three countries introduced a halt to labour immigration, but asylum immigration and 
family reunification, mainly from Asian countries, escalated from the 1980s on and 
was the dominating source of immigration until 2004, when labour immigration again 
increased as a result of the EU extension eastwards. In 2012, 19 percent of the 
Swedish, 10 percent of the Danish and 13 percent of the Norwegian population had an 
immigrant background (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012, pp. 8-9).  
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There are multiple patterns in the immigration discourse that are shared 
between the three countries, but I will only mention two here, which are 
interconnected: culturalization and the problematisation of difference. Culturalization 
pertains to how the immigration issue gradually has turned into a question of cultural 
differences between immigrants and the majority population, a tendency both 
qualitative and quantitative studies have demonstrated (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019, p. 
145; Yılmaz, 2016). This can be coupled with the problematisation of difference: how 
this cultural difference is understood as a social problem. Many scholars using 
qualitative methods have argued that this kind of problematisation is hegemonic in the 
immigration discourse in all the three countries (Brune, 1998; Gullestad, 2002a, 2004; 
Hervik, 1999, 2004), and quantitative studies lend some support that at least problem-
orientation indeed is dominant in the contemporary immigration discourse (Hovden & 
Mjelde, 2019). As we shall see, immigration comedy also digs into this issue. 
The professional comedy scenes in the three countries have historically been 
dominated by revue, which in its Scandinavian version is a combination of literary 
cabaret and a more lavish variety shows. Content and aesthetic formulas have largely 
travelled between the three countries, and there has been an open door between the 
revue milieus and the entertainment divisions in the public broadcasting stations. That 
being said, a certain opposition has always existed between the conservative impulses 
of professional revue and the more radical and young television artists – who 
nevertheless have tended to have their comedy education from revue as well as work 
in revue later in their career. Revue is popular both as amateur entertainment and in its 
professional-commercial form, but has never gained a high artistic status in Norway 
and Denmark. In Sweden, on the other hand, artists like Povel Ramel and Hasse & 
Tage became critically acclaimed and ventured to some degree into the realm of fine 
arts. They also had a strong connection to student milieus through student revues, 
called spex. This is perhaps the reason why revue seems to have enjoyed a stronger 
position on Swedish television in the 70s and 80s than in the neighbouring countries, 
where formats developed especially for television, influenced by comedians working 
at the BBC, dominated – an influence that also was visible in Sweden (Bruun, 2011, 
pp. 32-35; L. O. Larsen, 2001; Sjögren, 1997, pp. 156-182). Since the early 1990s, 
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stand-up comedy became an alternative – and again an opposition – to revue, which 
also opened the door for new types of Anglo-American influence. There has also 
always been broadcast longer formats like sitcoms, comedy dramas, farces, and 
comedy films in Scandinavia, but the 1990s was nevertheless a period where sitcoms 
heavily inspired by the new sitcom-wave from the USA were introduced to 
Scandinavian screens as a ‘new genre’. 
Television comedy is a popular entertainment genre in Scandinavia, but it 
should be noted that viewed from the production side, it appears more exclusionary. 
TV comedy has until recently been produced by self-organised, relatively independent 
editorial offices who have also been in charge of recruitment (Bruun, 2011, pp. 127-
169; Sjögren, 1997, pp. 180-238; Ytreberg, 2001, pp. 79-114), which obviously is a 
way to reproduce the same tastes, sensibilities and production cultures of a small 
clique. Furthermore, the comedians largely have a middle-class background and tend 
to come from the nation’s capitals, a tendency especially strong in Sweden with its 
spex-tradition, and where the so-called “Gothenburg humour” in the 70s and 80s saw 
itself as an oppositional alternative to the hegemonic comedy scene in Stockholm. 
Ethnocultural diversity has been scarce until recently. On the content side, television 
comedy has not been too sensitive to the large oral folk culture of especially jokes, but 
also to some degree to amateur revue and humorous music, which mirrors a very 
different view of the immigration issue, as I will discuss later. Scandinavian television 
comedy thus seems to be a middle-class affair when it comes to the production side, 
even though it is popular in terms of ratings and audience figures.  
When it comes to how immigration has been treated in comedy, I have as 
already mentioned found sketches and revue songs about the issue starting in the late 
60s, but it became a stock topic for comedy in the early 90s and has in quantitative 
terms only become more prominent since then. Comedians with an immigrant 
background appeared in the stand-up scene in the late 1990s, as I will discuss in 
chapter 4, or in the late 1980s if one includes Lasse Lindroth, an adoptee from Iran 
who entered the Swedish comedy scene under the stage name Ali Hussein, and largely 
poked fun at stereotypes about immigrants. Since the late 2000s, comedy shows made 
by immigrants and targeted towards immigrant audiences have been a staple in the 
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public service channels, as I will discuss in chapter 6. However, the most prominent 
butt of the joke in Scandinavian immigration comedy is not immigrants, but those who 
oppose immigration, which will be discussed in chapter 3.  
Regarding the public reception of immigration comedy, the standard response 
has been celebratory: comedy shows poking fun at issues related to immigration have 
been seen as valuable, important and often much needed. That does not mean that 
there has been no controversy, typically accusations of racism, of which I will discuss 
some cases in chapter 5. When it comes to scholarly attention, on the other hand, this 
has been scarce. There have been some mentions of comedy movies in studies on 
Scandinavian migrant and diaspora film (Bakøy, 2010; Hjort, 2005; Wright, 2005), 
where especially the work of Carina Tigervall (2005) should be highlighted as she 
draws on scholarly work on the Swedish immigration discourse at large in her analysis 
of popular comedy movies. Even less attention has been given to TV formats, with the 
recent exceptions of L. O. Larsen (2015), discussing the Norwegian sitcom Ali Reza 
and the Rezas as a space of in-betweenness and its reception as a broadening of the 
public sphere, Rosenfeldt and Hjarvard (2017), who analysed the debate about the 
Danish sketch show Det Slører Stadig as an instance where the cultural public sphere 
was a corrective to the political one by including more frames and voices, and 
Karlsson Minganti (2014), discussing how humour as a norm has been negotiated by 
young Swedish Muslim comedians. The main exception is Berglund and Ljuslinder 
(1999), who in their impressive work Humor som samhällsmoral (Humour as societal 
moral) textually analysed all instances of immigration comedy in the most popular 
Swedish humour shows between 1981 and 1993, as well as conducted focus group 
audience studies around these sketches. They demonstrated that Swedish immigration 
comedy at the time had a clear pro-immigration tendency, a finding I also did and that 
can be extended to Scandinavia as a whole, but questioned its power to challenge 
prejudice and established patterns of thought. Humor som samhällsmoral is clearly an 
important contribution, but lacks the social context of the immigration debate at large 
and is also of course a bit dated. With the exception of the above-mentioned works, the 
study of Scandinavian immigration comedy is hence a largely uncharted territory. 
 
 19 
That being said, it seems peculiar to write about humour and immigration in 
Scandinavia without treating the obvious case: the Mohammad cartoon scandal. That 
is nevertheless exactly what I will do. One reason is that this event is thoroughly 
described and discussed in the scholarly literature, from multiple perspectives. More 
important is its status as an exceptional event. It certainly influenced how immigration, 
and especially Islam, was treated in Scandinavia. In this dissertation, however, I 
choose to rather focus on the everyday workings of the public sphere: less spectacular, 
at most including a small scandal, but probably not less important. After all, it is the 
many small changes and developments that typically alter public opinion and even 









































Chapter 2: The cultural public sphere, humour, and the writing of 
history: theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches 
 
2.1. Public sphere theory as a framework for investigating the political role 
of expressive culture 
 
In its Habermasian version, the public sphere is an independent social arena where 
citizens put forward demands of control and governance over the state, by means of 
public opinion generated through publicity. Democratic decisions should be based on 
domination-free discussions where everyone can participate and does so based on 
norms of rationality in order to reach an outcome that benefits the common good 
(Habermas, 1992, 1996, 2002). In my view, there are two main advantages of public 
sphere theory for the study of the relationship between politics and the arts. The first 
advantage pertains to how a democratic and an epistemic dimension are intertwined in 
public sphere theory: the public sphere is about the formation of attitudes and creation 
of knowledge with the purpose of making political decisions, and pivotal in this 
process is the participation of those who are influenced by these decisions. Any 
constructive, or destructive, potential expressive culture might have for democracy can 
be studied as part of this epistemic-democratic process.  
The normative ideal behind Habermas’ version of public sphere theory has not 
gone uncontested. Critics of Habermas writing from rhetorical and agonistic 
perspectives have argued that it is neither possible nor desirable to reach an agreement 
of what the common good is (Kock & Villadsen, 2012; Mouffe, 1993, 2005b). More 
interesting, in my view, are the revisionist historian critics of Habermas, who argue 
that the idea of a common good has served as a cloak to cover the power relations of a 
public sphere where white, bourgeois men were taken to be the universal standard, and 
that not only the standards of the common good, but also the understanding of what 
counts as matters of common concern was measured by this standard (Eley, 1992; 




This thesis is not the place to continue these theoretical debates, but they 
provide a background for my own normative position that will be used in this 
dissertation. I view the public sphere as an arena for participation and plurality, where 
the value of this participation is connected not only to its democratic merits, but also to 
its procedural epistemic merits. With diverse participation, different perspectives can 
be introduced, and this can be done through different means. This is valuable not only 
due to the non-ideal state of empirical public spheres, as they are not actually 
domination free and thus other means than rational discussion alone might have to be 
employed (Elster, 1986, pp. 119-120; Habermas, 1992, pp. 441-443; 2006b), but also 
because human lifeworld and experience, in all its diversity, will benefit from diverse 
representation in the public sphere also when it comes to form (Arendt, 1958, pp. 175-
176; Fraser, 1992, pp. 125-127; Gripsrud, 2008; Warner, 1992; 2002, pp. 87-89). A 
rational-critical discussion is perhaps the best final step to reach agreement of the 
common good, but to understand the complexity of human lifeworlds, other means, 
like humour and comedy, might be better suited on the road to that point.   
How to understand what should count as a step on this road is a second 
advantage a public sphere perspective has in research on the political relevance of the 
arts. Through the explicit connection between discourse and political action, public 
sphere theory has developed concepts to account for how this connection works in the 
empirical world. This is the tricky matter when studying human activity that not 
explicitly can be seen as political action in the sense of seeking to influence law-
making and governance, for example expressive culture. The concept I will use is 
public opinion formation, which can be used as a heuristic tool to connect the micro 
and macro levels of the public sphere: explaining how what goes on in texts and 
cultural practices are relevant for larger social processes. Furthermore, I will, inspired 
by Hauser, Warner, and Skinner, concentrate on the texts of the public sphere, as it is 
through texts public opinion is accessible to publics, and advance a textual-historical 
view of public opinion formation. I will present this closer in a later section, and first 
elaborate how opinion formation is understood and how it has been dealt with in 




2.1.1. The public sphere as an arena for opinion formation 
In Habermas’ later works, an analytical distinction is made between opinion formation 
and will formation (Habermas, 1987, 2006a), where the former happens in weak 
publics that cannot make any binding decision (Fraser, 1992; Habermas, 2006a). 
Opinion formation is the process of collective learning that yields a communicative 
power (Habermas, 1984, 1987), whereas will formation is the transformation of this 
communicative power into political decisions, mediated by deliberative discourse in 
the political system proper: governments, parliaments and courts (ibid, 2006a). This is 
the background for conceiving the public sphere as a sounding-board and a filter-bed 
that detects societal problems, feeds them into the loop of public opinion formation 
and eventually puts them on the agenda of deciding bodies (Habermas, 1996, p. 143). 
In this model, the mass media play an essential role as a nexus that detects, 
filters and edits the wild flux of published opinions from all the different actors in the 
public sphere (Habermas, 2006a) – from politicians to activists to experts to artists. 
Although Habermas probably imagined quality newspapers as the typical executor of 
this function (Rasmussen, 2016, pp. 60, 92-93), it makes more sense historically and 
sociologically to view television as the central element of the media-based public 
sphere since the WW2. Television gathered the largest audience, it was (in Europe) 
partly integrated with the political system and the nation-state through the public 
broadcasters, and did also to a certain extent bring different social strata of society in 
contact with each other to a larger degree than any other medium (Dahlgren, 1995; 
Gripsrud, 1999, 2010; Murdock, 1999; Williams, 2003) – at least until the internet 
became really prominent. Furthermore, John Ellis (2000) argues that television, due to 
its form of production and phenomenological qualities for its audiences, play a central 
role in modern information societies as “a vast mechanism for processing the material 
of the witnessed word into more narrativized, explained forms” (p. 78), the process of 
working through. Compared to public sphere theory, working through is certainly a 
more open-ended process than opinion formation. This does not mean that it cannot be 
a part of opinion formation, as it, as Ellis argues, is a process that makes the unknown 
more familiar (pp. 85), constantly adds new explanations to difficult material (pp. 79-
80) and returns repeatedly in new ways to the same social antagonisms (pp. 87). 
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Although the process of working through in principle never ends, it might of course 
influence other processes in the social world, and thus be one of many inputs into 
opinion formation. I will not actively use Ellis’ notion in this dissertation, but it is an 
important reminder of how texts and practices that are less directly political 
nevertheless can be important in the shaping of our understanding and attitudes, and 
thus also an important part of the theoretical rationale for my emphasis on television 
comedy. 
A problem raised by perspectives like Ellis’, however, is that when looking at 
opinion formation in the media, it remains a problem to pin down the public opinion. It 
seems too all-encompassing to call everything broadcast on TV, all published 
opinions, public opinion. Although they are publicly accessible, each and every one of 
them cannot be representative for La volonté générale. On the other hand, it seems too 
limited to equate public opinion with the will of the people in the form of the political 
decisions that ultimately are made, as it seems like Habermas to some degree does in 
his later works, as do scholars working within the deliberative systems-paradigm (See 
for example Chambers, 2017; Habermas, 2006a). This would for example exclude 
vibrant and visible public opinions that nevertheless do not turn into policy – at least 
not evidently.  
The best answer is probably a compromise: public opinion is something more 
than empirical published opinions, but also something more than an opinion which 
stands in a 1:1 relationship with policy. A good alternative is to view public opinion as 
a process rather than a product (Hauser, 1998), going on in a public sphere viewed as 
“a medium for the exchange of social experiences with the aim of developing a 
community of action” (Gripsrud, 1990, p. 35, my translation). This is how I 
understand public opinion in this dissertation. A benefit of this process-view for my 
purpose is how it creates an opening for understanding how public opinion formation 
includes more than the ‘pure’ process of deliberation and its outcome. It is likely that it 
is in the processes that need to precede deliberation that expressive culture can play a 
role.  
One example is how public opinion formation entails a certain orientation 
towards if not the common good, at least towards matters of common interest (see also 
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Couldry, Livingstone, & Markham, 2010), but that it is not pre-given what a matter of 
common interest is. This point has been central in the works of many feminist critics 
of Habermas, where especially Nancy Fraser (1989, 1992) has pointed out how issues 
that formerly were seen as private concerns, for example wife battering, have been 
politicised when different social groups have formed subaltern counterpublics, publics 
who in one way or another define themselves as opposed to the hegemonic public, for 
example the feminist movement. As we see, this process of politicisation is a matter of 
access to and participation in the public sphere by those affected by a concrete issue, 
but a central point for Fraser is that it also is a way to change the hegemonic means of 
communication, as new forms of discourse are necessary in order to understand new 
issues as political. This is an explicit opening for the value non-deliberative discourse, 
like expressive culture, can have in the public sphere. 
Fraser is also concerned with how participation in the public sphere and the 
politicisation of needs also is a process that “involves the crystallization of new social 
identities” (1989, p. 303). This is similar to central ideas put forward by another public 
sphere theoretician, Axel Honneth (1995), who also has engaged in debate with Fraser 
(Fraser & Honneth, 2003). Honneth attempts to describe the grammar of social 
conflict through different social groups’ demands of and struggles for recognition from 
society at large. According to Honneth, recognition is the basis for both social 
cohesion and for social change, as it is a way to define both individuals and social 
groups as parts of society on various levels, but also a mechanism through which one 
can claim that one has been disrespected and deserves to get this mended through 
recognition (Honneth, 2007). This way, new dimensions of human life and new social 
groups will eventually be recognised as an important part of the social fabric. There 
are clear overlaps between recognition theory and the idea of politicisation that Fraser 
advocates, but recognition theory provides a more sophisticated account of how 
turning an issue into a matter of common interest also is inherently connected with 
identity formation in the public sphere – and how social and individual identities are 
interdependent. For example, an important part of the history of the labour movement 
was also how the understanding of poverty changed from being a matter of the 
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individual’s responsibility to a matter of the social order, and thus started to fuel social 
organisation around a shared identity: the worker (Johansen, 2019, pp. 376-385).  
Honneth’s understanding of disrespect was originally formulated as a lack of 
sufficient respect regarding the value of a social group’s labour, but I see no problem 
in extending it to include symbolic expressions of disrespect like discriminatory 
rhetoric or hate speech. This also mirrors Taylor’s (1994) conception of recognition, 
which is more explicitly geared towards living together in multicultural societies. In 
such cases, struggles over recognition will also be boundary struggles where different 
types of speech acts are deemed illegitimate in the public sphere. According to 
Midtbøen et al. (2017), institutional elites have the power to draw up and define the 
boundaries of free speech in different ways. This kind of boundary-work is 
continuously challenged, where the debate of what should be defined as hateful 
speech, or even inherently problematic political positions, and thus illegitimate are two 
relevant examples here. These contestations also happen in the public sphere through 
different means.  
The reason for presenting these three different, but related, notions – 
politicisation, recognition, and boundary struggles – is that each of them can serve as a 
more precise concepts that I will draw on to understand how comedy can contribute to 
opinion formation, since they can be used to understand how the process of public 
opinion formation proceeds before it arrives at the stage of deliberation3: It goes 
through the stages of understanding if the issue is political at all, determining the 
social identities of the participants involved and their relation to the public at large, 
and debating whether certain speech acts and political positions are legitimate. All 
these processes are also to some degree meta-debates about the public sphere itself. As 
such, they also have democratic and epistemic values beyond being preparatory stages 
for deliberation: Habermas underlines that the politically relevant workings of the 
public sphere not only consist of directly influencing the political system, but also 
“reflexively […] revitalizing and enlarging civil society and the public sphere as well 
as confirming their own identities and capacities to act” (Habermas, 1996). Public 
 
3 But they are not meant as an exhaustive list of such processes.  
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opinion formation is thus both a thematisation of societal issues and a continuous self-
thematisation – a collective learning process considering both the problems we face 
and the question of who we are (see also Peters, 2008).4  
The question for this thesis then becomes if, and how, the cultural public 
sphere is an arena for different pre-deliberative processes of opinion formation, a 
question which becomes more complicated as the cultural public sphere by definition 
exists for its own sake, not for any political function. 
 
2.1.2. The cultural public sphere 
In Habermas’ account, literature, the arts and their institutions had a pivotal role in the 
development of the European bourgeois public sphere. A central part of this was the 
development of the artworld, where art became an independent institution 
disconnected from its earlier functions in court and church, which created the material 
basis for the idea that art exists for art itself. Due to this idea, art developed into a 
commodity closely intertwined with the market character of bourgeois society – a 
quality that did secure the profanity of art as well as the accessibility of art to 
everyone, at least in principle (see also Adorno, 2013; Bourdieu, 1993; Danto, 1964; 
Habermas, 2002). This made it possible to introduce new areas of the bourgeois life 
experience to artistic treatment, and to construct publics around works of art where 
anyone could discuss them and the lifeworld issues they were about.  
The literary public sphere was thus constituted by autonomy from the other 
spheres of life. This seemingly creates a paradox: by being freed from politics and the 
 
4 This interest in pre-deliberative processes is shared with an important strand in contemporary public 
sphere theory, deliberative systems theory, which aims to go “beyond the study of individual 
institutions and processes to examine their interaction in the system as a whole” (Mansbridge et al., 
2012, p. 2). I will nevertheless not apply this theory, for two reasons: It provides no concrete analytical 
tools that can be used to analyse the actual processes of opinion formation in different parts of 
deliberative systems; and with its systemic emphasis focused on a specific outcome – solving political 
problems through deliberation – it does in my view reduce the different parts of the public sphere to 
the function they have towards the end-goal, and thus excludes reflection of how the public sphere 
also is an arena for self-thematisation regarding both subjectivities and the public sphere in itself. In 
addition, it rectifies public opinion by treating it as something that can be settled once for all.  
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day to day lifeworld concerns, the literary public sphere became a powerful area for 
examining these lifeworld concerns and even for conducting political action. Such a 
claim becomes less paradoxical when taking into account how autonomy was 
instrumental in creating independent institutions necessary for political critique. In 
addition, the activities in the literary public sphere – and perhaps in the public sphere 
in general – can be seen as having a certain play-character, meaning that being less 
goal oriented gave these activities a flair of freedom which again gave them creative 
and political potency (Høibraaten, 2002, p. XL). That being said, since the cultural 
public sphere is constituted by it being separate from the field of politics, there will 
always be a tension between the political and the apolitical aspects of expressive 
culture, with the consequence that we cannot a priori assume that the arts have a 
political function. Rather, we have the burden of proof to demonstrate it in each single 
case. 
As Gripsrud (2008) points out, scholars interested in developing democratic 
theory have not cared too much about expressive culture, which probably is the reason 
for a lack of systematic theory building on the topic. There is, however, not a lack of 
contributions. One can sort these in three branches: Functions-oriented, audience-
oriented and historically oriented.  
Functions-oriented works on the cultural public sphere is probably the most 
diverse branch and seeks to make general theories of the political qualities of different 
modes, media and genres. It is thus characterised by a preoccupation of texts, often 
applying existing concepts from critical theory, visual culture, literary theory or 
rhetorical theory, but also occasionally developing new concepts. Humour and its 
related modes has been a field of interest here, where for example Willett (2008) and 
Hariman (2008) have argued the case for respectively irony and parody’s power to 
provide vitality of free thought in the public sphere. One of the most prominent 
contributions in this branch, however, is about quite another genre, namely Martha 
Nussbaum’s (1995) theory of narrative imagination, where literary fiction is seen as 
an important tool for civic education. To read fiction, according to Nussbaum, is a way 
to train the empathic and compassionate faculties of the reader, important civic 
faculties as they make it possible to understand how an individual’s likelihood to fulfil 
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common human aspirations depends on their social circumstances. In addition, 
empathy and compassion are the basis of a different set of values than the economic-
rationalistic one. Nussbaum rarely refers explicitly to democratic theory in this part of 
her work, but the many references to civic virtue, citizenship and the public sphere as 
well as her complete body of work indicate how the theory is grounded in a liberal 
republicanism (Alexander, 2008) where the public sphere and participation in it is seen 
as paramount.  
Nussbaum’s theory is clearly based on the particularities of literary fiction, 
where the linking of aesthetical features of the text and democratic values is especially 
interesting, as the virtue-ethical framework Nussbaum operates within makes a 
theoretical link between what goes on in the act of reading and the fostering of civic 
values, based on the affordances of fiction. In spite of this solid theoretical 
background, Nussbaum has been criticised for lack of empirical grounding in real-life 
contexts (Keen, 2006, pp. 214, 221-223; Koopman & Hakemulder, 2015, pp. 81-82; 
Moi, 2013, p. 62). Studies based on her ideas struggle to establish the link between 
narrative imagination and empathy happening in the act of reading, and the 
development of empathy and social awareness as a lasting consequence of reading – 
not to mention to demonstrate whether these faculties actually are put to work in a 
civic context or not – for example by changing, or maintaining, public opinion about 
marginalised groups. The same criticism can be extended to Willet and Hariman, 
although they have escaped the kind of critical attention given to Nussbaum, perhaps 
due to a combination of their lesser fame and the relatively sharp divide between 
humour pessimists and humour optimists. With these objections in mind, historical 
research (Hunt, 2007) makes points similar to Nussbaum in this respect by pointing 
out how the reading of fiction was what made possible the development of universal 
human rights. In other words, functional perspectives like narrative imagination cannot 
be simply debunked, but need to be supplemented by more empirically oriented 
research, for example audience-oriented studies. 
 In this second branch of research on the relationship between the cultural and 
the political public sphere, the most famous concept is probably cultural citizenship. 
As defined by Joke Hermes (2006), this pertains to the bonding and community 
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building, and reflection on that bonding, that is implied in text-related practices of 
popular culture. Hermes stresses that popular culture links the domains of public and 
private, as well as offering us an opportunity to ponder our fears, ideals and hopes for 
society – “how popular culture addresses us in our role as citizen” (Hermes, 2006, p. 
28). This approach has – explicitly or implicitly – been  used in multiple empirical 
studies (Hermes, 2005; P. Larsen, 2010; Lindtner & Dahl, 2019; van Zoonen, 2005, 
2007; van Zoonen, Muller, & Alinejad, 2007), including a study on humour by Joanna 
Doona (2016). She suggests that comedy engagement amongst young Swedish adults 
fosters an important alternative route to cultural and political citizenship, that allows 
young people to deal with their experience of uneasiness regarding the media and 
political system while still staying connected to the world of politics.  
The main merits of this approach are the focus on how the cultural pre-
conditions for participation in the public sphere, and thus opinion formation, is 
constructed through text related practices; as well as the attention paid to the role of 
emotions as well as matters of power and exclusionary mechanism. The main critique 
towards the concept of cultural citizenship is that is it fuzzy and hard to operationalise 
in empirical research. As a consequence, the link between cultural engagement and 
political processes becomes spurious and opaque, as Torgeir Uberg Nærland (2019b) 
has claimed. He suggests public connection as an alternative theoretical approach, 
which refers to citizen’s possession of “an orientation towards a public world where 
matters of common concern are addressed” (Couldry et al., 2010) as a minimum 
requirement for functional democracies. Using qualitative interview data combined 
with media diaries as well as background data of his informants’ media usage and 
socioeconomic status, Nærland presents five functions of watching TV series for 
public connection (2019b) and highlights how this is interconnected with social 
background and media repertoires (2019a).  
All these studies and approaches present important insights on expressive 
culture’s role in the public sphere. Common for all of them is, evidently, the focus on 
citizenship in its various guises. This is an important dimension of the public sphere, 
but not the only one. As citizenship is located in the individual, as a quality that 
enables us to participate in the public sphere, it necessarily coincides with opinion 
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formation, but cannot be conflated with it. Ultimately, opinion formation from a public 
sphere-perspective is a question of social change (or lack thereof), rather than a 
question of the qualities and capabilities of the citizens. The branch of research that 
covers this best is the historically oriented.  
This kind of research has often been conducted within the realms of the 
traditional disciplinary fields like Nordic studies (Gripsrud, 1981, 1990; Østberg, 
2018), Dutch studies (Nieuwenhuis, 2017), history (Townsend, 1997), or theatre 
history (Balme, 2014), but also within the broader umbrella of cultural studies 
(Kuipers, 2011; Zijp, 2018, 2019). As a consequence, this line of research is very 
diverse both theoretically and empirically. All the cited contributions do however 
share a combination of textual analysis – even if it sometimes is very rudimentary – 
and contextual analysis, which seeks to understand the nexus between the cultural 
event in question and the common concerns of the public sphere. For example, Balme 
(2014) and Kuipers (2011) look at instances where expressive culture itself – theatre 
and cartoons, respectively – has been the matter up for debate in the political part of 
the public sphere. Townsend (1997) and Østberg (2018) argue that satirical magazines 
were used to carve out a space for critique in the public spheres of the 19th century, 
while Gripsrud (1981, 1990) investigates how amateur theatre played a role in both the 
ideological and the organisational formation of counterpublics. Finally, Zijp (2018, 
2019) discusses the ‘feedback loop’ between the cultural and the political public 
spheres through cases from the Dutch cabaret tradition, taking as starting points both 
cultural products and specific political debates. 
Two of these deserve closer attention. Christopher Balme (2014) has as his 
central thesis that modern theatre best should be seen as a private sphere, despite being 
publicly accessible and legally defined as a public space. This is because modernist 
theatre rarely manages to engage with debates outside the small circle of its special 
interest audience. Although theatre often claims to be politically engaged by having 
political issues as the subject of performances, their treatment of these issues is rarely 
picked up again by the larger public sphere. Thus, the feedback loop is cut off and 
ends in the blackbox, so to speak. Another aspect of modernist theatre’s privacy is 
how it frequently transgresses boundaries of sex, violence and blasphemy, which 
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Balme claims is possible only because going to the theatre in practice is viewed as a 
private matter between consenting adults. In a real public space, these kinds of 
transgressions would be highly problematic. It is in fact on occasions when they are 
picked up in the public sphere outside the theatre that theatre manages to play a role in 
the public sphere as an indicator of social conflict, and sometimes even as a crowbar 
that changes public opinion. Furthermore, Balme argues that these debates rarely fulfil 
the criteria of rational-critical debate, but due to how they regenerate through the 
public sphere, and sometimes even seem to change public opinion, should be seen as a 
part of what Habermas (2006b) calls the wild public sphere, which resists organisation 
and where different forms of communication and expression far from deliberative 
ideals are permissible and even beneficial. 
Balme’s account is interesting, especially as a warning against celebratory 
accounts of the cultural public sphere. He defends his main claim through numerous 
historical case studies starting from the puritan anti-theatre movement in pre-
Cromwellian England to recent debates over depictions of the Prophet Mohammad. He 
shows how, even though the theatrical texts themselves play little role in the debates 
starting in the theatre, the cultural status of theatre and its special location in society 
and the public sphere does play a role in how these debates play out. I will draw on 
this point when analysing the public reception of comedy, which clearly is structured 
by cultural views on humour’s powers and value. Another of Balme’s findings that 
also was visible in my material is how the debates in the public sphere, and thus the 
formation of opinion, also is an arena where different social groups try to seize an 
opportunity to exercise discursive power, for example an international Catholic 
movement in a case where a performance was accused for being blasphemous. 
Balme’s study is exemplary as a demonstration of the value historicisation has in 
understanding how the cultural public sphere plays a role in opinion formation. 
However, when arguing that the theatrical texts themselves have little value, 
he treats the theatre audience in a strange way. Although he mentions how theatre and 
other arts was a way of thematising private experiences of the bourgeois public in 
Habermas’ original model, he does not seem to be open to the idea that something 
similar could happen with a contemporary theatre audience. Actually, it sometimes 
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seems like the only social role he imagines people who watch modernist theatre can 
have is the one of theatre audience. After they watch a performance, they go home, 
never to speak of or think about it again – or to do anything else in the public sphere, 
for that matter. This is of course an exaggeration from my side, but it nevertheless 
illustrates the problems of emphasising the feedback loop model of Habermas’ later 
conceptions of the public sphere too much. It is indeed possible that expressive culture 
that does not generate debate nevertheless plays a role in the public sphere, but what 
this role eventually is needs to be grasped by different concepts and methods.  
An important work in this regard, also with theatre as its object of study, is 
Jostein Gripsrud’s (1990) study of amateur theatre in the New Norwegian language 
movement5 between 1890 and 1940. Although he never uses the concept of camp 
public, developed by Negt and Kluge (1993) and referring to a counterpublic that 
stands in a dialectical opposition to the dominant public sphere, it is relatively clear 
from his writing that he views the New Norwegian language movement as such a 
camp public, which is also supported by his earlier work on the Norwegian labour 
movement’s amateur theatre (1981), where he explicitly uses the concept. From this 
perspective, he analyses both the comedies used in the amateur performances, relates 
them to the writings of Aasen and Vinje, the ideological founders of the New 
Norwegian movement, and situates them in their social context. Based on this, he 
argues that the amateur comedies should be seen as a way to process a set of social 
experiences pivotal to the New Norwegian language movement: The tension between 
modernity and tradition, the tension between the New Norwegian language movement 
and the dominant national public sphere, and the tension between the ‘genuine’ 
 
5 New Norwegian or New Norse, nynorsk, is one of two written varieties of Norwegian. The original 
aim was to construct a written language that formed an abstracted unity from the different spoken 
dialects in Norway, as well as having a clear historical connection to old Norse, as if the Danish 
influence stemming from the personal union with and later colonisation by Denmark never existed. 
New Norwegian has since the beginning been a minority language, and its promotion is the key cause 
for the New Norwegian Language Movement, målrørsla, although together with other, associated 




impulses from farmers and the refinement of these impulses by intellectuals and 
teachers. Furthermore, he argues that this processing of experiences both was a way to 
constitute and control what the New Norwegian language movement should be, as 
well as relating it to the wider, national public sphere. 
Gripsrud’s work combines close reading of texts with great sensitivity to 
historical context, with an emphasis on public debate in a wide sense. It is important to 
note that the social experiences he discusses cannot be conflated with political issues 
in the narrow sense, e.g. the matters that eventually could be put up for deliberation 
and turned into political decisions. Rather, the opinion formation he discusses is the 
formation of opinions about who we are and what the public sphere is. Gripsrud 
demonstrates how this formation can happen in the cultural public sphere, paying 
attention to both the particularities of texts and the particularities of their context, 
including the connection to the wider national public sphere. His work is also 
interesting in light of the barometer thesis of humour, as he argues that when a comedy 
piece mirrors social tensions, it also processes them for its audiences and thus 
contributes to opinion formation. While Balme demonstrates how the feedback loop of 
the public sphere can be useful when studying the politics of art, Gripsrud shows how 
an account of the cultural public sphere that takes one step back from the daily 
newspaper debates has its merits as well. They are both empiricists rather than 
theorists: although public sphere theory is their overarching perspective, they do not 
commit to rigid appliance of theoretical models but have the empirical material as their 
starting points: the texts of the public sphere, interpreted in their particular historical 
context. Their example will be followed in this dissertation, by taking a textual-
historical view of public opinion formation. 
 
2.1.3. A textual-historical view of public opinion formation 
A text-oriented view on public opinion, and even on the public sphere per se, is visible 
in Habermas’ earliest work. Here, public opinion is not manifest, but something that 
can be abstracted from the collective reasoning of the bourgeois public – a result of all 
the texts in circulation. This idea, which is not only an academic conception but indeed 
a part of the bourgeois public’s self-understanding, is inspired both by Kant’s theory of 
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public reason and Rousseau’s idea of the general will. In this respect, it should be 
noted that public opinion here equates will formation legitimated by rational-critical 
discussion, through which the bourgeoisie put forward their demands of control over 
the state, what Hauser (1998) calls the rational deliberation model of public opinion, 
characterised by consensus and empirically tangible through its political outcomes. 
This model is also prominent in Habermas’ late work, where he seems to argue that 
considered public opinion is only really manifested through voting (2006a, p. 418) – a 
strangely reductive view in light of the richness of his earlier thought on the subject.  
As Hauser points out, it is indeed questionable to claim that there is, or ever 
has been, only one single public opinion. Such a view would in its furthest 
consequence remove the conflict dimension from politics and lock down one solution 
as the only correct one, which would privilege one hegemonic project rather than 
being an abstract common good, as Mouffe (1993, 2005a, 2005b) has contested in her 
critique of deliberative democracy. Hauser proposes the alternative of conceptualising 
public opinion as based on actual discursive practices (1998, p. 85). This would entail 
inferring public opinion from the rhetorical exchanges that goes on in all levels of the 
public sphere, although Hauser puts a special emphasis on vernacular rhetoric. He 
argues that a rhetorical model is the best in order to avoid reification of public opinion, 
and rather understand how it emerges and takes form, as well as how it is connected to 
empirical publics and their development of common understanding through dialogue 
with others. I would add that this perspective also allows one to distinguish between 
will formation and opinion formation, as opinion formation as a consequence of this 
thinking cannot be seen as the outcome of a process, but as the process itself, which 
goes through many stages before it eventually turns into ‘general will’. A benefit of 
this conceptualisation is that it makes it possible to investigate how public opinion 
changes and is contested in the empirical world, taking the pluralism and 
differentiation of the public sphere into account. 
This kind of rhetorical, text-oriented perspective is sensitive to process, 
context and contingency, and thus avoids the pitfalls Habermas was accused of in the 
development of his original theory: to ignore the tension between normative ideals and 
the empirical data these ideals are developed from, and as a result produce general 
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sociological categories that are too rigid when applied on the diverse empirical reality 
(DiCenzo, Delap, & Ryan, 2011, p. 196; Habermas et al., 1992; Lindtner, 2014, pp. 
81-82; Tjønneland, 2018, pp. 3-17). Furthermore, Hauser’s model of public opinion is 
actually conspicuously similar to how Habermas paints the development of a 
bourgeois public sphere and the public opinion(s) growing out of it. The bourgeois 
public was a reading public, indefinite in principle through the universal circulation of 
printed material, involved in a dialogue “with themselves about themselves”. This 
makes it clear that the bourgeois public opinion was to be found in the process of 
writing, reading, and discussing – and it can even be argued that the public sphere was 
constituted by print material, as it was both the foundation for and the manifest 
demonstration of public opinion and the social activity that produced it.  
Such a perspective has been advanced by Michael Warner (1990), who claims 
that not only public opinion, but also publics themselves always are constituted by 
rhetorical address. Publics cannot be conflated with empirical audiences or pre-given 
social groups: a public “comes into being only in relation to texts and their circulation” 
(Warner, 2002, p. 50). This, Warner argues, is also the key for the ability publics (and 
public opinion) have to be drivers of social change:  
 
A public might be real and efficacious, but its reality lies in just this reflexivity by 
which an addressable object is conjured into being in order to enable the very 
discourse that gives it existence. 
A public in this sense is as much notional as empirical. It is also partial, since 
there could be an infinite number of publics within the social totality. This sense of the 
term is completely modern; it is the only kind of public for which there is no other 
term. Neither crowd nor audience nor people nor group will capture the same sense. 
The difference shows us that the idea of a public, unlike a concrete audience or the 
public of any polity, is text-based – even though publics are increasingly organized 
around visual or audio texts. Without the idea of texts that can be picked up at 
different times and in different places by otherwise unrelated people, we would not 
imagine a public as an entity that embraces all the users of that text, whoever they 
might be. Often, the texts themselves are not even recognized as texts – as for example 
 
 37 
with visual advertising or the chattering of a DJ – but the publics they bring into being 
are still discursive in the same way. (Warner, 2002, p. 51) 
 
Warner’s conception of publics and the public sphere has the benefit that it reminds us 
that most of our activities in the public sphere consists in looking (or listening) rather 
than talking (2002, p. 63)– in other words, that we are lurkers rather than participants. 
This is in line with more recent critique of the so-called “participatory turn” in 
audience research (Carpentier, 2011; Livingstone, 2013), which has been criticised 
both for ignoring how people most of the time engage with the media (Costera Meijer 
& Groot Kormelink, 2015) and larger political and ethical questions on not only 
advancing, but also being responsive to political demands (Dreher & Mondal, 2018). 
For my purpose, it also has an advantage over Hauser’s rhetorical model, as the latter 
is heavily based on an idea of the importance of vernacular rhetoric, meaning that 
ordinary people talk together and participate in other ways in the rhetorical exchanges 
that make up public opinion, similar to Mansbridge’s (1999) conception of everyday 
talk, and more recent empirical studies of how talk sparked by other genres and modes 
can be considered as vernacular, political rhetoric (Andersen, 2020; Iversen, 2018; 
Vatnøy, 2017). Although it is established that comedy watching is a social experience 
of which talk is an important part (Bore, 2011a, 2011b), which also sometimes can be 
considered as political participation (Doona, 2016), there is namely little trace of this 
kind of talk in my empirical material. As it is drawn from historical sources, any 
informal everyday talk is of course lost, but there is also limited reception material to 
be found in form of letters to the editor, debate pieces, or comedy critique. The main 
bulk of comedy programmes – also the very popular ones – roll over the screens 
without sparking public conversation besides PR material. This makes it more 
pertinent to look see how the comedy texts themselves address their public, but also 
how they relate to other texts, comic and serious, and how they construct a common 
world – what Warner calls the poetic world making of publics. This is yet another 
place where the particularities of humour and comic discourse come to the forefront, 
as different forms of discourse have different qualities, which again provide their 
publics with different agency in this poetic world making – which ultimately have 
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political significance. To paraphrase Warner again: where a rational-critical discussion 
scrutinises, asks, rejects, opines, decides, judges; comedy ironicises, ridicules, mocks, 
fools around, plays, celebrates. 
It should be mentioned that Warner stresses that not all publics have a 
connection to the public: the public which more or less is synonymous with the polity 
and thus is key to the governing power of the public sphere. This is an important 
precaution: many of the texts circulating in publics and counterpublics play no 
political role in the sense that they are directly or indirectly relevant from the 
perspective of dominant public, they do not contribute to the kind of opinion formation 
that again might play a role for will formation, also not in the indirect ways sketched 
above. Moreover, Warner questions if publics based on a different discursive agency 
than the one given by reading and possessed by the model bourgeoise public can have 
any agency towards the state at all. These points serve as important warnings against 
overestimating the political power of e.g. expressive culture: not everything that goes 
on in the wild public sphere (Habermas, 2006b) has political significance and we need 
a method in order to determine what has.  
Hauser’s model can be useful in this respect. It is based on a dialogue around 
an issue, which clearly has a link to the public as a polity. This is also a theoretical 
motivation for concentrating on comedy that thematises one such specific political 
issue – immigration. Their differences aside, what Warner and Hauser has in common 
is their emphasis on how neither publics nor public opinion is to be found in single 
texts, but rather in rhetorical exchanges (Hauser) or concatenation of texts through 
time (Warner). What they both lack is a historical perspective. A useful complementary 
perspective for this project is therefore the historical close reading principle developed 
by Quentin Skinner (2002). He claims that the best way to explain ideas and utterances 
from the past is to understand them as parts of interventions in their contemporary 
debates, thus seeking the text’s historical intention. Developed for the field of history 
of ideas, and not explicitly touching upon the question of public opinion and certainly 
not the interpretation of comedy texts, Skinner’s insights might at first appear less 
relevant, but they are based on more general linguistic and historical principles and 
thus transferable to new contexts. Skinner claims that the understanding of any 
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utterance is dependent on the understanding of the utterance’s illocutionary force, in 
other words, what the utterance was intended to do. The consequence of this is that the 
researcher has to understand the relevant context of the utterance, in order to grasp it 
as communication and thus a sort of intervention into this very context. Interpreting an 
utterance, or a text, thus involves “recapturing the presuppositions and purposes that 
went into the making of it” (p. 115). This is a historical way of interpreting texts, and a 
rhetorical way, interested in intentions. These intentions, however, are not a 
psychological or cognitive entity, they are “intentions embodied in their [utterances] 
performance” (p. 120). It is what the texts intend, their illocutionary force, that is 
interesting, not what their creators thought.  
 The insights of the three scholars discussed in this section are the basis for my 
textual-historical view of public opinion. Here, public opinion is viewed as created by 
texts, through their constituting of rhetorical exchanges around issues, addressing 
people as particular publics and contributing to poetic world making. The texts are 
thus doing something, a something that only can be interpreted by looking closely at 
the particularities of the texts themselves, but also at their historical context by relating 
them to other texts. My interest does thus not lie in the texts themselves, but how they 
are a part of the public treatment of the immigration issue. This has also served as a 
rationale to look after similar cases both within and across the countries: When 
different texts do similar things, it can be argued that they are indicative for historical 
change and important tendencies in public opinion formation. As opinion formation 
and will formation are forms of action that are carried out through texts, the historical 
processes of doing things with texts is where the process of opinion formation in the 
public sphere become manifest and can be studied.  
Following this, one question that remains for the empirical researcher is to 
answer how very different texts, often operating within very different logics, can be 
meaningfully related in order to do a sound, hermeneutic exegesis of public opinion 
and opinion formation, which will be discussed in section 3 of this chapter. Another 
question, equally relevant, is the how-question: Not just what was done, but how it was 
done, by the main features of the texts that are the object of research here: comedy and 
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comedy reception. This makes it paramount to understand the rhetorical, cultural and 
social particularities of humour.  
 
2.2 Humour and comedy: between suppressive and subversive, serious and 
unserious 
 
Quite a lot of scholarly energy has been invested into developing a theory of what 
humour is and what social significance it has. In this dissertation, I use a working 
definition of humour as a communicative mode in which something is interpreted as 
being funny, with the aim of provoking mirth and laughter. “Mode” should here simply 
be understood as a particular means of communication that can be employed across 
different genres and media and that is located on a more general level than things like 
speech acts, rhetorical devices or techniques. Comedy, on the other hand, will be 
defined very broadly as an entertainment genre with humour as its dominating 
element. The reason for these broad definitions is that they allow me to avoid digging 
deep into, and especially to make a definite stand, in the debates over the ‘nature’ of 
humour and comedy. That being said, these debates contain important insights of the 
social, rhetorical and aesthetical properties of humour and comedy, which is where my 
main interest lies.  
Going through the literature on humour, one soon realises that humour and 
comedies have been assigned many functions and qualities that often contradict each 
other. I find it fruitful not to eliminate such tensions, but rather view them as the main 
particularities of the humorous mode. For my purpose, I identify three interesting 
tension pairs that are fundamentally interconnected with each other. Most central in 
this thesis is the tension between humour as a conservative, even suppressive, social, 
rhetorical and cognitive force; and humour as radical, creative or even subversive. A 
tension more fundamental when it comes the ‘nature’ of humour is perhaps its 
character as an unserious mode of communication that can be used for serious means 
(Mulkay, 1988). Finally, humour often brings about emotions and affects normally 
thought of as contrary to each other, like joy and embarrassment or anger and light-
heartedness, but humour is also at times associated with the lack of emotion. To sum 
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up, humour is characterised by ambiguousness and duality along multiple dimensions. 
In this section, I will first show how these tensions are present in the canonical 
theories of humour, and then dig deeper into how I understand them by clarifying how 
they are related to my own humour definition. The social significance of immigration 
comedy is however not just a matter of rhetorical or aesthetic affordances. The social 
and cultural position of humour and comedy is important as well and will be discussed 
in separate subsections.  
 
2.2.1. Three (four) classical theories of humour 
In classical humour theory, superiority theory, incongruity theory, and relief theory 
comprise the canonical trio. Sometimes, a fourth theory is added, often termed 
carnival theory, other times phenomenological theory or even existential theory. As 
many authors have pointed out before me, all these theories have problematic sides, 
and fall short if the aim is to answer what humour is or to explain why we laugh or 
what makes something funny. However, these traditions all have merit in casting light 
on the different social and psychological aspects of humour at work. 
The oldest theory is superiority theory. Going back to Plato and Aristotle’s 
treatment of comedy, the essence of this theory is that we laugh about the misfortune 
of others, we experience schadenfreude and feel superior. The classical formulation of 
this can be found in Hobbes’ Leviathan, where he refers to laughter as something that 
rises from our experience of “sudden glory” (1991 [1651], p. 43) when we observe the 
misfortune or silliness of others. This view has also been connected with the ability to 
suspend empathy and emotional engagement – if not, we would feel pity instead of 
glory and mirth when we observe the misfortune of others – for example by Henri 
Bergson, who wrote about the “momentary anaesthesia of the heart” (1914, p. 11). As 
we can see, superiority theory places itself on the suppressive side: Humour is a way 
to express, and perhaps also execute, power and social division. As such, it is a serious 
mode. At the same time, superiority theory also tends to be based on humour’s 
unseriousness, or at least detachment, when it is based on the premise that empathy 
needs to be suspended when interpreting something as funny. This also points towards 
how humour is based on suspension of some emotions, “a momentary anaesthesia”, 
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but also on the propagation of other emotions – a sudden glory on the expense of 
others. This could also lead to negative emotions for the person laughed at, a view that 
has been most sophistically advanced by Billig (2005b) in his contemporary version of 
superiority theory, where laughter essentially is viewed as ridicule.  
Relief theory originates from the psychological theory where the original 
meaning of the word “humour” is to be found, referring to the four fluids that made up 
a person’s temperament. Relief theory followed the developments in psychology and 
turned first into a theory of how laughter served to release nervous energy, then into a 
part of Sigmund Freud’s theory of the unconscious. The basic point in Freud’s joke 
theory (1976) is that joke telling is a way to satisfy certain desires in spite of an 
obstacle – whether that be socially or psychologically. Psychologically, the obstacle 
consists of suppressing certain thoughts, or more precisely by occupying certain 
mental pathways – an inhibition. Maintaining such inhibitions demands psychological 
energy and thus creates tension, which is released when a joke is told. This sudden 
surplus of energy results in laughter and a feeling of joy, relative to the amount of 
energy that was used to create the psychological inhibition. It should also be noted that 
Freud distinguishes between non-tendentious and tendentious jokes. In the latter 
category, which according to Freud are the funnier ones as they release larger amounts 
of energy, jokes are a socially acceptable way to express socially unacceptable content, 
such as hostility or smut. Humour thus becomes a tool to treat social taboos in a safe 
way. The tension between negative and positive emotion in humour is obvious in 
Freud’s relief theory, as is the tension between serious and unserious – the joke is a 
free space where one can get away with things that normally would be inappropriate, 
and thus actually carry out aggression or sexual forwardness. The tension between 
conservative and radical is perhaps not as obvious, but the joke as a free space is the 
key also here: As a free space, escaping the rules, it is radical, but since this only is 
allowed in the context of joking, by using joke techniques, the joke is at the best 
irrelevant, perhaps even conservative as it serves as a safety vault for the uneasiness of 
civilisation, and therefore works to maintain social order by diverting any energy that 
could be used for change.   
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More prominent in modern psychological research, perhaps because of the 
dominance of cognitive perspective with its affinity for models of mental 
representations, is incongruity theory. Incongruity is here viewed as a necessary 
precondition for humour, where two normally disparate ideas, concepts, or situations 
are put together in an unexpected manner. In addition to psychologists, this theory is 
also popular among linguists (Raskin, 1985), and it also had its fair share of attention 
from canonical thinkers, from Aristotle over Cicero to Schopenhauer. Most famous is 
perhaps Kant, who defines laughter as “an affection arising from the sudden 
transformation of a strained expectation into nothing” (1987 [1790], p. XX). Kant’s 
definition shows that also incongruity theorists have paid attention to the affective 
dimension, while the subversive/suppressive tension has been less central. An 
exception is Henri Bergson (1914), who argued that the source of humour is the 
incongruity between the organic, flexible human intelligence and habitual behaviour 
“something mechanical encrusted upon the living” (p. 49), which also includes a social 
correction where the inflexible and mechanical is the butt. The unserious, on the other 
hand, is central in incongruity theory, as the incongruous elements combined in 
humour would not be combined in ordinary and serious thinking or communication.  
Besides this canonical trio, there exists a long tradition of a ‘humorous outlook 
of the world’, which thus can be named an existential (Lippitt, 1996) or 
phenomenological (Kuipers, 2008) theory. This tradition originally stems from the 
cynic philosopher Diogenes and was reborn in modern philosophy in the works of 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Influenced by Nietzsche, the most famous contemporary 
work within this theoretical perspective is probably Mikhail Bakhtin’s Rabelais and 
his world (1968), which connects the renaissance writer Rabelais to a rich tradition of 
folk humour that culminated in the carnival, the background for yet another name of 
this theory family, carnival theory. In Bakhtin’s account, the humour of the carnival 
forms an alternative sphere to the official, serious everyday world. More contemporary 
theorists propounding some sort of phenomenological theory include Zijderveld 
(1982), Mulkay (1988), Willett (2008) and Hariman (2008). What is shared by all 
these accounts is an emphasis on humour’s non-seriousness and ambiguity, and its 
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potential for fostering freedom and a special kind of community6. The unseriousness 
of humour is central here, which Mulkay (1988, pp. 22-38) understands as how the 
humorous mode is used to construct incongruity and congruity at the same time, what 
he calls interpretive duality, as opposed to serious discourse where one as a rule should 
strive to solve incongruities and ambiguities. Unseriousness in this account is thus 
something more than a sociological characterisation of joke telling situations: it is a 
special mode of communication that does something radically different than serious 
modes. This paves the way for an understanding of humour as radical, a position 
scholars like Koestler (1964); Zijderveld (1982), Willett (2008) and Hariman (2008) 
have taken, arguing that humour has a potential to foster creativity. There has however 
also been proponents of the opposite view – Mulkay argues that humour is 
predominantly a conservative force in contemporary societies (1988, p. 211), and 
Bakhtin stresses that the logic of carnival is only temporal, and hence actually serves 
to confirm the official, serious everyday system. Phenomenological theories also 
provides accounts of the emotional tensions of humour, in different ways: These 
theories tend to emphasise how humour is saturated with joy and fearlessness, but this 
is at the same time connected with seemingly more gloomy aspects of the world, like 
the acknowledgement of the futileness of all worldly efforts in Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche, or its connection with the grotesque and with brutal violence and death in 
Bakhtin. This seemingly extreme tension is rooted in how humour is seen as a way to 
elevate oneself above the negative emotions associated with these aspects of life – so 
we see that the tension between humour as affective investment and as affective 
detachment is important also in this kind of theory. 
There is no reason to hide that I have an affinity for this kind of perspective. 
Although there are some issues with phenomenological theory, most notably problems 
in operationalising its insights in empirical research as well as an exaggerated belief in 
humour’s goodness and power, it also takes humour’s special features as a starting 
point in order to explain its social functions (Kuipers, 2008), to a much larger degree 
 
6 The exception being Nietzsche, who true to himself focuses on humour’s role towards the 
development of the Übermensch rather than any fostering of community.  
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than other theories. That being said, the other canonical humour theories, and modern 
versions of them, also highlight important social and communicative functions of 
humour.  
 
2.2.2 Humour between serious and unserious, subversive and suppressive, 
detached and involved. 
My definition of humour as a communicative mode in which something is interpreted 
as being funny, with the aim of provoking mirth and laughter, is a slight reworking of 
Ruch’s (2008) definition, where humour is defined as an experience of the perception 
that something is funny. In this psychological definition, the unique experiential 
quality “funny” is associated with a perceived incongruity. Without entering into a 
humour-theoretical debate, I will suggest that when interested in humour’s social and 
cultural aspects, funniness should rather be associated with unseriousness, and 
interpretation is a better concept than experience. This is because the experience of 
incongruities not always elicit fun and mirth, but often rather fear, disgust, or 
puzzlement. The curious connection between horror and comedy has often been 
discussed (Carroll, 1999; Ekeman, 2019; Morreall, 1983), which points towards the 
need to add an extra explanatory dimension to understand how some incongruities are 
funny while others are horrifying, or to say it with Nietzsche, how laughter can be a 
means for managing “to say a joyous Yes to life despite its negative side, despite its 
horrors and suffering” (Lippitt, 1992, p. 41). Understanding humour as an unserious 
mode of communication is helpful here. First of all, it stresses how funniness is not 
only an experiential, psychological quality, but an active, interpretive stance towards 
the world – it is something we can do with texts. Second, unseriousness is a way to 
bracket any serious implications of what is communicated. The illocutionary force of a 
speech act in the humorous form is ambiguous. Humour is both committing and not 
committing. If you say something offensive in the form of a joke, is it then really 
offensive? This points towards the relationship between humour and play (Boyd, 
2004), recalling Bateson’s (1972) account of how the playful nip of a playing animal 
per definition denotes “this is play”, thus not a bite, but also denotes a real bite. This 
tension is what makes it possible to use the unseriousness of humour for serious 
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purposes, for example mocking or maintaining hierarchical relations at the workplace 
(Mulkay, 1988). At the same time, humour’s family semblance to play is also the 
background for its creative and subversive potential, as freedom from serious, 
constraining logics give room for genuinely new meanings (Bateson, 1972; Huizinga, 
1949; Koestler, 1964), but also as a space where the fear associated with serious world, 
where consequences are real and authorities have power, is absent (Bakhtin, 1968, p. 
47; Hariman, 2008).  
As we see, the tension between humour as a conservative or as a radical force 
goes hand in hand with the tension between humour’s unseriousness and seriousness. 
There is however no 1:1 correspondence between seriousness and humour’s 
conservative aspects, and on the other hand between unseriousness and its radical 
aspects. We remember that Bakhtin emphasises how the temporal unseriousness of 
carnival on the end preserved the dominant, official world. On the other hand, satire, 
which is exemplary use of humour for serious purposes, is at least in popular opinion 
viewed as radical – as “speaking truth to power”. Following Schwind (1988), satire is 
characterised by a satirical aggression towards something or someone who exists in 
the world outside the comical text, paired with a reference to social norms. Typically, 
satire thus function disciplinary and corrective towards someone by pointing out how 
they violate one or multiple norms, through different aesthetical means that serve to 
ridicule the butt of satire. This definition does not point toward satire’s radical 
potential, but rather highlights it as a conservative genre, reliant on pointing out how 
existing social norms are transgressed. That being said, it is of course entirely possible 
for satire to be subversive by challenging figures of power who transgresses shared 
social norms. This indicates how the conservative/radical division is less clean cut in 
practice.  
Satire, with its clear moral and topical commitment towards something in the 
world, is also an exemplary sub-genre, or sister genre7, of comedy in order to 
 
7 Satire is typically viewed as a form of comedy, but it does not have to use humour as its main 
element or use humour at all. A better understanding of satire might thus be that it combines critique 
with entertainment (Declercq, 2017; Vigsø, 2019). Since it nevertheless frequently takes the form of 
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understand how humour, despite all its ambiguousness and unseriousness, is 
nevertheless always about something or someone. Jokes have a reference - something 
we laugh about, commonly called the target or the butt – and it is part of a social 
practice, where typically the joke-teller, or the comedian, tells a joke to the joke 
listener, or the audience – while the butt/target is a third person, or a thing. This simple 
tripartite joke structure was originally coined by Freud (1976), and is useful in order to 
discuss humour’s social and communicative function, as this depends on who the 
sender, the audience, and the butt of the joke are. The challenges when moving from a 
relatively simple, interpersonal joke situation to mass mediated comedy, lay in 
determining who or what the butt actually is and who the implied audiences are. 
Freud’s model also included an affective response – in fact, this is a major part 
of his inhibition-theory. This points to the last part of my definition, how humour aims 
at provoking mirth and laughter. In spite of these well-known perlocutionary effects of 
humour, the mode is also often associated with emotional detachment. This has been 
mentioned above, in how superiority theories often include how humour presupposes 
bracketing of empathy and phenomenological theories underlines how unseriousness is 
a way to be detached, also emotionally, from the concerns of the serious world. 
Detachment is perhaps even more central in research on another sister mode of 
humour, irony, which has been associated with intellect and self-control as opposed to 
uncontrolled emotional investment, but also with cynicism and a total lack of emotion 
(Hutcheon, 1994, p. 41). While irony and humour cannot be conflated, there is 
certainly an overlap in how the two modes avoid the commitments of serious 
communication, which also includes an element of emotional detachment. Black 
humour is perhaps the clearest example of this, where misfortune is turned into a 
laughing matter. However, this is actually not complete emotional detachment, but a 
re-interpretation which also includes affective work and the intention to elicit a certain 
affective response from the audience. By creating a distance from some emotions, the 
joke-teller creates others. Mirth is the obvious candidates here, but it has been argued 
 
comedy, and they both share the teller-target-audience tripartite structure, I find it useful to think of 
the two as sister genres.  
 
 48 
that humour and laughter aim at an affective response from the butt of the joke, as 
well: the feeling of shame and embarrassment through being ridiculed (Billig, 2005b). 
The feeling of ridicule, as well as mirth’s character of being on somebody’s expense, is 
central in different versions of superiority theory, which has a strong position in 
different studies of humour’s social function. Thus, perhaps a bit ironically, the joyous 
aspects of humour and mirth are often placed in the background. In this dissertation, I 
will make a case for the joy connected to humour and its social use – but also 
underline that it is necessary to understand how this joy works as a part of the tripartite 
structure of the joke. 
The three pairs of tensions described in the start of this section – humour as 
conservative vs. radical, as serious vs. unserious, and as connected to negative 
emotions vs. positive emotions – or even no emotions at all – are, as we can see, 
intertwined and based on one another. Furthermore, they do not seem to be easily 
solved. If ambiguity is a central feature of the humorous mode, this also means that 
seriousness and unseriousness, emotional detachment and emotional investment, 
radical and conservative impulses are present at the same time in concrete, empirical 
instances of humour and comedy. A productive way to go for researchers interested in 
the social and political use of comedy is thus not to eliminate these tensions by for 
example determining if comedy is fundamentally radical or fundamentally 
conservative, but to investigate how these inherent tensions matter in real life contexts 
and are put to use in the public sphere as unsolvable but productive tensions. This is 
the main theoretical contribution this thesis aims to make. The humorous mode, with 
all its inherent qualities, does however not exist in a cultural vacuum, and how humour 
is viewed by its users – and adversaries – matters equally much for how humour can 
be used to do things in the public sphere. 
 
2.2.3. Humour’s cultural position in Western culture: Between damage and 
salvation. 
There are multiple ways to approach humour’s position in Western culture. There 
seems to be a general agreement that humour, as we know it, is a modern concept with 
roots in the enlightenment, when the earl of Shaftesbury connected laughter and mirth 
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to a certain human intellectual and emotional disposition – humour (Amir, 2014). This 
disposition has developed into a central part of the understanding of modern 
personhood (Wickberg, 1998), and Billig (2005b) argues that humour optimism, 
accentuating the positive sides of humour and of having a sense of humour, dominates 
late modern Western culture. This point has also been discussed in relation to how 
politicians include humour and self-deprecation as parts of their public ethos (Gaupås 
Johansen, 2020). It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to cover all sides of how 
humour is and has been valued in Western culture, or to contrast it to how humour is 
viewed in other times and places. I will instead first point out how the Western positive 
view of humour has been used as an exclusionary mechanism against Muslims, and 
then sketch two general positions, one humour optimist and one humour alarmist, that 
are relevant for understanding humour’s role in the public sphere: Provocative humour 
as essentially valuable, or even salvific, and as essentially offensive and damaging.  
In a paper about the Mohammad cartoon scandal, Kuipers (2011) summarises 
the discourse on Muslim humourlessness. She argues that it is repeatedly articulated in 
the Western world, with the cartoon scandal as its most dramatic peak, and that there 
are many examples of Muslims trying to fight this stereotype, for example through the 
comedy tour Allah Made Me Funny. Furthermore, she argues that the power of this 
Muslims-have-no-humour-discourse is connected to how labelling a group as 
humourless often is used as an exclusionary mechanism, how humourlessness is 
associated with religious fundamentalism, and finally how lacking a sense of humour 
is viewed as a fundamental personal shortcoming that makes one unsuited for 
modernity. The trope of the humourless Muslim is a clear background in much of the 
comedy reception in my material, especially connected to female comedians with a 
Muslim background. As such, some of the shows can also be read as answers to this 
strong cultural idea. 
This often goes hand in hand with a cultural view of transgressive humour as 
essentially valuable, an idea that probably is older than the modern sense of humour, 
stemming from the work of the renaissance humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam, In Praise 
of Folly (1979 [1509]). In this tradition, the comedian is seen as a sage fool who dares 
to speak truth to power (Bevis, 2013, p. 66; Gilbert, 2004, pp. 2-3; Palmer, 1994, pp. 
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40-53). Humour is here given a special status and value both by virtue of its underdog 
position and as a special source of truth. In modern thought, this heritage lives as the 
idea of humour as fundamentally challenging the social order, and at the same time 
sharpening critical thinking and paving the way for genuinely new thoughts (Gaupås 
Johansen, 2020). We see how this view is connected to the creative and subversive 
aspects of humour, rather than its conservative aspects. American late-night show 
comedians like Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert are probably the clearest practitioner-
proponents of this idea, and they also serve as vehicles for it through their public 
reception (ibid). It is also clearly visible in my material, where immigration comedy 
very often is celebrated as important, brave, and taboo-breaking – as a general rule 
without explicating these adjectives very much. The emphasis on humour’s 
importance also mirrors how humour after all is viewed as a serious business.  
The position this idea has in intellectual life in Scandinavia is visible in the 
Norwegian book Etter Charlie Hebdo: ytringsfrihetens krise i historisk lys (After 
Charlie Hebdo: A historical Perspective on the Crisis of the Freedom of Speech) by 
historian Kjetil Jakobsen (2016), who makes the case for offensive and transgressive 
humour as a necessary part of democracy and freedom of speech. This is an important 
reminder of how humour optimism does not exist in a vacuum, but tends to go hand in 
hand with other cultural ideas, like appreciation for freedom of speech and rational 
thought. Although Jakobsen’s position is much more elaborate and better argued for 
than the typical mass media celebration of transgressive humour, he nevertheless 
mirrors their excessive humour positivity with strong claims like “Only humour makes 
a profane and rational view of the world possible” (pp. 249). There are few reflections 
in his book on the powerlessness of humour – for example on how humour is the 
weapon of the underdog because the underdog have no other means to fight with than 
the joke (Gaupås Johansen, 2020). 
Jakobsen does however have an eye for the negative sides of humour, 
connected to how humour as transgression also often is offense. In the purest form of 
this kind of criticism, what I call humour alarmism, offensive humour is viewed as 
damaging. This view seems less prevalent in the mass media and in popular 
consciousness, and it is thus harder to identify its historical roots, but it seems to me 
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that it is connected to the development of the modern ideals of personal authenticity 
and human dignity, so that any offense, or misrecognition, of a person is potentially 
damaging to her personal identity (Taylor, 1994). This becomes especially potent when 
personal identities become intrinsically connected with collective identities, like 
gender, race and ethnicity (Fukuyama, 2018), so that poking fun at selected social 
groups is seen as not only damaging for the individual, but as violence against 
marginalised groups, reinforcing existing power relations. If less prominent in the 
public sphere, humour alarmism enjoys a strong position in the academy, visible in this 
quote from introduction of the widely used edited volume Beyond a joke: the limits of 
humour: 
 
If a comic assault on someone’s sense of themselves as individual subjects, or on the 
sense of social and cultural identity of a particular social group or category, proves to 
have seriously damaging results and repercussions, we should take this seriously 
(Pickering & Lockyer, 2005, p. 4).  
 
Although few would disagree with the good intentions put forward in this excerpt, its 
rhetoric is interesting: Expressions like “comic assault” and “seriously damaging 
results” indicate a firm belief that humour can inflict real and serious harm, and it is 
also clear that this is thought in relation to social and cultural identities. This is typical 
for the humour alarmist view. Another important feature of this view is it emphasis on 
how difficult it is to talk back to humour, as it by virtue of its unseriousness is seen as 
a carte blanche for transgression – when accused of being offensive, the joker can 
always defend herself with “it was just a joke” . The tension between serious and 
unserious is thus at work in the humour alarmist view. Furthermore, those who 
actually speak up against offensive humour risks to be labelled as killjoys, people 
marked as deviants from the social duty of creating objects of happiness (Ahmed, 
2010), for example humorous occasions. We thus see how humour is presented as 
dangerous because it both inflicts harm and is nearly impossible to defend oneself 




It is easy to see how these two views, humour optimism and humour 
alarmism, can form the basis for controversies over humour in the public sphere, and 
this has indeed often been the case in Scandinavian immigration comedy. Typically, 
these controversies start when someone takes offense, and other actors then rush to the 
defence of the show in question with arguments on how the show is important. That 
being said, humour optimism and alarmism rarely appears as pure, coherent 
ideological positions in the public sphere – and they are also not mutually exclusive: 
the actors defending humour on some occasions will criticise humour on others.  
At the same time, when appearing in their more coherent form, as they 
sometimes are presented in academic research, these two views have incompatible 
accounts of what humour is, and thus arrives at different conclusions over what it can 
do. Humour optimists do take humour very seriously, but at the same time emphasise 
its radical potential for new thinking associated with its unseriousness. A tension they 
seem to ignore, on the other hand, is how humour can bring about not only positive 
emotions but also negative ones. Besides their view of humour, they also seem, as 
Jakobsen points out, to take a certain stance in the debate over freedom of speech 
where also crass and offensive utterances should be permitted, a stance that perhaps is 
based on an idealised view of the public sphere where the actors enjoy participatory 
parity and uncivil speech thus becomes less problematic. The alarmists, on the other 
hand, view the public sphere as infused with power, and offense and ridicule thus 
become much more problematic. Regarding their humour view, they do indeed take 
humour seriously, but seem to view its unseriousness only as a rhetorical carte blanche 
for transgression – so humour becomes as offensive and serious as other types of 
communication, perhaps even equal to violence. The positive emotions associated with 
humour, or its ability for creativity, is typically missing in the alarmist view – and if 
for example joy is discussed, it is discussed as schadenfreude infused in power 
relations.  
As scholarly positions, these two are of course a bit overplayed from my side, 
meant to present a theoretical point rather than represent individual authors. The two 
views can nevertheless easily be recognised in the literature. Although few readily 
admit that they view humour as inherently good or inherently bad, both empirical 
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analyses and theoretical contributions often end up placing themselves in one of the 
two camps, and there is thus a risk for begging the question of how humour can work 
politically and socially. This polarisation seems especially strong in the literature on 
ethnic and racial humour.  
 
2.2.4. Two typical views of ethnic and racial humour 
In this subsection, I look closer on two typical examples of the two positions, in order 
to clarify their basic assumptions and what I view as their shared problematic aspects.  
The humour optimists will be represented by the book Ethnic Humor in 
Multiethnic America by David Gillota (2013). Gillota views ethnic humour as a 
response to the increasing multiculturalism of American society, and is especially 
interested in comedy about ethnical relations rather than about ethnical groups in 
isolation. His book is a comprehensive textual analysis of contemporary Black, 
Jewish, and White American ethnic humour – to term comedy shows like South Park 
white ethnic humour is one of his original contributions. His view of ethnic humour is 
largely influenced by his choice to term it ethnic rather than racial: As ethnic 
boundaries in the scholarly tradition are up for negotiation, ethnic humour can be a 
tool for this negotiation. This is often done, according to Gillota, by subverting or 
collapsing ethnic stereotypes. The ultimate positive consequence of this is that 
comedians can challenge their audiences to view ethnicities as formable, and that their 
comedy can promote interethnic understanding and be the basis for a multi-ethnic 
civic identity. He does, however, not include any reflections or original research on 
how this promotion goes on in practice: His book is framed by theoretical macro 
perspectives on multiculturalism and ethnicity, as well as historical reflections on the 
changing American interethnic relations, while his method is textual analysis of 
multiple shows and comedians. There are no intermediatory steps that can explain how 
the negotiation of ethnicity in comedy texts can serve as an input into the larger 
negotiations of ethnicity in American society.   
Gillota’s account is clearly influenced by important traits of the celebratory 
view of humour identified above, especially how humour can generate genuinely new 
thoughts. How comedy through this also foster community and understanding is a 
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typical topos in celebratory accounts of ethnic and racial humour. It is also worth to 
note how he builds on assumptions and research interests from the field of ethnic 
studies: how ethnic boundaries are constantly negotiated, and that the question of 
peaceful co-existence between different cultures is central. Finally, it is typical how the 
work with ethnic stereotypes is central in his book, where he sees humour about ethnic 
stereotypes by comedians with that very ethnic background as a means to subvert 
those stereotypes. The question of whether ethnic and racial comedy that makes use of 
stereotypes challenges or reproduces them is perhaps the most contested in the field.  
On the opposite side of Gillota on this question stands Raúl Pérez, who here 
will be represented by a micro-sociological participatory study (2013) and a textual-
historical study (2016). In both studies, he is concerned with showing how comedy is a 
way to perform and perpetuate racist discourse that otherwise would not have been 
acceptable. In the first study, he analyses how comedy students are taught rhetorical 
strategies that allow them to engage in overt race talk, and another central finding is 
how non-white students are encouraged to poke fun at their own ethnic identity. In the 
second study, he argues that the popular comedy character José Jiménez in the 1960s 
was a continuation of the blackface minstrelsy tradition at a time where this was 
deemed unacceptable in comedy about Blacks. Since José Jiménez was a Latino 
character, “brownface” could be used as a continuation of the minstrelsy tradition and 
thus serve as a reworking of racial ridicule in order to make it acceptable in public, a 
reworking that according to Pérez continues by different means in contemporary 
comedy shows today. 
Pérez is like Gillota concerned with ethnic stereotypes but is sceptical to the 
idea that using them is a way to challenge them. He argues quite forcefully that any 
use of a stereotype most likely will reproduce them, and the power relations they are a 
part of, whatever the intention of the comedian might be. It is also clear that he views 
stereotypes as harmful, as they are seen as ultimately being dehumanising. Humour is 
thus mainly viewed as a rhetorical strategy to enforce existing racial domination. We 
see here how humour can do serious work by virtue of being unserious: one can get 
away with racism if it comes in the form of a joke.  
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At first glance, Pérez seems to be less preoccupied with humour as essentially 
damaging because it can offend than what the ‘typical’ humour alarmist would be. 
However, a closer reading reveals that this is because his project is how humour is a 
way to cloak offense and overt racial talk, and thus preserve the existing power 
structures that can withhold human dignity from different racial groups, of which 
offensive stereotypes are one among many means. Pérez uses words like “ethnicity” 
and “ethnic group” a lot, but prefers terms like “race”, “racial humour” and “racist 
humour”. This is indicative of his position in a field different from Gillota’s, where 
racial domination and fixation of individuals into culturally constructed races is more 
central than the fluidity of ethnic boundaries and peaceful coexistence in multicultural 
societies.  
Pérez work is more sophisticated than Gillota’s when it comes to the question 
of how the microlevel of comedy is connected with macro levels of society, like racial 
relations. He does this by combining a view of comedy as rhetoric with sociological 
and historical insights, interpersonal sociology in his paper on comedy students, and 
sociologically oriented history of civil rights movement in the Jozé Jiménez-paper. 
However, his strong views on stereotypes seem to necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that racism always will be reproduced in any form of ethnic or racial humour. This is 
also mirrored in his theoretical tools for connecting the micro and macro levels, as he 
interprets both textual and pedagogical strategies as symptoms of the reproduction of 
racial power relations. Although he mentions rhetorical techniques for subverting 
stereotypes, he does not analyse such techniques closer, or relate them to other forms 
of racial discourse, in order to rebut them and defend his strong claim. Pérez may of 
course be right in his claim that comedy cannot change racial discourse, but the 
opportunity should at least be empirically investigated instead of rejected on the basis 
of theoretical assumptions. 
Both scholars discussed here have presented important insights and 
reflections, but they nevertheless seem to have arrived at their normative conclusion 
on ethnic and racial humour before they embarked on their empirical studies. This is 
probably due to theoretical assumptions inherited from their respective scholarly fields 
as well as from the optimist and alarmist views on humour. In addition, their 
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theoretical tools to connect the micro and macro levels, to connect comedy with 
society, are insufficient: Gilotta’s because such theoretical tools simply lack, Pérez’ 
because they are tuned towards the reproduction of social structures and power 
mechanisms, not towards how these can change. I propose two solutions to this 
problem. The first is to work with the tensions in the humorous mode, especially when 
it comes to whether it is a conservative or a radical force, exactly as unsolvable but 
productive tensions instead of having to pick one pole. The second is to interpret 
humorous texts not in isolation or in the context of something as broad as ethnic or 
racial relations at large, but in the context of what else goes currently goes on in the 
public sphere. With this kind of meso perspective, taking into account the publicly 
accessible texts that after all are important parts of ethnic and racial discourses, it can 
become clearer how humour and comedy is a part of the opinion formation on things 
like immigration, multiculturalism, and racial relations, and how the particularities of 
humour are used to do things in these processes of opinion formation.  
  
2.2.5. Cultural humour views put to work: Interpretive repertoires about humour 
in the Scandinavian immigration discourse. 
The humour views I have sketched above rarely manifest themselves in pure, coherent 
forms, neither in scholarly work nor in debates in the public sphere. They are more 
likely to appear fragmented, sometimes mixed with each other, and to a large degree 
influenced by how they are used in different rhetorical context. Therefore, I find it 
useful to apply the notion of interpretive repertoires to analyse how the two views are 
the basis for how humour and comedy are treated in the public sphere. An interpretive 
repertoire is “a lexicon or register of terms and metaphors drawn upon to characterise 
and evaluate actions and events”  (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 138) The usefulness of 
the concept for my purpose lays in how it can be used to account for both cultural 
patterns and situational variants, structural constraints and the agency of actors. 
Interpretive repertoires have their foundation in cultural ideas, but can be tweaked and 
varied in order to be useful in different situations. Furthermore, they are based on 
recurrent, finite patterns of speech, and are thus based on discursive structures, but are 
nevertheless flexible enough to be used as strategic means for actors. Unlike how 
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discourses sometimes are thought, one single interpretive repertoire is namely rarely 
hegemonic: it always exists competing repertoires, and the same individual can 
perfectly fine use different repertoires on different occasions.  
Interpretive repertoires exist on the level of language use, or rhetoric if one 
wishes, and are thus not on the same level, conceptually, as discourses or cultural 
ideas. They are however something more than for example topoi, commonplaces, 
talking points, arguments, metaphors, and tropes; as interpretive repertoires feature all 
these kinds of patterns in language use, structuring them around a certain logic – albeit 
not in a strict sense, like scientific models. Working with my material, I have 
inductively identified four major interpretive repertoires concerning humour that are 
common in Scandinavian comedy reception, which are presented in table 1. These 
repertoires are not meant to be exhaustive and the descriptions of them are not meant 
to be definite, but should be seen as a tool to clarify how the often very diverse 
instances of comedy reception actually can be seen as following certain patterns. The 
first column of the table shows the four major repertoires and the most important 
arguments they consist of, while the second column show what I see as adjacent 
repertoires, repertoires that cannot be subsumed under the major repertoires but tend to 
lend support to them in one way or another. I will not discuss each repertoire more 
closely here, as I hope the reader will recall my earlier discussions on the cultural 
ideas of humour, and see how they are mirrored in these repertoires.  
 
Table 1 The interpretive repertoires of Scandinavian immigration comedy reception 
Major interpretive repertoires Adjacent interpretive repertoires 
 
Humour as a special kind of truth-
telling 
 
• Humour challenges taboos 
• Offensive humour has a shock 
effect that makes us see clearer 
 
Humour as social glue 
 





• Humour is a way to freely 
express one’s self 
• Humour builds bridges and thus 
removes mutual prejudice 
• Humour makes it easier to talk 
about difficult things 
• Humour is a way for the 
subaltern to speak  
Humour criticism as political 
correctness 
 
Islam as a killjoy 
 
• Muslims have no self-irony 
• Muslims are against everything 
that is fun 
• Muslims are religious 
fundamentalists 
• Islam suppresses the life-forces 
 
 
Islam as fundamentally non-Western 
 
Humour as a central part of modern 
personhood 
 
Religious fundamentalism as 
incompatible with joy and funniness. 
 
Offensive humour causes real damage 
 
• Offensive humour perpetuates    
dehumanising stereotypes 
• Offensive humour creates real 
pain  
• Offensive humour violates 
human dignity 
• Offensive humour endorses and 
encourages antisocial behaviour 
• Offensive humour is 
disrespectful 
• Offense conceals any well-meant 
satirical intent 
 
Stereotypes are always harmful 
 
Offense damages the sense of self 
 
Media works as a hypodermic needle 
 






As one can see, the different arguments and commonplaces that belong to each 
interpretive repertoire interact with each other and form a larger whole. Humour can 
for example be seen as a special form of truth because it both challenges taboos and is 
a way for the subaltern to speak, while offensive humour can be seen as causing real 
harm because it can both inflict real pain and is impossible to defend oneself against. 
This does not mean that all the arguments and commonplaces that make up one 
repertoire depend on one another or always appear together, but that it is useful to 
understand how their use are structured by a shared logic, which is the name I have 
given to the repertoire. Thus, when somebody celebrates comedy that breaks taboos, it 
is often not because taboo breaking per se is postulated as being good, but because it is 
seen as a way to reveal a special truth. Similarly, when somebody refers to humour 
• It is impossible to defend oneself 
against offensive humour 
• Humour tends to go hand in hand 









• People who criticise humour do 
so on ideological default 
• Critiquing humour means that 
one cannot take a joke 
• Those who criticise humour 




The nanny society 
 







criticism as being expected, this is something more than a mere statement of their 
personal anticipations: It is a way to label somebody as being politically correct.  
As mentioned above, these repertoires are all based on different cultural ideas 
about humour. As one can see, many of them are also coloured by the immigration 
discourse at large. This type of intersections, between the discourses of comedy and 
the discourses on immigration, will be central in this thesis, and will be a part of the 
discussion in the next section where I will present my method for data collection and 
analysis.  
 
2.3 Writing the history of immigration humour in the Scandinavian public 
spheres 
 
My method, the writing of history through cases, posed two major challenges. First, I 
had to find instances of immigration comedy in the three countries. This was partly a 
practical question, but also a question of interpretation and classification: what should 
count as immigration humour? Second, I had to detect patterns and developments of 
immigration comedy and its reception. Third, I had to select appropriate cases and 
historicise them as parts of processes of public opinion, in order to answer my research 
question. 
 
2.3.1 Finding immigration humour: the problem of definition and the archive 
situation 
At the beginning of my project, I thought the collection of material would be a 
straightforward, although labour intensive task. I had a clear definition of immigration 
comedy, and a clear scope in empirical material: locally produced comedy that had 
been broadcast on television. I did know that there was no kind of inventory or 
catalogue of immigration comedy in either one of the three Scandinavian countries, 
but especially the three public service channels – SVT, DR and NRK – had archives 
that were available for the general public, either through their own platforms or 
through the national libraries. My plan was to make a list of all comedy programmes, 
and then watch through them in order to find instances of immigration comedy.  
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Starting with Sweden, I realised it was not that easy. Just making of a list of all 
Swedish comedy programmes became problematic. Although the national library of 
Sweden, Kungliga Biblioteket, has a very good and user-friendly interface for their 
database of audio-visual content, it is based on metadata from the television channels 
themselves – and this is of very variable quality. There is, for example, no consistent 
marking of genres. Thus, a search on “humor” would yield a large number of results 
where humour was the topic in a talk show or a factual programme, while searching 
for “komedi” would mostly yield numerous episodes of American sitcoms or movies 
that were assigned as comedy in their descriptive text. Especially older shows were not 
classified as comedy or humour at all, but put in the generic bag of “entertainment”, or 
not assigned to any genre. The Danish database, Mediestream, had the same problem 
combined with a (at the time of doing the research) less user-friendly interface and no 
systematic digitalisation of records prior to 2006, while the Norwegian national library 
does not have any public searchable database – one needs to know the title of the 
programme one wants to see. Luckily, NRK’s own web TV has a large historical 
archive with the best metadata I found in this project. Unfortunately, the interface is 
not made for research and it is for example impossible to do advanced searches or to 
sort your results – they appear sorted according to an opaque algorithm. 
When contacting people working in national libraries or TV stations, they 
were all very helpful in providing me with concrete material – but nobody wanted to 
give me a list of all comedy programmes that had been broadcasted – understandably, 
as to their knowledge no such lists existed and making them would be very time 
consuming.  
Luckily, such lists do exist somewhere: Wikipedia. At least for Sweden and 
Norway. Although I am well aware that this list is not complete, it was nevertheless a 
starting point. However, going through these lists and watching some of the material, I 
realised two things: first, assuming that each show had just one season of six 30 
minutes long episodes, and that there were as many shows in Denmark as in Norway 
and Sweden, watching through all these programmes would for one person take 8 
years without breaks – 37 years if complying with the collective agreement on 
working hours in Norwegian public sector. This was obviously not feasible. Second, I 
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ran into a number of classification problems. It was not too straightforward to decide 
on what should count as an instance of immigration comedy. Does a joking remark 
about immigration policy qualify, or a minor character with a funny accent? I found it 
impossible to apply strict systematic criteria here, but chose to collect only 
programmes where the topic of immigration or immigrants seemed central to the 
humour in an episode, sketch, or a scene as a whole. For stand-up shows, it should be 
central in the entire monologue or at least make up a longer stretch of it.  
As a consequence of this, standup-offshots like roasts, news satire like 
humoristic talk shows, and the national versions of Have I got news for you, have been 
left out from the selection. This is somewhat unfortunate, as these programmes tend to 
be popular, and their orientation towards the political sphere is clear. However, it 
would have been impossible to collect all jokes about immigrants or immigration from 
these shows. The omission can also be defended from a more substantial point of 
view: this kind of explicit news satire has been extensively researched (see Holbert, 
2005; Young, 2018), and a focus on humour that has does not have as obvious a 
relation to the political sphere is both methodically tidy and theoretically and 
empirically interesting. The politics of humour that does not claim to be political can 
be as relevant for the public sphere as self-declared political humour. 
More problematic was the omission of comedy on radio, stage and the 
internet. If I would only include TV material, I had to ignore the surprisingly rich early 
wave of humour ridiculing xenophobia on radio and revue scenes from the late 60s up 
to the early 80s, for example the popular Norwegian character Stutum8 or the Swedish 
revue monologue “Bunta ihop dom”9. I would also have to exclude Norway’s first 
immigrant stand-up comedian, Shabana Rehman, who never had one of her shows 
broadcast, as well as the Swedish youtuber Gina Dirawi, who became a well-known 
TV host, but rose to fame through her character Syster Khadidje10, a success on 
YouTube but rarely shown on television, and then in a very altered form. Thus, I chose 
to have my main focus on televised material, and conduct a systematic collection here, 
 
8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NEg8RYdonjg&t=189s (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3HYrE32taAA (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3xbO-kQmsM (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
 
 63 
but to include material from stage, radio and online if I found historical indications of 
its significance. 
Something that I chose to totally omit, however, was what truly can be termed 
vernacular culture. Today, the main humoristic material of vernacular, or low-brow, 
culture consists of the anonymous internet culture producing remixes and memes, for 
example the Instagram-account “Utlendinghumor”, Facebook humour pages like 
“Latterdøra” or the widely popular video remixes called “Laserturken”. In 
contemporary Scandinavian history, local revues as well as songs of uncertain 
provenience were important, for example a song I remember being played from burned 
CDs in school breaks during my rural upbringing, just named “Innvandrersangen”, 
“The immigrant song”, basically consisting of nothing more than a list of racist 
stereotypes sung in an equally stereotypical accent11.  
While the stage, radio and broadcasting material practically always display an 
immigration-friendly stance, a lot of the popular material is hostile towards 
immigration, sometimes even overtly racist. This is less the case for a more 
professionalised form popular culture that is associated with rural working class – the 
local varieties of country music, which often have humorous lyrics. Songs like 
Hellbillies’ “Ein neger sto på Ål stasjon” (“A Negro was standing at Ål Station”) or 
Vassendgutane’s “Greit å vere Neger” (“OK to be a Negro”)12 tend to display the 
majorities’ experience with immigration in a more poetic-humorous, non-hostile way, 
even with a critical attitude. Nevertheless, they clearly operate within different 
 
11 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ax7UK4qWMM0 (Last checked February 11th, 2021). The song 
was apparently made as antiracist satire by a music teacher in 1999, with the title “Innvandrervise” but 
has certainly circulated as the opposite – besides being popular in school breaks, it was also used on 
the election stands by anti-immigration right wing populist party Frp in 2009 
(https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/--ille-at-Frp-bruker-lata-mi-1.6644779) (Last checked February 
11th, 2021). 
12 These two bands are indeed very different in many ways, including their location in sociocultural 
taste hierarchies, where Vassendgutane passes as considerably more low-brow – but they do share 
country roots, commercial popularity and a connection with rural and working-class Norway that 
distinguishes them from the urban, middle-culture music scene, or cultural scene at large. See 
Breistrand (2013); Dyndahl (2013); Thedens (2001); Vestby (2019). 
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aesthetic worlds and humour regimes than the middle-brow mainstream comedy. 
Vassendgutane’s song, for example, is from 2011, when the use of the word “Neger” 
by a white stand-up comedian in Oslo or Bergen probably would have been considered 
highly problematic. This indicates a division between official culture, represented by 
the public broadcasters and the major stand-up clubs, and vernacular culture, 
represented by anonymous joke production and country music, a division that seems to 
be marked by differences in social class and the divide between centre and periphery. 
It should thus be noted that this dissertation cannot be seen as a history of all 
immigration humour, but rather as a history of the urban, middle culture, officially 
sanctioned version of immigration humour. This is not necessarily too problematic: as 
I write from a public sphere perspective, this becomes a history of the kind of humour 
that was allowed to work in the main fora of the national public spheres and thus have 
a privileged way to reach the national publics. It should, however, be noted that also in 
this case, complying with earlier studies (Jakobsson & Stiernstedt, 2018), 
Scandinavian public service TV conveys a middle-class perspective of the world.   
 
Even after all these omissions, my potential material was still too large. I therefore had 
to give up my ambition of being all-encompassing, and make a different strategy. First, 
I would use all kinds of sources – from online searches to asking people in the industry 
or academia to academic books – to find instances where immigration comedy had 
been discussed, mentioned or just remembered. From this, I developed a first priority 
list. Second, I used the lists available on Wikipedia, and for the sake of Denmark, the 
inventory of Danish programming that I, relatively late in the process, discovered in 
Hanne Bruun’s (2011) book on Danish TV satire, to do online searches to see if the 
programme description of any of these shows had any reference to immigration. What 
I found here would form my second priority list. Finally, I used different kinds of 
sources to detect comedy programmes that had been very popular or seen as influential 
in one way or another. This became my third priority list. I would then watch through 
the available programmes on these lists in prioritised order – which was necessary not 
because of time, but for financial reasons. Swedish and to some degree Danish 
material could be watched for free in their national libraries, but then I had to 
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physically travel to Stockholm and Copenhagen, where lodging is expensive. 
Norwegian material from the national library could be sent to my local university 
library for viewing there, but most of it was not digitalised, and after a certain number 
of episodes I had to pay cost price for its digitalisation. Since my budget was limited, I 
therefore tried to find the material on open or cheap sources first – the web players of 
TV stations, streaming services, YouTube or DVDs, and then went to the national 
libraries to see the rest, in my prioritised order until my funds went dry.  
These limitations aside, I managed to collect and view quite a large amount f 
material, and even though it is not a complete or representative selection of 
immigration comedy broadcast in the Scandinavian countries, it is an indicative 
selection which mirrors important trends in Scandinavian comedy as well as the 
instances where immigration humour was noticed in public reception or flagged by the 
TV stations themselves. Thus, it is likely that the shows constitute a saturated 
selection, as I have managed to cover a rich empirical distribution of different varieties 
of comedy when it comes to both topic and form, and also cover one of these shows 
most important contexts: how they are located in the national comedy scenes. Based 
on this final list of shows, I then collected reception material through searching in 
online search engines and the press databases Retriever, Mediestream and InfoMedia. 
This material proved to be relatively scarce, mostly consisting of PR material or very 
short reviews. I did however find indications of more substantial reception and even 
debate on some shows and comedians, which would be part of the background for 
selecting my cases for closer analysis.  
 
2.3.2. Systematising immigration humour: finding patterns in the material 
The next step was to find patterns and developments in my material in order to select 
appropriate cases for closer analysis. I planned to conduct a systematic coding, 
departing from the relatively simple “who is joking about what”-idea: determining if 
the sender (comedian) had an immigrant background or not, and who and what the butt 
of the joke was: immigrants themselves, politicians or policy, or the sentiments and 
attitudes of the majority population. I also added TV station and channel, the year it 
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was broadcasted (and rerun, if relevant), production milieu if possible, genre, and the 
ethnicities and nationalities that were part of the jokes.  
This relatively simple coding soon became problematic. It was, for example, 
not always straightforward to determine if the sender could be classified as an 
immigrant or not. What about Norwegian Zahid Ali or Danish Omar Marzouk, who 
early in their careers played some sort of immigrant stunt reporter for their more 
famous creator-writer colleagues Otto Jespersen and Jan Gintberg. It is clear that they 
were comic actors, but to what degree were they senders? Was this a case of 
immigrants joking about immigration, or the majority population doing so by proxy? 
Another difficult case would be with adoptees playing a character who was an 
immigrant growing up in Scandinavia with immigrant parents, like Swedish Lasse 
Lindroth/Ali Hussein or Norwegian Lisa Tønne/Ali Reza. Should the status of foreign 
born be enough to classify them as immigrants, even though they grew up in the 
majority culture? My solution was to break down the categories and make both 
creative role and country background more precise. Similarly, the butt of the joke was 
often ambiguous, more particularly, there were many cases representing prejudice 
about immigrants where it was unclear whether the butt of the joke were immigrants 
or prejudices about them. I also had ambitions of coding for recurring motifs, topoi 
and humour techniques, but to reduce the aesthetical variance and diversity of the 
show down to fixed categories, albeit partly inductively generated, proved difficult, of 
little use and as an oversimplifying way to interpret texts.   
These problems demonstrated that I needed a more hermeneutical method 
already in this stage, instead of a coding approach. As my basic hermeneutic principle, 
I adhered to Quentin Skinner’s (2002) claim that the best way to explain ideas and 
utterances from the past is to understand them as parts of interventions in their 
contemporary debates, thus seeking the text’s historical intention. The practical 
method thus became to, instead of coding the shows, annotate important features of the 
shows while I watched them. These features could be aesthetical, like attempts to 
describe humour styles, but also more content oriented, like clear quotes from the day 
to day immigration debate or use of tropes that also are present in the serious parts of 
the immigration debate, for example the veiled supressed Muslim woman. There is a 
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significant step from the systematic approaches of social sciences to a hermeneutic, 
humanistic approach like this, and its outcome will depend to a high degree on my 
particular hermeneutical horizon. This is, however, possible to explicate to some 
degree and thus share how I arrived at my interpretations. First of all, my theoretical 
interest laid in understanding the comedy texts are doing something in the public 
sphere, and how humour was used to this means. These were the central theoretical 
principles guiding my annotations. Second, my contextual knowledge primarily 
consisted of having watched if not all, at least very much of what has been made of 
Scandinavian immigration comedy, thus knowing the tradition each text was a part of. 
Third, I also possessed a freshly created contextual knowledge about the immigration 
issue in the Scandinavian public spheres, as a result of following the work of the 
colleagues in my umbrella project SCANPUB, conducting my own qualitative 
readings of the representative sample of press material collected in this project, as well 
as familiarising myself with the existing scholarly literature on the Scandinavian 
immigration debate. Fourth, my reading of the texts was formed by my training in 
rhetoric and art history, skilled in analysing moving images and placing them within a 
cultural context.  
Regarding the reception material, the process was much simpler. As already 
mentioned, there exists relatively little reception of comedy programmes, especially in 
form of debate or more thorough cultural journalism. In this second step, I made notes 
of each time similar topics, for example controversies over racism, appeared in 
comedy reception across countries, shows and actors, and constructed a tentative list 
of possible cases for reception studies.  
Taken together, the process of watching and annotating comedy shows led me 
to find some interesting constants and differences. For example, the dominant butt of 
the joke – in all three countries, through the times and in different genres, is 
xenophobia in its various guises. This is quantitatively dominating, and I would argue 
that it is safe to say that immigration humour on Scandinavian TV is explicitly pro-
immigration. This does of course not mean that there is no use of potentially 
demeaning language or ethnic stereotypes, but that the historical intentions of the 
show’s jokes most likely support a liberal, even enthusiastic, view on immigrants and 
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immigration. Besides this similarity, there were also a few differences between the 
countries – where Sweden was the one standing out. While the anti-xenophobic 
humour in Denmark and Norway was without any class markers, xenophobic attitudes 
are clearly marked as belonging to the social, cultural, and geographical periphery in 
Sweden. Furthermore, religion was sometimes a topic in Norway and Denmark, but 
virtually never in the Swedish stand-up or television shows, although clearly important 
in Gina Dirawi’s popular YouTube-channel, based on the character Syster Khadidje, a 
devoted, strict Muslim woman who accuses everything of being haram. Finally, there 
is a much richer tradition of immigrants making immigration humour in Sweden, with 
more comedians and more programmes, and even an own word for it: “Blattehumor”, 
“blatte” being slang for immigrant. 
Despite similarities and constants like this, my material was very diverse, and 
to detect developments or tendencies proved difficult. At the start of my project, I 
hoped to be able to periodise and make a neat, linear account of how immigration 
humour had played a role in the opinion formation of the public sphere, but it soon 
became clear that it was difficult to use my work so far directly as a way to write a 
comprehensive or totalising history of immigration comedy in the Scandinavian public 
spheres. What they were useful for, however, was as starting points for making a 
strategic selection of cases that enabled me to answer my research question as well as 
constituting an evidence-close and systematic reconstruction of the past, by locating 
important points of difference and discontinuity in my material.  
 
2.3.2. Historicising immigration humour in the public sphere: selection of cases 
and principles of historical contextualisation 
The methodological guidelines enabling me to do so are drawn from Michel 
Foucault’s work, mainly from the book Archeology of Knowledge (2002) and his 
inaugural lecture at Collège de France, “Orders of Discourse” (1971). Drawing on the 
French Annales school of history, Foucault proposes a general history as an alternative 
to the reductive global history, where the latter aims for causality and a story of 
development and logical connection synchronically as well as diachronically. Names 
of periods such as “the Renaissance” and stories like “the history of Western thought” 
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are all examples of such global histories – history as a Bildungsroman, so to speak. 
The alternative to this approach is to define different chronological series, and then 
describe the relationship between these series. This relationship is the real object of 
study for the historian, and also where the interest in discontinuity comes in. Rather 
than seeking causal relations, genealogies, and general laws, discontinuity allows the 
historian to understand the borders of the different series, which relations that are 
possible between the series, and how these are distributed in time – which “series of 
series” or “tableaus” one can create. 
 The core idea behind this is not to reject the existence of historical 
connections, but rather to call for caution when it comes to totalising explanations that 
press a grand narrative down on empirical reality – including the idea of historical 
telos. When writing a history of the cultural public sphere, I see this as a useful 
warning against interpreting the myriad of texts which comprise the public sphere as 
necessarily leading towards its ultimate political aim: rational will formation. Instead, 
Foucault’s concept of general history, and his specific take on it when writing a history 
of discourses, encourages to look for connections between the diverse texts in the 
public sphere, starting from observing the features of the texts themselves rather than 
looking for a pre-conceived type of connection – what Foucault calls a positive 
discourse analysis. It then becomes possible to see how the different texts – or 
enunciations, to use Foucault’s term – are distributed, not only chronologically but 
also according to their relationships with other texts – to find their location within a 
discourse.  
It became clear for me that the annotations I had made about the comedy 
shows could be used this way. Features like style, genre and humour technique pointed 
towards the ‘inside’ of the comic discourse, the (seemingly) autonomous aesthetic 
laws governing it, while features like butt of the joke, recurring tropes, joker/sender 
and TV channel pointed towards the ‘outside’ of the discourse, how it is connected to 
other kinds of discourses, practices and institutions (Schaanning, 2000, pp. 200, 213-
215). Instead of searching for tendencies and developments, the categories could then 
be used to search for discontinuities, which made it possible both to draw a strategic 
 
 70 
sample of texts for closer analysis and to conduct this analysis in order to understand 
the comic texts as a part of opinion formation in the public sphere. 
Searching for discontinuity meant looking for historical ruptures in my 
material. In Foucault’s thought, the “series of series” or “tableaus” are not so much 
static texts as events or interventions that radically change a social system 
(Schaanning, 2000, pp. 303-313). This can happen as any enunciation, the smallest 
unit of discourse that exists as an empirically observable instance, depends on its 
discourse as well as stages it. The system of the discourse constrains what kinds of 
enunciations that are possible to make, but since this system should not be seen in a 
classic structuralist way, as something ‘behind’ empirical instances, but rather as the 
set of already performed enunciations, any enunciation will also create and alter the 
discourse. Radical ruptures happen when different discourses – different series – start 
to interact in a new way. One of Foucault’s examples are when the discourses on 
criminal law in the 18th century started to intersect with the discourses about physical 
and mental discipline from schools, hospitals, factories and military camps, radically 
transforming the criminality/punishment discourse and thus also the thought and 
practice of criminal law (Schaanning, 1997, pp. 19-20). 
It should be made clear that I am not using a Focauldian method, but rather a 
Foucault-inspired one. For example, I treat each comedy text or reception text as an 
enunciation, the smallest unit of discourse, which needs to be carefully described 
empirically, with the purpose of finding its relations to other enunciations and thus to 
the wider discourse. It is not easy to understand what Foucault defines as an 
enunciation, as he explains it negatively by contrasting it to what it is not. It is not, for 
example, the same as a speech act, nor a logical or grammatical proposition, but since 
he mentions that a book or a prayer is comprised of many enunciations, it would 
probably be truer to Foucault to conceptualise a joke as an enunciation, and a comedy 
programme as a set or cluster of enunciations. In my research process, this does not 
make too much of a difference, as the main point is to stay close to the empirical units 
of the discourse when doing the analysis, rather than departing from a pre-conceived 
idea of the logic behind the discourse. The enunciations’ status as things that exist in 
the empirical world (as opposed to being abstract concepts) is thus more important 
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than the exact level they are located on. A more substantial objection to the use of 
Foucault could be that he is interested in describing when discourse radically change. 
This is not the case in my material: it cannot be said that immigration comedy in the 
2000s is fundamentally different from immigration comedy in the 1990s. This is a 
valid point, and the main reason for not claiming to write a Foucauldian history. 
Nevertheless, his combination of a discontinuity-oriented history writing combined 
with discourse theory is useful also to detect smaller changes, and for understanding 
the meaning these changes had for the public sphere.  
With these reservations in mind, immigration comedy can already be seen as a 
“series of series”, as it by definition is a place where comedy and the serious debate 
intersect. However, this would be nothing more than a re-formulation of the barometer 
thesis of humour. To follow the research logic of ruptures would mean to look for 
instances when the relationship between the public sphere and immigration comedy 
changed in one way or another. Immigration comedy would then be one series which I 
describe carefully through my initial annotations about the comedy shows, annotations 
that make it possible to see how it enters into altered relations with other series. These 
altered relations would then have to be described closer in order to discuss how this 
might play a role for the opinion formation in the public sphere.  
This principle was the background for my selection of cases, a selection I also 
tried to base on ruptures that happened in all three countries. These cases should then 
be seen as discursive events where comedy intervened in the public sphere’s treatment 
of the immigration issue in a new way. My collection of cases is however not 
exhaustive. There could have been other case sets, for example, the advent of comedy 
joking with Islam, the early topical satire on xenophobia in the 1970s – a rupture 
insofar as it was the first times satire was used in Scandinavian immigration debate – 
or the inclusion of immigrants in the sitcom genre, which changed aesthetically in the 
1980s and 90s. There could also have been other cases within the sets – there are for 
example many more controversies where comedy has been accused of racism than 
those that I analyse in chapter 5. The choice of the case sets that ultimately became 
selected was partly based on my wish of covering cases of both comedy texts 
themselves and their reception, in order to understand the workings of comedy’s 
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aesthetical properties as well as humour’s cultural position, partly by the theoretical 
interest in historicising these cases as parts of the process of public opinion formation. 
I thus used my knowledge of theoretical problems in public sphere theory and in 
humour research in order to see how these problems and my cases could mutually 
enlighten each other. The final selection of cases thus consists of those I viewed as 
most interesting to think with for the illumination of how humour and politics can be 
meaningfully related.  
Going on and analysing these cases more closely, the two basic principles are 
also drawn from Foucault’s discourse history. The first is that any comedy 
programme, or its reception stages as well as alters the discourse(s) they are part of. 
For immigration comedy, this would be both the immigration debate and the discourse 
of humour. The analytical questions would then be exactly what part of the discourses 
that are staged, and how this is done. To answer this, one needs to look for the 
relations the comedy show – or event – in question creates with the other texts that 
make up the public sphere. I see this as a fundamentally rhetorical way of analysing 
discourse, compatible with Warner (2002) and Hauser’s (1998) understanding of how 
texts form publics and public opinion, or for that sake Skinner’s (2002) historical close 
reading technique where texts are best understood as interventions in a debate. If an 
event stages and alters the discourse, it is used to do something, it is used to intervene. 
Again, how it seeks to intervene is the interesting question – both regarding the 
context of the intervention as well as its means. In my analysis of comedy texts, I 
concentrated on how the text put the tensions inherent in the humorous mode at work, 
but besides this, I used no readily mapped out close reading strategy. Complex, 
aesthetic texts are best to approach with concepts relevant for the text at hand, 
concepts that only can be chosen after an initial reading. These concepts were however 
of course drawn from existing literature on humour, film, television, and visual 
rhetoric, sometimes even from earlier research interested in the same text.  
The reception material, on the other hand, was analysed by identifying 
interpretive repertoires, recurrent patterns of speech used to construct interpretations of 
the world (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 149), that could be related to cultural ideas 
about humour, but also to other repertoires important in the immigration debate, for 
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example of how Islam is understood as the opposite of Western and democratic values. 
The patterns of how these repertoires were used would then be the basis for 
understanding how debates over and journalism about immigration comedy could be 
historicised as events that staged, intervened in and altered the broader immigration 
discourse. 
 
This far, I have argued that in order to answer my research question, how can TV 
comedy thematising immigration contribute to public opinion formation on 
immigration in the larger public sphere, it is useful to apply a textual-historical view of 
opinion formation. Public opinion formation can be studied by understanding how 
texts intervene in their contemporary historical context, where they do different kinds 
of work. To understand any potential significance of this work, how it might be a 
contribution to public opinion formation, it is useful to use different concepts 
developed by public sphere theoreticians for understanding how comedy and comedy 
reception feeds into the pre-deliberative processes that are part of public opinion 
formation. The significance of specific texts can thus be defended theoretically.  
Furthermore, I have argued that in order to select comedy events that are 
particularly interesting in order to understand how humour and comedy contribute in 
the public sphere, it is useful to identify historical ruptures, moments where comedy 
and the serious public sphere intersected and interacted in new ways. Since public 
opinion formation is a process of change, such ruptures are moments where we clearer 
can identify how comedy events were a part of and fed into these processes. Finally, I 
have discussed the particularities of the humorous mode that makes it possible for 
comedy to contribute in its special ways. Humour’s potential in this regard is given by 
its productive tensions, how it tends to do opposite things at the same time: Humour is 
both conservative and radical, both serious and unserious, both used for emotional 
detachment and emotional investment as well as juggling positive and negative 
emotions. These tensions are also important backgrounds for two prominent cultural 
views on how humour works politically and socially, humour optimism and humour 
alarmism, which are manifest in comedy reception through various interpretive 
repertoires used to endorse and criticise humour. Both the particularities of humour ‘in 
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themselves’ and how these particularities are understood and valued culturally are of 
equal importance when seeking to understand what kind of work comedy can do in the 
public sphere. In the following, the usefulness of these theoretical and methodical 
claims will be demonstrated by the analysis of four sets of cases: Two sets focusing on 



















Chapter 3: Ridiculing the racists: Sneering irony and biting satire 
against xenophobia. 
 
Bullying has many positive sides. It is the start of an exciting life for the bully, but more important, 
bullying is a way to weed out the losers early on.   
Otto Jespersen on Torsdagsklubben, October 10th, 2002.  
 
Anti-immigration attitudes and the people propounding them have been the most 
prevalent butts of the joke in Scandinavian immigration comedy. This includes 
everything from light-heartedly poking fun at angst for the cultural change brought 
about by immigration, like Galenskaparna & After Shave’s revue song “Pappa jag vill 
ha en italienare” (“Daddy I want an Italian”)13, to ridiculing outright racists, as many 
Swedish stand-up comedians did in routines about neo-Nazis in the 1990s14. In many 
ways, this is a story of continuity rather than of ruptures. However, the picture 
becomes different if humour is seen as a way to carry out aggression. This has been 
central in many theories of humour since Hobbes (1991 [1651]), especially in 
superiority theory, but also in central incongruity-oriented works like Bergson’s 
Laughter (1914), the version of relief theory developed by Freud (1976) and of course 
also in Bakhtin’s (1968) original theory of the carnivalesque. 
In public sphere theory, however, aggression has a bad reputation. It is 
incompatible with the most common understanding of a central virtue of the public 
sphere, civility, “a discourse that does not silence or derogate alternative views but 
instead evinces respect” (Jamieson, Weitz, Kenski, & Volinsky, 2018, p. 2). Habermas 
is often associated with civility, although he rarely writes directly about it. His 
discourse theory, which is the theoretical foundation for his version of the public 
sphere, is however based on interpersonal communication and individual speech 
action, which it can be argued that aggression obstructs (Mitchell, 2018). Agonistic 
 
13 From the revue Stinsen Brinner, Lorensbergsteatern 1987 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G52VOXv-pzg (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
14 E.g. Lasse Lindroth AKA Ali Hussein, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMkb7GJj1u8 (Last 
checked February 11th, 2021) 
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theories of democracy often frame themselves as more positive towards passions and 
emotion in the public sphere, but it should be noted that Mouffe emphasises the 
difference between agonism and antagonism, where the first entails a clash of 
positions, the second a clash of people as they view each other as enemies (Mitchell, 
2018). Verbal aggression is thus not unproblematic from an agonistic perspective 
either.  
Worries about incivility, aggression, and affect in general, are prominent in 
meta-discussions of the public sphere, especially connected to social media (see 
Dahlgren, 2018 for an example). Satire, on the other hand, seems to generally escape 
critical attention regarding its aggressiveness, which is interesting as it historically has 
been considered a very aggressive genre characterised by personal attacks (Østberg, 
2018). Furthermore, I would argue that the two shows that will be discussed in this 
chapter, Norwegian O.J. – En utstrakt hånd (O.J. – a hand reaching out) (1999) and 
the Swedish Grotesco 2, more precisely their first episode, “Svindemokraterna” (The 
pig democrats) (2010), were especially aggressive, targeting respectively individual 
politicians and a social group. The aim of this chapter is to understand how humour 
and irony was instrumental to put forward a form of aggression that otherwise would 
have been deemed as illegitimate in the public sphere. As such, satire is a way to work 
around the boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate speech. At the same time, I will 
argue that these satirical shows took part in a different boundary struggle where right-
wing populist parties and their political views are the ones that are deemed 
illegitimate15. Here, the satire shows follow the general tendencies in the serious public 
sphere, but nevertheless add new aspects to the condemnation of right-wing populists 
both by adding an affective texture of joy through aggression and by critically 
examining the right-wing populists’ own narratives. Before analysing the two shows, I 
will argue that they should be historicised on the background of a cultural and 
 
15 This kind of condemnation has also been a tendency in the Danish public sphere (Mjelde, 2020), as 
have comedy with xenophobia as its butt, but I have not found any shows comparable to the two 
discussed in this chapter in my Danish material. This is probably due to coincidences and personal 
preferences among satire-makers, and does not reflect anything about Denmark.  
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aesthetical development that was instrumental for an increasingly aggressive satire: the 
hardening of humour through irony.   
 
3.1 A new humour? The ironic age and the hardening of humour in the 
1990s 
 
Aggressive or hard humour can be understood as a cultural humour style (Friedman, 
Kuipers, Savage, & Silva, 2013; Kuipers, 2009, 2015) and will thus of course be 
related to both cultural politeness norms and changing moral boundaries. Therefore, it 
is not strange that the debate of humour being too transgressive, inappropriate or 
aggressive will repeat itself with regular intervals, as L. O. Larsen (2001) has pointed 
out for the Norwegian context. However, something special seemed to have happened 
in the Western world in the 1990s and early 2000s: boundary transgression, especially 
the aggressive kind, became valued in itself (Kuipers, 2015, p. 149). This is thoroughly 
discussed in a Dutch study regarding both popular jokes and comedy (ibid, p. 147-49) 
and documented in a Norwegian study on jokes (Johnsen, 1997, pp. 157-158). This 
does of course not mean that dirty jokes16, sick jokes17, or hate jokes18 did not exist 
 
16 Jokes referring to sexual activity, but of such character that some kind of taboo is crossed. This is of 
course highly contextual, both regarding place and time – in a public setting in the 50s it would be a 
mere allusion to sex, in contemporary times it would refer to improper sexual behaviour, which again 
is relative to social position, local culture and occasion (Kuipers, 2015, pp. 131-135). “If a woman 
sleeps with 10 men she’s a slut, but if a man does it… He’s gay, definitely gay.” (from 
https://worstjokesever.com/sex)   
17 Jokes making fun of suffering and/or tragic situations, also often called dark humour, e.g. holocaust 
jokes or dead baby jokes. “What’s the similarity between a Jew and a pizza? They both go in the 
oven” (told to the author at a party in the Netherlands in 2015). “What's red and sits in a corner? A 
baby chewing razor blades” (Dundes, 1979). 
18 Jokes that clearly express direct aggression towards a group that is held in contempt by the joke 
teller, Kuipers (2015) calls them attitude jokes. “How many niggers does it take to roof a building? 10 
if you slice them tin enough” (Billig, 2005a, p. 39). “What’s the difference between a pregnant 
Turkish woman and a trampoline? If you jump on a trampoline, you take your shoes off first” (Kuipers 
2005: 26, quoted in Kuipers 2015: 143).  
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before the 1990s (see Legman (1975) for an (indignated) account of this). The 
historical change is visible in how these kinds of jokes started to be performed in the 
open, in social contexts where they earlier would be unheard of, as well as in the mass 
media (Johnsen, 1997; Kuipers, 2015). Kuipers explains this development in the 
Netherlands with a trickle-down effect from alternative comedy to the mainstream 
from the 1970s on, as well as with a general tendency in Western expressive culture to 
value shock effects and transgression in itself, combined with generational dynamics 
where each new generation needs to be ‘worse’ than the previous one.  
It is especially interesting to note that many of the alternative comedians 
Kuipers discusses worked within public broadcasting. The resources public service 
had to both experiment and disseminate the results of these experiments seem pivotal 
for the development of this new, often aggressive form of comedy and its central 
position in the public sphere. Ytreberg (2001) discusses how this happened as a 
reaction to the new market situation when Norwegian NRK’s television monopoly 
ended. Comedians from alternative radio got relatively free reins to make a comedy 
show, The Show (1992), which was central for NRK’s strategy of reaching different 
segments of the population at the start of the fragmentation of the TV market, more 
specifically young, urban people with high education (ibid: 236). One of these 
comedians, Otto Jespersen (alias O.J.), was asked to create a show with a broader 
appeal and clearer satirical character, centred around his own persona (ibid: 253-257). 
This show, O.J. – ute på prøve (1994), became the first of three (followed by and O.J. 
– på nye eventyr (1995) and O.J. – En utstrakt hånd) on NRK in the 1990s19, where 
the O.J. persona combined classical TV host charisma with rhetorically crafted insults 
 
19 This is just one example of what was often called “the new humour” (Ytreberg, 2000), but there 
were so many new comedians and programmes that shared some aesthetic and institutional 
characteristics that I think it is safe to say that we witnessed a historical shift in Norwegian comedy at 
this time (see Løvland (2002), Wester (2005); Ytreberg (2000); and Kjus (2005) for discussions of 
other shows and comedians in the period). The O.J. persona, and the original programmes he appeared 
in, are nevertheless the ones best discussed in the scholarly literature and therefore well suited to 




as well as an ironic distance to both himself, the act of insulting and the subject matter 
of the insults (ibid).  
Irony is a, if not the, central word for understanding the cultural zeitgeist of 
the 1990s. There seems to be no general agreement about how irony should be 
defined, but I will in this chapter use Linda Hutcheon’s double definition. The main 
merits of this definition are that it is fundamentally pragmatic, as well as that it takes 
both ironist and audience into account: irony is something that is done with texts, and 
it is a way to do things with texts – a perspective that makes it possible to understand 
through textual analysis how comedy shows work in the wider public sphere:  
 
From the point of view of the interpreter, irony is an interpretive and intentional move: 
it is the making or inferring of meaning in addition to and different from what is 
stated, together with an attitude toward both the said and the unsaid. (…) from the 
point of view of (…) the ironist, irony is the intentional transmission of both 
information and evaluative attitude other than what is explicitly presented. (Hutcheon, 
1994, p. 11) 
 
Irony is of course at least as old as the Gilgamesh epic, but Generation X, the 
generation born between 1960 and 1980, was often called “the ironic generation” 
(ironigenerasjonen) in Norway, a term originally coined by the mass media, but 
eventually also used by academics20. While Norway is my case in point from this 
period, studies on Generation X and TV humour in respectively Sweden (Johansson & 
Landén, 2014) and Denmark (Bruun, 2011; Schiermer, 2008) indicate that similar 
changes happened all over Scandinavia21. The affinity for irony was also not specific 
 
20 Originally used in a causerie by journalist Tom Stalsberg in Dagbladet September 4th, 1996. In the 
academic world, it is most prominently sociologist Gunnar C. Aakvaag, self-proclaimed member of 
the ironic generation, who has used the term in public debate 
(https://morgenbladet.no/ideer/2015/i_skyggen_av_10ironigenerasjonen) (Last checked February 11th, 
2021). 
21 In addition to Otto Jespersen, who, although too old to be a part of generation X, definitely was a 
proponent of its cultural sensibility, the comedians Harald Eia and Bård Tufte Johansen were central 
in Norway. In Sweden, Henrik Schyffert and Killingegänget made shows very similar to those made 
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for Scandinavian members of Generation X. On the contrary, it has been discussed as 
a Western generational phenomenon, closely related to lifestyle and expressive culture 
(Heiman, 2001; Johansson & Landén, 2014; Ortner, 1998; Schiermer, 2008). In 
relation to film, Sconce (2002, pp. 351-352) understands it as a sensibility, meaning an 
intersection of a sociocultural formation and an aesthetic, with directors like Lynch, 
Tarantino and Anderson as important proponents. The common denominator for these 
directors, and for the Scandinavian “new humour” (see Ytreberg 2000, 2001; Kjus 
2006, Eia 2006, Bruun 2011), was a form of ‘total irony’, or ironia vitae (Sloane, 
2001), where everything in life is seen through an ironic lens, which manifested itself 
as a consequent detachment from both generic conventions as well as social 
expectations – Sconce (2002) calls it blank style. This was the background for the 
many accusations about nihilism and moral cynicism towards the cultural products of 
Generation X (Sconce, 2002; Wester, 2005; Ytreberg, 2000), and also the background 
for a unique, harder, form of comic aggression. Although irony is often seen as a 
‘cold’ and detached way of communicating and relating to the world, its potential for 
anger and transgression is well known  – think of one of irony’s subtypes, sarcasm, a 
rhetorical device known to be hurtful, and a word whose Greek roots mean “tear 
flesh”. Irony’s play with the tension between both emotional and illocutionary 
detachment and commitment is what gives it potential to carry out aggression, as I will 
show in this chapter.   
Thus, although comic aggression is old news, it nevertheless seems to have 
changed in the 1990s, when Scandinavian TV humour was integrated in a larger 
Western change of sensibility, which also as discussed above was connected with a 
more ‘material’ historical change in the media landscape (Ytreberg, 2001) as well as 
surrounded by public controversy (Wester, 2005; Ytreberg, 2000, pp. 142-145). 
Hence, it makes sense to understand this period as a historical change, a rupture, in the 
 
by Eia and Tufte Johansen, while Casper Christensen and Frank Hvam with Casper og 
Mandrilaftalen, although being latecomers, can be seen as Danish representatives. In this chapter, the 
Norwegian scene is used both because of Otto Jespersen’s satirical practice relating to the immigration 




field of comedy, which had consequences for how aggressive satire could be. A lot of 
the new humour could however not be called satirical. Many of its comedians enjoyed 
portraying themselves as anti-satire and proponents of total irony (Bruun 2011, Eia 
2006, Johansson and Landén 2014, Schiermer 2008). O.J. – En utstrakt hånd and 
Grotesco 2, on the other hand, consistently have a standpoint behind their irony: the 
comical aggression points towards a referent in the world outside the text, as well as to 
a social norm that this referent is represented as breaking (Schwind, 1988, pp. 23-72). 
Furthermore, satire criticises this norm transgression through aesthetical means used to 
ridicule the referent (ibid). Satire directed towards people that are anti-immigration has 
been a staple in Scandinavian immigration comedy, and has taken the form of both 
social satire, with stylised social types and mentalities as its butt (Bruun, 2011, p. 58) 
and political satire, with society’s powerful institutions and their representatives as its 
butt (ibid: 50). O.J. – En utstrakt hånd and Grotesco 2 are nevertheless special not 
only as examples of a new, more aggressive form of humour, but also because of their 
satirical targets: right-wing populist parties at a time where either the political or the 
discursive position of these parties changed, respectively Fremskrittspartiet (The 
Progress Party, Frp) in Norway in the late 90s and Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden 
Democrats, SD) in Sweden around 2010. The shows should therefore not only be 
studied as examples of a historical rupture in comedy itself, but also as a reaction to, 
and hence a part of, a historical change in the larger field of immigration discourse, 
where it can be argued that a hardening of the immigration debate was – perhaps 
coincidentally – met by the hardening of satire.  
 
3.2. Laughing at the indecent Progress Party: O.J. – En utstrakt hånd 
 
O.J. – En utstrakt hånd (O.J. – a hand reaching out), hereafter En utstrakt hånd, was 
broadcast in two seasons on NRK1 in 1999. While the earlier O.J. shows lacked an 
explicit theme, this was declared to be about multicultural Norway. Presenting itself as 
“Etnisk moro fra Oslo 3” (“Ethnic fun from Oslo 3”), a reference to the urban well-off 
areas of Oslo where also NRK had their studios, the show would open with a vignette 
showing a well-fed white hand first reaching out to, and then grabbing and crushing, a 
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skinny, black hand – a clear reference to the title. The set decor can be described as 
ethno-camp: Persian carpets, mahogany and zebra patterned furniture, shishas, wooden 
elephants and one odd (and possibly offensive) detail: a bag of dog food. In addition to 
Jespersen himself, the show’s cast consisted of a weekly guest, as well as a house band 
of people with immigrant background all playing tunes and instruments coded as 
“exotic”, among them djembes and a swarmadal; and finally a vox populi-like panel of 
three men of colour, with the stereotypical names Jesus, Ali and Sambo.  
 
 
Figure 1 Otto Jespersen with his vox populi of immigrants. From O.J – En Utstrakt Hånd, 
NRK, 1999. 
 
All these visual and musical means added up to the show’s character as not only a talk 
show parody, but also a parody of the different discourses that circulated about 
multicultural Norway, and thus a form of social satire. This was also the topic of many 
of the sketches, interviews and monologues in the show, but not exclusively, as the 
topic of the day also depended on the guests and current affairs. However, the show’s 
first episodes coincided with the Kosovo war and the following flux of refugees, 
which was an important issue in Norwegian public debate at the time. Thus, Jespersen 
had a chance to combine pre-planned social satire with fresh, relevant political satire. 
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Similar to his earlier shows, this was done through his persona as an almighty and 
sarcastic show host – O.J.  
This persona was originally characterised by an aggressive interview 
technique, which had roots in the late night radio show Revolvermagasinet (1988) and 
The Show, but it was in the three programmes named after himself that the O.J. 
persona became the star of the show, and was refined into a sometimes friendly, 
sometimes aggressive talk show host, carefully juggling elements of rhetorical 
virtuosity, classical TV host charisma and a distanced parody of the show host role 
(Ytreberg 2001). This style was used in interviews with studio guests, where Jespersen 
to various degrees would interchangeably insult and ignore his conversation partner, 
but its highlight was perhaps when O.J. delivered monologues of “fresh talk” 
(Ytreberg 2001:259-261), which Wester (2005) has characterised as personal attacks. 
These monologues consisted both of addressing the viewers directly as well as of 
autobiographical stories and talk about current affairs and people currently in the 
limelight of the public sphere. He would also sometimes address public persons, 
especially politicians, directly. Stylistically, he would deliver his monologues as well 
as the interviews with a deadpan expression, sometimes interrupted by an overtly 
controlled smile resembling a grin. His direct way of looking into a camera, and active 
gesticulation, was a contrast to this facial mimicry, and his monologues also often 
escalated from contained seriousness to aggressive outbursts, where he would scream 
towards the camera, point directly towards the TV audience and deliver angry and 
sarcastic statements about people and current affairs. As one can see, and as Wester 
(2005) observes, Jespersen’s persona has several antisocial features, which I will show 
are instrumental for how he uses them to carry out satire about xenophobia in this 
particular show. 
In the second episode of En utstrakt hånd, Jespersen used his monologue to 
comment upon the Norwegian treatment of refugees from the Kosovo war, with a 
special emphasis of the rhetoric of the right-wing populist Progress Party 
(Fremskrittspartiet, hereafter Frp). Although Frp had an anti-immigration stance from 
the very beginning, and made it into a central issue for the party in the local election of 
1987 (Gripsrud, 2018; Hagelund, 2003), the late 90s was nevertheless a time of change 
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in the party as their relatively moderate rhetoric – both when it comes to 
characterisations of immigrants as well as policy suggestions – was replaced with a 
more fierce and controversial rhetoric (ibid). Frp had since the 80s been accused of 
“fishing in muddy waters”, meaning profiting from and even encouraging prejudice 
towards immigrants (Bjøntegård, 2017; Brox, 1991; Hagelund, 2003), but it is 
relatively clear that it was not until the 90s that both Frp’s rhetoric and its institutional 
anchoring changed in such a way that the allegation started to carry weight. In the late 
80s and early 90s, party leader Carl I. Hagen argued against immigration on mainly 
economic grounds, and neither made use of prejudiced rhetoric nor questioned the 
legitimacy of refugees’ need for help (Bjøntegaard 2017)22. This changed in the late 
90s, where especially party members Øystein Hedstrøm, Vidar Kleppe and Jan 
Simonsen were known for harsh rhetoric on immigration – which included statements 
like “where Christians, Muslims, Jews, Arabs and people from different cultures live 
together, life is characterised by murder, drugs and other forms of crime»23, and the 
proposition that asylum seekers from selected countries should be followed 
everywhere to avoid crime24. Hedstrøm also reportedly had contact with right-wing 
extremists and used their input to create parts of Frp’s immigration and integration 
policy (Gripsrud 2018: 222). Finally, the local elections in 1995 and 1999 can both be 
characterised as “immigration elections”, largely due to how Frp promoted 
immigration as a key issue (Hagelund 2003: 116). This is important background 
information in order to understand Jespersen’s monologue beyond being merely 
political satire of one concrete incident, and rather as a response to a change in the 
immigration discourse.  
The incident in question was that Frp-leader Carl I. Hagen, about two weeks 
after the NATO bombing of Serbia had started, appeared in the newspaper Aftenposten 
 
22 This point was also central for Ottar Brox (1991), who criticised the immigration debate in the 80s, 
calling it a moral championship were it was necessary for the participants to distance themselves from 
racism, albeit there – according to Brox – were no instances of racism in the mainstream political 
debate. 
23 Hedstrøm in Dagsavisen, June 27th, 1999. 
24 Simonsen on NRK Radio, September 2nd, 1999. 
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as a firm opponent both of the NATO bombing and of bringing refugees from Kosovo 
to Norway and other Western countries. Hagen argued that a better option would be to 
help the Albanians in Kosovo and the neighbouring countries, including supplying 
them with weapons so they could fight the Serbian army (Aftenposten, September 6th, 
1999). Jespersen’s monologue was then delivered Friday, September 4th, just three 
days after Hagen’s statement in the press – which also shows how close to 
broadcasting the show was produced. 
 
Spring has of course arrived further south. In Kosovo, for example, it is apparently 
green already, and the bumblebees have started to buzz around the poppies on the 
fields down there. But it is no joking matter being a bumblebee down there right now, 
given that around one million Kosovo Albanians rumble over the fields fleeing from 
Serbian soldiers. It is terrible what goes on down there right now, but what’s even 
worse is that 90 Albanians have arrived here in Norway. And there are more to come. 
Bondevik [the prime minister, Christian Democrats] says that we have to open our 
homes for them. It’s not really a good time right now. I am building an extra living 
room in the basement, I am going to have a bar, pool table, jacuzzi over in the corner, 
and it is not totally cool to have the basement full of hungry Albanians who move 
around among the building materials and make a mess out of it. Is this what Bondevik 
means, that it is going to be like this?  
Carl I. Hagen is currently the only one who sees this threat towards Norwegian 
basement living rooms, unfortunately. We should help them where they are, he said to 
Aftenposten on Tuesday, in Kosovo, we need to give them food, and weapons, he said, 
and chase them back towards the Serbians!  
And while the others just talk and talk, Carl and co.25 does something. He and 
some other Frp boys are actually planning to travel down to Kosovo now. The trip will 
be financed by a series of new embezzlements by local Frp politicians. They are going 
down to turn the refugee flux into a formidable attack against the Serbians! They have 
been training for an entire week now, in Frognerparken. First, they went up to Armo 
shop in Trondheimsveien and bought some really heavy camo clothing. Everybody 
 
25 This is a reference to the sitcom “Karl & Co” (TV 2 1998-2001), known for relatively simple 
character-driven situation comedy, here probably connoting poor taste. 
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except Vidar Kleppe, who insisted on keeping his bright yellow V jumper, because he 
thought that would cause fear and uncertainty amongst the Serbians and I think he is 
fucking right about that!  
What the boys have practiced the most, is to roll sideways with their weapons 
ready as we see in movies. And most of them managed quite well, except for Øystein 
Hedstrøm. He did indeed roll the fastest of them all, but he was so unfortunate that a 
stick was hooked in a part of his hair, and thus he tangled one and a half meters of 
combover into the thorns and got stuck! Jan Simonsen thought that they needed to cut 
over his hair all down to the bacon rind to free him, but Hedstrøm refused straight 
away, he has after all spent ten years saving the little hair he has, and so Carl I. Hagen 
promptly pulled up the entire bush with its roots, and Hedstrøm of course barely 
managed to stand on his feet with this fucking big thorn bush on his head, it has roots 
several meters long, that drag along the ground behind him, he cried and he did not 
want to come to Kosovo anymore, if this was what it was going to be like! But Carl I. 
Hagen declared: on the contrary! With this headpiece, he was so well camouflaged, 
that he could get the honour of going in front in the campaign against the Serbians 
when they arrived in Kosovo! The Progress Party is a delightful party, you guys! 
Because they are right! We do not solve the conflict by letting refugees into 
Norway. It is better to bomb them where they are!  
 
This monologue is exemplary political satire: topical, very dependent on shared 
contextual knowledge earned from the news, attacking politicians for their bigotry 
(Bruun 2011). Following Schwind’s satire model, Frp is the real world-referent that is 
criticised for violating social norms. The core of the satirical criticism towards the 
party lays in an incongruence between the ideals propounded by Carl I. Hagen and the 
reality: the scenario of Frp going to war is cued as ironic because it is obviously 
fiction, and thus it is implied that the party in reality does the opposite of what they do 
in this story: stay safely at home while encouraging others to go to war. The evaluative 
message of the irony is hence that Frp has broken a social norm that can be formulated 
as “one should help victims of war, even if it means putting oneself at risk”. This 
reconstruction is also backed up by the sentence “And while the others just talk and 
talk, Carl and co. does something”, which should be read as ironic, since contextual 
knowledge tells the audience that Frp was the only Norwegian party that neither 
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wanted refugees nor active Norwegian millitary participation in the conflict. The Frp 
politicians are thus portrayed as someone who neither are interested in helping the 
victims of wars, nor show any form of bravery. This is accentuated and taken further 
in Jespersen’s final statement, “it is better to bomb them where they are”, which he 
shouted in a festive, enthusiastic voice, smiling and raising his hands. Being a 
paraphrase of a real Frp slogan, “It is better to help them where they are”, this creates a 
semantic clash between the pragmatism clothed in humanist ideals of the latter, and 
the alleged harsh realities in Kosovo – there is no help there, only bombs. This way, 
Jespersen uses irony to challenge Frp’s own narrative about themselves and their 
policy, by indirectly that Frp’s suggested policy is not humane at all, as it ignores and 
maybe even contributes to human suffering – it is indecent. 
 
 





Sociologist Anniken Hagelund argues that the Norwegian discourse on immigration has 
been dominated by an ideal of decency. She summarises this as follows: 
 
A rhetoric is applied where it is made clear that while free immigration is impossible, 
immigration politics is a matter of helping people in deep distress, and a rich nation, 
which prides itself of its humanitarian traditions, has a responsibility for doing so 
(2003: 13).  
 
Hagelund argues that taking up this decency position has allowed Norwegian 
politicians to restrict immigration while at the same time making clear that they follow 
humanitarian ideals and seek to help those who truly need it (ibid). Most interesting 
for my purpose is her discussions of how decency only “becomes meaningful in 
contrast to that which is not decent” (ibid: 14), which in political discourse historically 
has been Frp. Furthermore, Hagelund uses Laclau’s term constitutive outside, “the 
'outside' that blocks the identity of the 'inside' (and is nonetheless, the prerequisite for 
its constitution at the same time)” (Laclau, 1990, p. 17) to explain the relationship 
between the decency discourse and racism. The Norwegian self-image as 
fundamentally decent is understood in opposition to racism. As I read Hagelund, this is 
also instrumental for making Frp into the embodiment of indecency, because although 
no politician would say that Frp is racist, the ‘fishing in muddy waters’ hypothesis 
implies a relation between Frp and racist sentiments in the population (2003: 218-19).  
Jespersen’s monologue fits well with the then current formulation of the 
decency discourse and the problematisation of Frp as its constitutive outside. In 1999, 
this dominated the immigration debate. Hagelund (2003: 130-32) discusses how the 
other political parties largely competed in being the most immigrant-friendly and 
emphasising their distance from Frp, perhaps as a reaction to public rallies conducted 
by Hedstrøm and Kleppe that often were referred to as “immigration shows” (ibid: 
126-129). Even though Jespersen’s monologue was held a few months before the 
election campaign, Frp’s rhetoric on immigration had been an issue in the media since 
1995 and became more prominent during the Kosovo crisis. The monologue can thus 
be read as a part of an old but revitalised tendency to exclude Frp from the realm of 
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decency. Seen this way, Jespersen’s humour was conservative, as it complied with 
dominant patterns of serious discourse, which in the terms of boundary struggles 
deemed not only certain types of xenophobic discourse as illegitimate, but also 
excluded those holding an anti-immigration position by labelling them as uncivil 
outsiders of the moral community (Thorbjørnsrud, 2017, pp. 262-264).  If that was all 
that there was to it, then the contribution of TV comedy in the public sphere was to 
reproduce the same tendencies that dominated the ordinary debate. 
However, this conclusion ignores how En utstrakt hånd worked within the 
decency-discourse by means of humour, hence following different rules than its 
serious counterpart, which made the show able to do things that could not be done in 
the ordinary debate. It is noteworthy that the counterattacks on Frp’s harsh rhetoric in 
the political realm would be made by means of either relatively straight forward 
condemnation, through distancing by positioning oneself as immigrant friendly; or by 
some version of the ‘fishing in muddy waters’-claim (Hagelund 1999: 37-42, 2003: 
126-34). It appears to have been impossible to claim that Frp was racist, or even to 
elaborate on what exactly it was that was problematic and indecent with their rhetoric 
and policy. This could be done in Jespersen’s satire due to its use of ironic humour, 
with its inherent balance between detachment and commitment, between non-
seriousness and aggressive evaluations. Controversial implications can always be 
negated when using irony. Jespersen’s monologue gave the ideal of decency flesh on 
the bone when he drew up a moral principle of helping people even if it puts yourself 
at risk and claimed that this was broken by Frp. This was even connected to a social 
form of satire: after describing his persona’s rather extravagant plans for a living room 
in the basement, and how this would be compromised by letting refugees stay, 
Jespersen stated that “Carl I. Hagen is currently the only one who sees this threat 
towards Norwegian basement living rooms”. Sequences like this show how the O.J. 
character is rather antisocial, which spills over to the satirical evaluation of Frp. The 
implication is that Frp’s restrictiveness in the immigration field is not due to economic 
prudence but in sentiments like stinginess and gluttony. Furthermore, Jespersen 
constructed a discrepancy between Frp’s own claims to be decent, but pragmatic (“we 
want to help them where they are”) – and a reality described as so dangerous that this 
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policy would be impossible, a discrepancy that is created and emphasised by the 
surprising reworking of Frp’s well known talking point, where the well-known became 
twisted and appeared in a new light. This served as a critical inspection and rebuttal of 
Frp’s own counternarrative where they sought to portray themselves as decent, and did 
together with the rest of the monologue frame Frp as cynical and hypocritical to the 
degree of being antisocial. This way, Jespersen’s humour contributed to boundary 
struggles in the public sphere by drawing up moral boundaries and to emphasise why 
Frp should be placed outside these boundaries. His satire, albeit being conservative in 
the sense that it goes along with the hegemonic discourse, did thus also have a creative 
quality, as it not only re-produced the moral boundaries but also produced them anew 
by filling them with more concrete sense and meaning than what the serious debate 
could do. TV comedy’s work in the public sphere was thus not only to draw moral 
boundaries, but also to make them clearer. Hence, a different boundary, the one often 
drawn between conserving and creative humour, becomes less clear, and one sees how 
the particularities of the humorous mode first and foremost lies in its productive 
tensions.  
In addition to being clarified, the moral boundaries were also elaborated with 
an affective texture and saturation brought about by the comical aggression in 
Jespersen’s satire. A large part of the monologue is straightforward ridicule of the Frp 
politicians. Jespersen uses familiar humour techniques like comic degradation 
(Bakhtin, 1968), when he paints a picture of ‘high’ politicians being reduced to ‘low’ 
bodies, rolling around in the bushes and getting their hair stuck. In addition, the 
politicians’ appearance is caricatured when Jespersen refers Hedstrøm’s lack of hair 
and Kleppe’s sweater. The grotesqueness of the imagery Jespersen paints does of 
course have a long tradition in comedy, also in political satire about real people. 
Nevertheless, something special is happening here. There is a sense of serious personal 
attacks. Jespersen does play a character, but his monologue has a more complicated 
relationship with the divide between fiction and reality than what a sketch would have. 
He combines burlesque scenarios with verbatim quotes from politicians, as well as an 
unsettling twist of Frp’s catchphrase “It is better to help them where they are”. 
Moreover, although it is a parody, he still partly operates within the generic contracts 
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of a talk show, where some committed relationship to the social reality actually exists 
– as opposed to comedy programmes (Kjus, 2005; Langer, 1981). This relationship 
with social reality is even stronger when Jespersen interviews people, but I will argue 
that it is an important part of his monologues as well.  
As quoted above, Jespersen ridicules a yellow sweater Kleppe allegedly used 
to wear. During this sequence, Jespersen first increases the pace, then slows down, 
starts with theatrical gestures and puts emphasis on certain words, before he speeds up 
again, increases the volume, makes a short thumbs up and finally looks at the audience 
with a strict face, taking a longer pause for applause: “Kleppe …who insisted on 
keeping his bright yellow V-jumper, because he thought that would cause fear and 
uncertainty amongst the Serbians and I think he is fucking right about that!”. Kleppe is 
insulted in a sarcastic tone, with hefty gestures and angry mimicry (which he also uses 
when referring to Hedstrøm’s scalp as a ’bacon rind’). Although staged and 
exaggerated, it bears very strong resemblance to how insults and bullying happen in 
ordinary communication – both when it comes to the delivery and how the degradation 
of the politicians is based on their real appearance. “Jespersen’s satire is wrapped in a 
bully’s behaviour”, as Wester (2005: 63) points out. This becomes clearer when we, 
following Wester (ibid) and Ytreberg (2001), conceptualise Jespersen’s persona as a 
way of conducting mediatised face-work in Goffman’s (1971) sense. By ironically 
distancing himself from a traditional host role and the face-work involved in this, 
Jespersen creates an opportunity to manoeuvre the face-work of other people 
(Ytreberg 2000). This is something more than symbolic aggression, as it can be seen 
as a face-threatening act and thus a direct attack on people’s public reputation (ibid) – 
and when it takes the form of satire, it becomes a way of intervening into the political 
debate with a level of aggression rarely seen in other form of genres. 
This kind of face-threatening acts are incongruous with the central generic 
feature of talk shows, namely their mediated intimacy. I would add that they also are 
incongruous with the classical kind of TV host authority based on a formal, 
institutionalised voice that is imagined to guarantee neutrality and factuality (Scannell 
& Cardiff, 1991) This is the core of Jespersen’s irony, where he in some respects 
appears to be a talk show host, but in other respects clearly is not. The evaluative 
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stance taken in this respect is one of distance and detachment from both classical TV 
conventions and his bully behaviour, and thus he does to some degree cancel the 
commitments that normally come with both the formal conventions of talk shows and 
the content of his talk, a trait which is quite paradigmatic for the new humour 
(Ytreberg 2000, 2001; Bruun 2011). This is how his personal attacks can be 
interpreted as humour, not as a grave transgression of norms, since they do happen 
within a parody of a talk show and thus can appear as nothing more than vehicles for 
an irony that seeks to ridicule TV in general and this genre in particular.  
However, it can be argued that the personal attacks actually happened. It is 
worth noting that while there are many cues of irony (see Hutcheon 1994 for a 
discussion of how irony is signalled) that suggest an ironic intention both towards 
television conventions per se and towards the talking points of the monologue, 
Jespersen’s description of Kleppe’s sweater as repulsive or his comparison of 
Hedstrøm as a pig are quite direct and can hence also be interpreted as real, insulting 
speech acts26. Thus, there are some aggressive impulses here that have a certain 
authentic quality. This creates a complex social space where the meaning of the 
monologue not necessarily becomes fuzzy, but at least is up to the beholder to decide. 
Is it real, meaning serious, aggression, or not?  
This tension is also visible in the virtuosity that Jespersen employs in his 
parody of a talk show host. As Ytreberg (2001: 262-65) argues, this does not only 
create distance to the formal conventions, but also individualises O.J. and creates a 
new kind of contract between him as a person and his audience. It is expected that he 
will break the rules for social behaviour, herein lies his virtuosity and a central part of 
the show’s potential to create pleasure. This can concretely be seen by how the 
management of applause is an integral part of his monologues: by means of changing 
 
26 I am aware that neither the word “repulsive” nor the comparison of Hedstrøm with a pig is explicitly 
expressed in Jespersen’s monologue, which could mean that inferring these semantic blocks entails 
that irony is detected, as it is something more than what is explicitly said (and even evaluative!). 
However, Hutcheon’s definition is based on a speech act perspective on meaning (if not, it would be a 
useless definition covering all kinds of implicitness in symbol use), and as far as I can see, there is no 
implicit speech act going on here – the face-threatening insults are quite explicit.    
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pace, volume and emphasis; gestures and cinematography, Jespersen seeks to make the 
studio audience applaud and laugh when he fires out an insult or an antisocial remark. 
The studio audience’s response should furthermore be seen as a model response for the 
TV audience (Ytreberg 2001). In other words, the intended audience response is 
approval. It would call for empirical audience research to determine exactly what it is 
that the audience approves of, but based on how Jespersen and the director used 
different aesthetic means to manage the audience, I think it is safe to say that it at least 
includes some sort of appreciation of his insults and transgression – and that the 
pleasure connected to their authentic quality is a central dimension of this. After all, 
these bully-like breaks of decorum are what make Jespersen funny.  
This does of course not mean that the audiences need to appreciate the insults 
based on their content. It might as well be that they enjoy them for the transgression in 
itself – in an ironic fashion. So far, this fits with the idea of irony as total detachment 
from the commitments of the real world. However, besides being epistemologically 
untenable (Tjønneland, 1999, 2004), this view of irony ignores how the trope also 
works with affects and evaluations. Hutcheon (1994, pp. 37-43) argues that irony 
always conveys an attitude or a feeling, although appearing to be distant – this is part 
of what she calls the edge of irony. This implies that Jespersen’s audiences do at least 
infer, but not necessarily share, the evaluative attitude behind this aggression (ibid, p. 
42). The cues to infer this evaluative attitude partly lays in the satirical message 
discussed above. 
Thus, in addition to being traditional satire about Frp’s questionable moral 
fibre, the monologue is also a text where party members are comically degraded and 
even directly bullied for their appearance. Their social face and public image are torn 
down in all thinkable aspects. To depict morally bad people as ugly and comical is an 
old trope, but it is still something that normally only comedians can get away with 
within a mainstream public sphere27. This important difference from serious debate 
suggests that the aesthetic and emotional aspects of satire play an important role for 
how its moral evaluations are carried out, and they are indeed an important part of 
 
27 At least it was until the election of Donald Trump. 
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Schwind’s (1988) satire model: the criticism towards the moral transgressor needs to 
be made by aesthetical means used to ridicule if it is to be satire. The question is if this 
matters for how satire works in the public sphere. In order to discuss the importance of 
this, it is necessary to move from the pure discursive level up to the level of social 
psychology.   
According to Michael Billig, laughter is essentially a disciplinary mechanism 
of ridicule. Billig views laughter as inherently rhetoric, “for it is typically used to 
communicate meaning to others” (2005b, p. 189), but he also views it as being 
connected not mainly with joy, but first and foremost with the pain of being ridiculed, 
which he claims is how we learn what laughter is during childhood (ibid: 194-99). 
Furthermore, he argues that ridicule is a social universal closely related to 
embarrassment, and that these two social phenomena work similarly in reproducing 
norms and thus maintaining the social order. Billig’s main concern is how it feels to be 
ridiculed, and the social consequences of these feelings. While his point is original and 
solidly argued, I do not necessarily agree with his rather strong conclusion of humour 
as inherently conservative – as I have indicated above and will return to later in this 
dissertation. More important at this moment, however, is how Billig pays less attention 
to the feelings of the ridiculer. This is probably because the point is well treated in 
classical superiority theory, already by Hobbes: 
  
Sudden Glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and 
is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the 
apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they 
suddenly applaud themselves (Hobbes 1991: 43). 
 
The combination of Hobbes’ insight and Billig’s theory makes it possible to see how 
laughing at someone also reproduces social order from the perspective of the joke 
teller and his audience. It contributes to draw and maintain moral boundaries and is 
thus central in the formation of in-groups (Fine, 1983; Frye, 1990, p. 61). This is an 
important issue in modern humour research (Kuipers 2008), but little attention has 
been paid to how this interacts with other ways of keeping an in-group together, 
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especially on the level of mediated communication. My claim is thus that satire like 
Jespersen’s monologue works with the inherent tensions of the humorous mode 
regarding negative and positive emotions by providing an opportunity to feel joy 
through aggression when drawing up moral boundaries, and that this is an important 
supplement to how these boundaries are drawn in serious discourse. The core point is 
that if moral boundaries are to be perceived as legitimate, it is necessary to feel good 
about sticking to them. One of the ways in which this can be done, is by feeling 
superior to people who transgress the moral boundaries. This is also a powerful way to 
create communion around these boundaries: shared laughter and joy. I would also add 
that this affective texture is a way to make a claim about why these moral boundaries 
matter, in other words, to make them politically relevant in this particular context. As 
stressed in the classical rhetorical tradition and demonstrated in modern psychology, 
emotional assessments of the world are also cognitive (Dalgleish & Power, 1999; 
Fafner, 1997) and make issues clearer as they serve as value judgements (Nussbaum, 
2004). This is perhaps the point where the functional interdependence of the satirical 
and the face-threatening parts of Jespersen’s monologue becomes clearest: combining 
them is a way to direct value judgements towards both Frp’s politics and the party’s 
politicians. En utstrakt hånd thus enforced moral boundaries both by spelling them 
out, added an affective component that made it clear why they were important, and 
provided for the creation of an emotionally based communion around them – all the 
time by placing a specific political party and its politicians outside these boundaries.  
With this in mind, the significance of the increased aggression in the humour 
of the 1990s becomes clearer. Harder humour can be understood as a stronger moral 
condemnation. Jespersen’s face-threatening humour combined with more ordinary 
satirical moves is in one way a total condemnation of Frp’s moral character, and with 
the ironic talk show parody as its basis it can be argued that he challenges the party’s 
social face and public reputation in a very real way, while still maintaining the comedy 
show’s right to transgress based on ironic distance. As Bruun (2011: 53-57) argues in a 
discussion about similar shows in Denmark, this tension is probably important for the 
entertainment value of the programme, which is as important a part of satire as its 
critical function (Vigsø, 2019). New forms of taste demanded new forms of satire, if 
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the genre was going to work. In addition, it is worth noting that the increased 
aggression, or harshness, in En utstrakt hånd was directed towards an increasingly 
harsh immigration debate. Hedstrøm, Kleppe and Simonsen talked about immigrants 
in a way that was unheard of before in the main fora of Norwegian public debate, and 
through this rhetoric they managed to set, or even become, the main agenda of the 
immigration debate in 1999. This is also the connection between the monologue I have 
analysed here and En utstrakt hånd as a whole: the kind of prejudice towards 
immigrants that the Frp-trio expressed publicly was also the butt of the joke in the 
show’s social satire, which was ubiquitous through its two seasons. The aggression of 
his satire can thus be seen as a reaction to an increased aggression towards immigrants 
in public debate, where prejudice that used to be socially sanctioned now would be 
central in the rhetoric of politicians.  
It is tempting to describe this dynamic as polarisation. The affective 
dimension of polarisation has indeed been an object of interest in the field of political 
communication in the last years (Iyengar et.al. 2018). There are also some indications 
in the representative data collected for SCANPUB that the immigration issue has 
become more polarised in Scandinavia over the years, indirectly measured by the 
steady increase of newspaper debate as well as a politicisation of the issue as national 
politicians to a larger degree participated in these debates (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019). 
However, the notion of polarisation as it is used in political science and 
psychologically oriented communication studies is based on a way of measuring 
public opinion that lays far from the scholarly tradition in which this dissertation is 
written, and it would not be sound to claim that Jespersen’s satire contributed to 
affective polarisation. What can be claimed, perhaps keeping in mind some of the 
assumptions behind the notion of polarisation, is that this satire contributed to an on-
going negotiation of an affective and moral divide in the Norwegian public sphere, 
where the treatment of immigrants was central. Although this negotiation in the 1990s 
also went on in serious discourse, manifested in the calls for decency amongst political 
actors, satire here had a special function, because the discursive rules governing it 
allowed it to be a space of aggression, and through this aggression elaborate and 




3.3. Grotesco’s “The Pig Democrats”: ridiculing the Swedish Democrats as 
socially and morally backwards 
 
The group Grotesco originated as a group of teenagers doing theatre classes in the 
Culture School – public extracurricular cultural education common in Scandinavia – at 
Lidingö, a wealthy suburb of Stockholm. They entered the national comedy scene 
through winning the Humorlabbet competition in 2005, where different comedy 
groups mailed in pilots that were broadcast on SVT. The winner, based on both jury 
and popular vote, would get their own show produced and broadcast on the same 
channel. The first season of the show, named after the group, was a critic’s favourite 
but not an audience success, but the show was nevertheless renewed as Grotesco 2 in 
2010. The first episode was titled “Svindemokraterna” and consisted – as most 
Grotesco-episodes do – of connected narrative segments fragmented by different 
sketches, sometimes obviously related to the main episode narrative, other times less 
so. The main narrative in this episode was how a political party rooted in Sweden’s 
southernmost region Skåne (Scania), Svindemokraterna – the Pig Democrats – are 
elected into Parliament for the first time. Their new MP, the pig farmer Jöns, travels to 
Stockholm together with his favourite pig, and due to his old-fashioned appearance 
and attitude, he feels alienated in the modern city and is also mocked quite a bit by his 
fellow MPs from other political parties. 
Svindemokraterna is quite evidently a caricature of the populist party 
Sverigedemokraterna, the Sweden Democrats (hereafter SD), which originally was 
based in Skåne and first entered Riksdagen, the Swedish parliament, in 2010, less than 
two months before this episode aired. The party, founded in 1988, has a historical 
connection to the extreme right, but had gone through a sort of cleansing process up to 
the election of party leader Jimmie Åkesson in 2005, who claimed that “the party is a 
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different one now than 10-15 years ago”28. Nevertheless, it remains a controversial 
party, and it was made clear by the established political parties that no one wanted to 
collaborate with them in any way after they entered Parliament. It has even been 
claimed that SD was stigmatised as being the beast, the extreme other, by the Swedish 
parties (Hellström & Hervik, 2014), and that the party’s entry into parliament was 
treated as an iconic event (Leavy, 2007) by the Swedish press (Loman, 2010). As I 
will show in the following, Grotesco’s sketch – like the O.J. monologue discussed 
above – can be considered as partaking in this dominant discourse about SD, while 
still doing something unique by virtue of being satire and humour. Before I embark on 
this analysis, I will describe the general style of Grotesco and locate it in a comedy 
context that also makes it clear how its satirical aggression should be understood in 
relation to the rupture in the comedy scene of the 1990s.  
I would argue that Grotesco’s style can be characterised by three features: its 
absurdity, its emphasis on the visually grotesque and its special use of identity 
humour, characterised by irony. The absurd lays in exaggerations built into story lines 
as well as musical numbers. For example, the very first episode of their first season is 
based on the premise that a magical portal has opened to Gothenburg of the 1970s, and 
extremely friendly working class people (a stereotype drawn from film and TV of the 
70s) are pouring into modern Sweden, threatening its efficiency and bringing it to the 
brink of collapse. Another example is one of Grotesco’s most popular musical 
numbers, “Bögernas fel” (The gays’ fault)29, where a pastor participating in a TV 
debate breaks out in song, singing how all thinkable problems in the world are caused 
by gay people. In many ways, this kind of absurdity emphasises Grotesco’s character 
as fiction, and is reminiscent of Monty Python.  
At the same time, Grotesco’s humour is often based on the visually grotesque, 
especially ugly facial expressions, but also lavish mise-en-scènes with many visual 
allusions as well as strange details, brought to its fullest potential in the Eurovision 
 
28 Original press release from SD, 
http://www.mynewsdesk.com/se/sverigedemokraterna/pressreleases/sverigedemokraterna-byter-
partisymbol-105142 (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
29 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T1lvMJ-l0_A (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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Song Contest parody “Tingeling”30. This again is pivotal in Grotesco’s special version 
of identity comedy. Arthur Asa Berger defines identity comedy as being “about people 
with all kinds of identity problems” (2010: 176), which I interpret as meaning that the 
comical conflicts are created by features closely related to social identity, and that the 
butt of the joke lays here as well. What is special with Grotesco is that their absurdities 
very often are based on existing, stratified social identities that can be located in space 
and time – like the working-class people from Gothenburg mentioned above, or the 
pig farmers from Scania that will be discussed in the analysis below. Grotesco’s 
closest relative is thus perhaps Little Britain, based on exaggerated characters with 
clear social identities and with a vast use of the visually grotesque. However, the 
humour in Little Britain lays in the repeating of the same conflicts and themes in 
different scenarios and variations (Berger 2010) – it is the comedy equivalent of jazz. 
Grotesco is based on variance – its grotesqueness hits in all directions, but common 
for all is how it makes fun of widely shared cultural stereotypes and narratives 
connected to social identities. 
This highly intertextual form of comedy is a descendant of the new humour of 
the 1990s, as it was based on poking fun at media conventions (see also Bruun 2011). 
Absurdity was also an important element here. The difference between these shows 
and Grotesco lays in how the logic of the comedy was not so much based on mocking 
media conventions, but rather the narratives of social roles and identities circulating in 
the mass media. Ironic distance was thus still important: in order to get away with 
grotesque portrayals of various social identities, it was necessary to be able to claim an 
ironic position (see also Finding 2010). This was done through the absurd, which 
emphasised the fictional character of the show. Nevertheless, this operated in a tension 
with the realism laying in the very precise pinpointing of different social identities, 
which created the opportunity for carrying out – or at least interpreting – a certain kind 
of comic aggression by means of the grotesque. Irony was, like in the new humour 
discussed above, again a carte blanche to be aggressive, but this time towards groups 
 
30 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yN9lOwZjXDU (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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rather than individuals, which I in the end of this chapter will show has potential 
consequences for how the show worked in the public sphere.   
 
The episode “Svindemokraterna”31 starts with a landscape shot of twilight sky, with 
the onscreen text “Skåne” (Scania) in the lower centre, accompanied by accordion 
music. The camera tilts down to a farm. A change in musical motif is followed by a 
cut to an interior scene, where we first see a man sitting next to a table, sleeping, and 
dressed in old-fashioned clothes. A song starts off screen, and a cut shows a rowdy 
party of people dressed in the same way, one of them singing a patriotic call and 
response song about Scania, where he sings the verse and the other party guests join in 
for the chorus – “In Scania”. The partying characters exhibit appreciation of the song 
and the party with exaggerated facial expressions. After some seconds, it cuts to a boy 
who eats porridge alone next to a radio – obviously in the same house, but in a 
different room, as the party’s song can be heard in the background. He breaks the 
fourth wall by hushing towards camera when the radio announcer states that the results 
from the general election are ready. There is a short report about other results, before it 
is announced, almost inaudible, that the Scanian Svindemokraterna has broken the 
election threshold and will be represented in Parliament. It then cuts back to the party, 
where after the chorus “In Scania” we hear the verse “To immigration we clearly say 
no/Too much change makes the Scanian scared32” – which also breaks the call and 
response-pattern as the party responds with a clear “No!!” after the first part of the 
verse. The boy seen before then interrupts the party by asking where his dad is, and is 
directed outside. Cut to the pigsty, where we for the first time see the main character, 
Jöns, who in a loving manner tends to one of his pigs. His son rushes in and says that 
Jöns has been elected to Parliament. 
 
 
31 The narrative parts of the episode can be watched (in poor quality) at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=waZwZusgj3I (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
32 «Till invandring säger vi tydligt vårt nej/För mycket förändring gör Skåningen skraj». The last 
word, “skraj”, is Scania dialect for “scared, fearful” (“rädd” in standard Swedish), which adds to the 




Figure 3 The Scanian party guests, singing a xenophobic song. From Grotesco 2, 
SVT/Grotesco, 2010. 
 
The next part of the story follows Jöns’ travel to Stockholm – as he leaves in a horse 
carriage, his son waves him goodbye, asking him to say hi to the King – and his 
troubles fitting in in the modern city as well as in Parliament. He walks with his 
favourite pig on a leash, and among other problems, he becomes shocked when he sees 
a man on a TV screen and thinks he is captured in a glass box. During this segment, it 
becomes clear that Jöns views Stockholm as a cold and hard place, not the least 
because of how he is treated by his peers in Parliament. Dressed in red and blue, they 
clearly represent the leading parties of each political wing, respectively the Social 
Democrats and the Moderates. They do not laugh at his jokes, they ignore him, they 
pretend not to understand his dialect, and they talk about a pig smell when he sits 
behind them. The sequence ends with Jöns writing a letter to his son, stating that he 
has decided that he was not fit for Stockholm or the Parliament and is ready to go 
home. 
The final part of the story starts in Parliament, where the chairman announces 
that Jöns is next speaker. When Jöns does not appear, the chairman asks if anyone 
knows where he is, and a conservative MP suggests looking in the pigsty, which elicits 
laughter from the chairman and the entire Parliament. Suddenly, Jöns appears, and 
holds an emotional speech about how he felt alienated in Stockholm and Parliament. 
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Accompanied by violas, he tells that he was about to give up his political career but 
changed his mind as he has a dream about a Sweden where a simple farmer like him 
can feel that Stockholm is his capital and that Sweden is his country. Then, he 
continues: 
 
“We are all human. We are fathers, mothers, sisters and brothers, but first and 
foremost, we are Swedes. And that is why it is time that we all spit in our hands and 
give a proper whirl at throwing out all these Negroes, the Jews, and first and foremost 
the Muslims!” 
 
The episode is then rounded off with a musical number, “Blanda Upp” (“Mix/Mash 
Up”)33, a hip hop parody where different conflicting groups, among them people of 
colour and neo-Nazis, were urged to have sex with, and implicitly get children with, 
each other, in order to fix the country’s problems with integration and xenophobia – 
the song includes a sex-scene between a black man and a blond white woman singing 
the Swedish national anthem. 
This description should make it quite clear that “Svindemokraterna” was 
political satire, where the butt of the joke was SD’s racist and Nazi past, and the 
episode’s relatively clear implicature was how this heritage still was a part of SD, 
behind the party’s rhetoric and self-image of being representatives for “ordinary 
Sweden” and perhaps even the only properly democratic alternative in the Swedish 
party flora (Hellström, 2010). Following Schwind’s satire model, the social norm SD 
is criticised for breaking could be reconstructed as “Sweden should be a pluralistic and 
multicultural society”. In the episode, SD’s alter ego Svindemokraterna represents the 
opposite: a chauvinistic and traditionalist milieu as shown in the beginning of the 
programme, as well as a clear exclusionary stance build into their vision of Sweden in 
the end. The inclusive Sweden that is presented here is only inclusive for those who 
are Swedes in the “correct” way – it is an ethnonationalist vision. This fits quite well 
with SD’s actual rhetoric and politics, where important topoi are how Swedishness 
 
33 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dCDMGu-
xi30&list=FL8iOBz__YVYeteMshsKce5A&index=458 (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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understood not as racial but as cultural unity; nostalgia about the “Folkhem”, the 
People’s Home, a sort of social democratic paradise allegedly lost; and the claim to 
represent the true concerns of the Swedish people alienated by the political and 
cultural elites (Hellström 2010: 93-136). 
The political establishment, and partly the media, reacted to SD’s rhetoric by 
framing SD as stupid or evil, starting in 2006 when the party started to become a real 
political force (ibid). The idea of the Swedish nation as multicultural and pluralistic 
rather than ethnonationalist was one of the strategies used to counter SD, as well as a 
critical discussion of the Folkhem nostalgia, partly as an attempt to reclaim it from SD 
(ibid.). Taken together, it is clear that SD was a constitutive other in the same way that 
Frp was in Norway. However, there were important differences. Firstly, SD was not 
only accused for fishing in muddy waters, but explicitly and forcefully accused of 
being inhumane and racist. The discursive battle regarding SD thus was about 
goodness (ibid) rather than decency, perhaps making the debate’s temperature even 
higher in Sweden than in Norway ten years before. Hellström and Hervik (2013: 451) 
have even argued that SD should be understood as a discursively constructed Beast, 
which in addition to being a constitutive outside comes about by crass language and 
unanimous condemnation. A Beast is an object of both repulsion and fear – it is an 
archetype of evil. Thus, the emotional temperature that I argued satire allowed for in 
Norway seems to have already been present in the Swedish debate – as well as the 
discursive room for explicitly spelling out what the moral boundaries that SD crossed 
were.  
However, looking at the second difference between Sweden and Norway, a 
different story emerges. Hellström (2010) and Hellström and Hervik (2013) argue that 
from 2009 on, SD, while still being politically isolated and in many ways still treated 
as a Beast, become less discursively isolated. Champions of freedom of speech would 
stress the importance of dialogue and open argumentation with the party (Hellström 
and Hervik 2013: 460, Hellström 2010: 129), it was stressed that SD’s electorate was 
not evil or stupid, but carried valid concerns (Hellström 2010: 129) and the Moderate 
party even argued that the integration of immigrants into Swedish society was failing, 
thus adapting some of SD’s talking points (Hellström and Hervik 2013: 460). 
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Hellström (2010: 70) argues that this is in line with a general European dynamic where 
radical right populist parties manage to set the premises for the immigration debate. 
Following the logic of the figure of the Beast, such a strategy could compare to 
“transforming the beast into a pet” (Hellström and Hervik 2013: 460).  
There were perhaps signs in Norway in 1999 that Frp was becoming more 
acceptable, as questions of integration and problems connected to multiculturalism 
moved higher on the agenda in the late 1990s (Hagelund 2003, Hovden and Mjelde 
2019). I would still argue that this tendency had little impact on how Frp was treated 
by other political actors or how other political actors discussed immigration and 
integration policy, as discussed above. SD did however partly become acceptable 
around 2009/2010 – and entered Parliament. This paved the way for a shame-laden 
crisis in the national identity constructed by the Swedish news media, as the party that 
had been assigned the role of evil now was a part of Parliament, thus a part of Sweden 
to a stronger degree (Loman 2010). This was a shock that needed to be worked 
through. Loman finds that this was done a few months after the election through 
different means, where one of them was Grotesco’s episode. She claims that the press 
coverage of “Svindemokraterna” indicates that it was seen as a way to lessen the blow 
of SD’s entrance into Parliament by turning it into an object of mockery and ridicule 
(ibid: 40). This therapeutic function of satire, in line with the relief theory of humour 
(Freud 1976), is probably important. As discussed above, the superiority felt by 
laughing at someone can help keeping in-groups together around shared moral 
boundaries, which become extra pertinent in traumatic times.  
But Grotesco’s “Svindemokraterna” episode did more than this. Its satirical 
intention was not realised by ridicule alone, but also by a narrative containing 
emotional appeals of sympathy towards the Jöns character. The first part of the 
episode ridicules both Jöns and his fellow Scanians – implicitly his electorate; while 
the second part appeals to sympathy towards Jöns, partly because he has been subject 
to ridicule. There is thus room for an interpretation that the episode contains an appeal 
to the audience’s bad conscience, as we probably have been laughing about Jöns 
earlier. This makes the last part, his speech, initially appear as an understandable and 
even sensible political vision, given that we previously have seen how “ordinary” 
 
 105 
people like Jöns are not taken seriously – and we have perhaps even participated in 
this ourselves through laughing. Hence, it opens up for emotional judgements about 
how SD’s claims of representing a misunderstood people might carry some validity. 
However, this impression is shattered when Jöns ends his speech with a racist rant, 
which creates an incongruence that might be an appeal to shock, or to laughter – 
perhaps to both. Whatever the final affective response, the incongruence makes any 
earlier felt emotions of sympathy become problematic, and thus works as a warning of 
the potential allure of considering any part of SD’s ethnonationalist rhetoric as 
legitimate appeals. Thus, it makes sense to read the episode not only as a way to 
handle the trauma of SD’s entrance into parliament, but also as a moralistic tale of 
caution that shows what can happen when we fall for ethnonationalist and nostalgic 
rhetoric. The comedy show thus participates in the boundary struggles of the Swedish 
public spheres by warning against any attempt to treat SD as representing legitimate 
concerns – to treat the Beast as a kitty.   
In the same way as En utstrakt hånd eleven years before, “Svindemokraterna” 
added something to the debate on right-wing populist parties: by making use of 
aesthetic devices to create affective texture, the moral boundaries could be explored in 
a different way and even made clearer. However, it should be noted that all empirical 
audience research on satire and political comedy shows that satire works best to preach 
to the converted: humour has little to no persuasive capacity (Young, 2018). It is thus 
worth noting that any possible political, or perlocutionary, effect indicated above 
probably would happen among those who already were critical towards SD in one way 
or another. The show should be seen as political rhetoric that strengthens existing 
views and vaccinates against counterarguments, not as rhetoric that moves voters.  
This calls for a discussion of how the programme could have been read from a 
different position: the one held by SD voters or sympathisers. The central point here is 
how the episode’s political satire was connected with a special kind of social satire, 
where the butt of the joke were people very precisely located in space, time and social 
standing. What is mainly made fun of during the episode is namely not right-wing 
attitudes, but the social backwardness of the MP Jöns and his social environment, thus 
in other words, the Swedish Democrat’s electorate in Scania.  
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This also points to an important difference between Norway and Sweden: the 
O.J. character, with his smugness and antisocial egoism, was also the butt of the joke 
for social satire, but it was more directed towards a mentality or a type rather than 
towards a socially stratified group. If the character could be given any geographical or 
class identity, it would be some sort of new rich petty bourgeoisie living in the high-
end neighbourhoods of western Oslo, but this identity is not too prevalent in his 
monologues. In “Svindemokraterna”, the pleasures of ridicule are closely connected to 
the absurd backwardness and even physical ugliness of Jöns and his fellow pig farmers 
– as well as to their patriotism, which becomes closely connected with their rural 
lifestyle. 
There is a tendency in Swedish comedy to assign a specific local and rural 
identity to xenophobes, cued by the characters’ dialect, geographical references and 
stereotypical cultural customs. The most common homeland of xenophobe comedy 
characters is Norrland – the northernmost part of Sweden34, but Scania is often used as 
well. Following Christie Davies (1990), undesirable traits are made physically and 
culturally liminal by assigning them to neighbouring or provincial people who are 
turned into joke material, and according to him, this is the universal mechanism behind 
all kinds of ethnic humour. Furthermore, Davies, who builds his theory on verbal 
jokes, claims that this kind of humour actually says nothing about attitudes towards the 
groups joked about, but rather works as a barometer telling us something about the 
society were the jokes are told and what it posits as major undesirable traits. Both 
Norrland and Scania can be seen as geographical and cultural borderlands of Sweden 
and are thus fitting for this kind of joke-target-dynamic. Following this, 
“Svindemokraterna” becomes a form of ethnic humour where it is made clear that anti-
immigrant sentiments are un-Swedish. However, Davies seems to ignore how humour 
also can work as ridicule. This becomes pertinent as “Svindemokraterna” is not a 
verbal joke told within an in-group, but mass communication heavily based on visual 
 
34 For example a famous revue-monologue from as early as 1968, “Bunta ihop dom” 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3HYrE32taAA), or the routines of Ronny Eriksson, one of 
Swedens first stand-up comedians (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGPWElGIOIA) (Last 
checked February 11th, 2021). 
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humour. In addition, it is broadcast and produced in Stockholm (by comedians from a 
neighbourhood with a very high socioeconomic status), but has a rural (and perhaps 
lower class) population as its butt. The shows character as ethnic humour, where 
xenophobia is located in the periphery and thus marked as un-Swedish, is namely 
deeply intertwined with existing stereotypes and narratives about Scania. The province 
is the dominant agricultural area in Sweden, and the only district where pig farming is 
common. In addition, the local dialect is a distinct one, often caricatured and generally 
enjoying low status (Bolfek Radovani, 2000). Furthermore, Scania is the Swedish 
province where the largest percentage of the electorate votes for SD, and the province 
where both the Nazi legacy and hate crimes against ethnic minorities are most 
prevalent. Thus, the episode clearly addresses demeaning conceptions about Scanians 
as rural and racist, and hence non-modern, and there is a power dimension worth 
noting.  
Grotesco themselves would probably say that the sequences from Scania, or 
Jöns being a rural fool in the city, are meant to ridicule SD’s nostalgia, or make fun of 
the existing cultural stereotypes of Scania as rural and backwards. This might very 
well be the case, but there is regardless of intention, there is a level of comic 
aggression in the portrayal of the Scania farmers that paves the way for a deep feeling 
of being ridiculed. We can thus see how humour uses its (alleged) unseriousness for 
serious means: The comedy show’s ambiguousness creates both the opportunity for an 
interpretation where SD’s electorate is ridiculed, and for refuting the validity of this 
interpretation. Again, the emotional tension is also at play, as the sketch allows its 
audience to feel joy through aggression by placing SD’s electorate outside the moral 
boundaries. The core here is the sketch’s strong emphasis on cultural backwardness 
and its character as ethnic humour according to Davies’ model, which support the 
interpretation that the electorate is the butt of the joke. Furthermore, some scholars 
argue that an important part of Swedish mentality is a self-image as the world’s most 
modern country, which includes progressiveness in sociocultural questions, and that 
the view of the nation as modern was created in opposition to a more traditionalistic 
cultural-national view (Angell 2002, pp. 95, 112, Berggren & Trädgårdh 2006). There 
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is thus a strong implicature that the people portrayed in “Svindemokraterna” not really 
are Swedish. 
This way, the episode feeds into the alienation theme that it makes fun of 
itself, which has been a staple in SD’s rhetoric where they portray themselves as 
victims of the establishment (Hellström 2010). Parts of the episode’s reception show 
that this was the case: complaints were filed to the Swedish media authority, 
Granskningsnämnden, of how SD was portrayed, and there are numerous angry blogs 
and posts in online discussion fora accusing the episode of not being funny, of being 
rude, or of being a part of the media establishment’s usual treatment of SD. The social 
function of ridicule, according to Billig (2005b), is to create embarrassment and social 
cohesion by making people stick to moral and social boundaries. However, empirical 
research of groups being laughed at indicate that ridicule can do the opposite if the 
group has consolidated itself in the right way: it can bolster moral and strengthen the 
wish to stay deviant (Kuipers 2008). Since “Svindemokraterna” was broadcast after 
SD’s greatest victory to date, its entrance into parliament, this is a more likely 
scenario. If so, it worked as divisive satire that used the mode’s special affective 
features to make moral boundaries, as well as who belongs to each side of them, 
clearer.  
 
3.4. Conclusion: Hard humour against the xenophobes: Allowing aggression 
into the boundary work 
 
Both O.J. – En utstrakt hånd and “Svindemokraterna” were reactions towards the 
increased importance, discursive or political, of the right-wing populist parties of 
Norway and Sweden. The two shows were to a significant degree part of a larger 
tendency, where the populist parties were placed outside the realm of moral decency, 
as the constitutive other or the Beast. The two shows also used the satirical modality’s 
typical inspection of cultural ideals versus reality to examine and substantiate why the 
two parties should be placed outside the good moral company, in other words made 
the moral boundaries clearer and more justified. In Norway, this was rarely done in the 
serious part of the discourse, so this was actually one of the rare instances where 
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comedy carried out serious business with more vigour than what the serious debate 
did.  
A perhaps even more important part of the role these shows played in the 
public sphere was how they provided aesthetic and thus emotional texture to the moral 
boundaries. Following theories of emotion and affect, this is a necessary part of the 
construction and legitimation of moral judgements. Thus, the shows played an 
important role in the boundary struggles of the two countries’ public spheres, where 
the position of anti-immigration tended to be labelled as a threat to the countries’ self-
understandings as good, modern and decent, and thus needed to be marked as moral 
outsiders. This was done in an especially forceful way by the two humour shows since 
they used ironic humour to carry out a form of aggression that would not be acceptable 
in other parts of the public sphere, an aggression which through its linkage with 
humour not only became acceptable, but also intrinsically connected to the good 
feeling of superiority. Thus, we see how the tensions in the humorous mode between 
seriousness and unseriousness, between detachment and commitment, and between 
negative and positive emotions are used to carry out political work.   
Whether anger and aggression is a constructive political force or not is as 
already mentioned a matter of scholarly debate within many different fields 
(Nussbaum, 2016). This is not the place to enter this theoretical debate, but it should 
be asked how effective these particular uses of anger and aggressiveness were. The 
main difference between the humour of Grotesco and the humour of O.J. was, as 
already mentioned, how the butt of the joke in Grotesco’s case clearly resembled the 
social group associated with the Swedish Democrats’ electorate, while O.J.’s 
egocentric persona had a less clear-cut connection to any socioeconomic group. Since 
it could be, and was, read as a way of ridiculing SD’s voters, the aggressiveness of 
“Svindemokraterna” had the potential of contributing to polarisation and a stronger 
SD instead of strengthening the moral hegemony. The show thus risked of being an 
offense more than a joke. En utstrakt hånd, on the other hand, was perhaps too much 
of a joke. Although Otto Jespersen often stated his satirical intention, and many 
audiences viewed him as obviously satirical, other audiences viewed him as being 
“only” an ironist, a moral nihilist only caring for transgression in itself. Yet other 
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audiences read his play with xenophobic slur and stereotypes as “fresh talk” where he 
told the politically incorrect truth about immigrants. There is always a risk that 
humour ridiculing prejudice will be interpreted as endorsing it, especially if it is based 
on the quotation of stereotypes and slur. This was indeed the case in En utstrakt hånd, 
which in this way – ironically – contributed to the increased publicness of xenophobic 
discourse. Irony proved to be a risky business for O.J.’s satirical project. 
These pitfalls point toward a more general trend of the role satire plays in the 
public sphere: it works best as a way of preaching to the converted. This does not 
mean that it is futile, as historical studies of satirical cartoons have demonstrated 
(Townsend, 1997; Østberg, 2018), but that satire probably is best suited to maintain a 
space of disagreement by indicating and elaborate on existing moral rifts. However, 
the price of this when it comes to especially aggressive satire might be that not only 
moral boundaries are strengthened, but also those who we place outside of them. 
This chapter has treated the far most common tendency in Scandinavian 
immigration comedy: Shows ridiculing xenophobic people, policies and attitudes. To 
various degrees, xenophobic positions have been deemed as illegitimate in the serious 
public spheres of Scandinavia. Comedy shows thus contribute to the boundary 
struggles in the public sphere by feeding into existing dynamics of establishing moral 
boundaries, but still does its particular part of the job by adding an affective 
component: they make the boundaries seem more self-evident by making it feel good 
to place deviants outside of them. This became especially clear and pertinent after the 
hardening of humour in the 1990s, when the satirical shows discussed here were 
mobilised to attack the changed discursive and political role of the right-wing populist 
parties. 
It seems that this kind of boundary work is typical for how the anti-
xenophobic immigration comedy in Scandinavia used the aesthetic particularities of 
humour to do political work, although the two cases discussed here were especially 
aggressive. Together with how these shows march along with tendencies in the 
mainstreams, this is perhaps the explanation for why they also were met with little 
controversy in the mainstream public spheres. This was not the case for comedians 
with an immigrant background, although they often were celebrated in the public 
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sphere. In the next chapter, the advent of immigrant comedians into the Scandinavian 
public spheres will show how the cultural understandings of humour can be as 
































































Chapter 4. When comedy earns you a voice: Stand-up as a gate of 
access for immigrants to the public sphere. 
 
What I will talk about here tonight is how it is to be me.  
The opening lines of Shabana Rehman’s first performance at Smuget in Oslo. 
 
Danes become integrated with the immigrants. When we see posh bankers walking around saying 
“sick gangsta”, integration has progressed significantly.  
Omar Marzouk, commenting on Yallahrup Færgeby, Jyllands-Posten December 14th, 2007. 
 
Access is a central concept in public sphere theory, especially in regard to subaltern 
groups’ participation. The revisionist historians and feminist critiques of Habermas 
pointed towards different exclusionary mechanisms of the bourgeois public sphere, 
which limited access for women, ethnic minorities and working class subjects, counter 
to the normative ideal of the public sphere’s openness to everyone (Fraser, 1992, pp. 
118-121). It should be noted that the notion of access in these accounts to some degree 
overlap with the concept voice, which can be defined as “the chance for populations to 
have a say in decisions that affect them” (Couldry, 2008, p. 16), including how social 
groups are represented in the media (ibid). The difference between voice and access, 
as I understand it, seems to be that while both concepts pertain to how social groups 
get their interests and interpretations represented, access also encompasses the 
subjects’ opportunities for participation. Voice, on the other hand, seems to be more 
concerned about the legitimate representation of social groups.  
In contemporary research, scholars have claimed that immigrants have limited 
access to the public sphere due to exclusionary mechanisms like the use of an us and 
them-framing in the media, which reinforces the image where immigrants are seen as 
different from the majority population and perhaps not even as proper citizens. 
Immigrants are also used less often than the majority population as media sources (See 
Eberl et al., 2018, p. for a comprehensive European literature review; and Eide & 
Nikunen, 2011; and Horsti, 2008 for Nordic examples). However, comparative content 
analyses from the SCANPUB project show that immigrants have been quoted 
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relatively often in all three Scandinavian countries (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019, p. 148). 
Furthermore, other genres than hard news have provided alternative, and more 
inclusive, coverage of the immigration issue (Riegert, forthcoming; Riegert & Hovden, 
2019). Finally, based on interviews with active immigrant participants, Midtbøen 
(2018) has questioned if ethnic boundaries really function as an exclusionary 
mechanism in the Norwegian public sphere.  
As Midtbøen also points out, while the exclusionary mechanisms limiting 
immigrants’ access to the public sphere have been extensively researched, less 
attention has been paid to the potential resources available in the public sphere that can 
be used by immigrant subjects to participate. Matters of access are entangled with 
larger questions of power in the public sphere (Couldry, 2008; Fraser, 1992, 2005), but 
it should be remembered that power can be productive as well as oppressive. In this 
respect, an interesting phenomenon happened more or less in parallel in all three 
Scandinavian countries: three stand-up comedians with an immigrant background, 
Shabana Rehman in Norway, Omar Marzouk in Denmark and Özz Nûjen in Sweden, 
gained access to the serious, political part of the public sphere and got a status similar 
to artist-intellectuals, frequently used as sources on matters of immigration, integration 
and racism. They thus did not only get access, but also relatively strong positions as 
immigrant voices. This is particularly interesting not only because they entered public 
life through the unserious field of stand-up comedy, but also because they have a loose 
connection to the organised immigrant community or social movements. Their 
entrance into the public sphere thus has to be explained in a different way than through 
the civil society-oriented models that are prevalent in public sphere theory, which for 
example Fraser (1989, 1992) seems to draw on in her influential discussions of 
subaltern groups’ access to the public sphere and the formation of counterpublics. It 
also challenges the relationship between access and voice, as their legitimacy as 
immigrant representatives can be if not questioned, at least discussed.  
In this chapter, I will argue that Rehman, Marzouk and Nûjen gained access to 
the political public sphere by virtue of being comedians. I will furthermore argue that 
this happened as a two-step process. The young genre stand-up comedy was especially 
well suited as a way to access the cultural public sphere for Scandinavians with an 
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immigrant background, not only to the comedy stage, but also to the larger cultural 
public sphere through television. Then, certain interpretive repertoires about comedy’s 
cultural value were used by the media as well as by the three comedians themselves to 
understand them as political. These interpretive repertoires, recurrent patterns of 
speech used to construct interpretations of the world (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 
149), worked as power mechanisms, but also as resources, which shaped how the 
comedians could access the political public sphere from the cultural one and 
eventually get moulded into a stable enunciative position. In the following, I identify 
such repertoires by demonstrating how the press coverage of the comedians made use 
of recurrent commonplaces and figures, and argue that there is a certain logic behind 
the use of these recurrent forms based on certain cultural ideas.  
 
4.1 Stand-up – the short road from open mic to national success. 
 
Stand-up comedy came relatively late to Scandinavia. Club concepts devoted to the 
genre, initiated by a few devotees in each country, appeared in Denmark in 1987 
(Hjorth & Palle, 2009, pp. 22-23), Sweden in 198835, and Norway in 1993 (Løvland, 
2002, p. 13). The genre’s Scandinavian pioneers were young men heavily inspired by 
contemporary American comedy, but also by Scandinavian popular revue, stemming 
from amateur theatre and market vaudeville (Hjorth & Palle, 2009, pp. 9, 22-23, 56-
58; Løvland, 2002, pp. 13-25). This was a sociological as well as an aesthetical 
influence, as many stand-up comedians had a background from some form of amateur 
revue (Hjorth & Palle, 2009, p. 45; Løvland, 2002, pp. 23-25).  
That being said, there was a clear social distinction between stand-up and 
other forms of stage culture, and expressive culture in general. The concrete 
expression of this was how the genre was not performed in arenas exclusively devoted 
to the arts, but in bars, clubs and restaurants. This distinction, not first and foremost 
from the fine arts, but rather from the existing entertainment theatre in form of 
professional revue, was significant, and also an important part of the early stand-up 
 
35 https://www.cafe.se/svensk-humors-historia-reportage/ (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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comedians’ self-understanding (Hjorth & Palle, 2009, pp. 15-16; Løvland, 2002, pp. 
14-17, 40-41)36. It should however be noted that the “new” genre was not the voice of 
the marginalised, as it lacked the connection American or British stand-up had to 
ethnic minorities and political countercultures (Løvland, 2002, pp. 78-80). It was 
nevertheless a clear contrast to more capital-demanding art forms in terms of the 
economic and cultural capital necessary to participate. This was probably important 
for the recruitment and the cultivation of the three comedians Marzouk, Rehman and 
Nûjen, with their immigrant and working-class background. It was cheap to learn 
stand-up by watching it: unlike expensive show or theatre tickets, one could see many 
comedians performing one night for the price of a drink in the bar. One did not need 
years of training to perform on the stand-up stage: open mic-formats, stand-up 
competitions and the club night format where a less experienced comedian warms up 
for a veteran all allowed newcomers to perform for the ordinary stand-up audience 
together with seasoned comedians. Even though the genre of course had (and has) 
multiple generic conventions beyond the aim of making the audience laugh, just this 
aim seems have been the pervading element of the contract between audience and 
performer, and the main criterion for success and evaluation of what makes a good 
stand-up routine (Løvland, 2002, pp. 47, 58-61). Løvland also claims that the early 
milieus were characterised by conviviality and joviality, and that new talents therefore 
were easily spotted and helped forward by more seasoned comedians (pp. 31-37).  
The latter should probably be taken with a grain of salt, as it is based on first-
hand sources reminiscing about themselves and their friends. Nevertheless, it should 
 
36 It is interesting to observe the similarity between the two sources I draw on here, although they 
belong to different genres. Palle and Hjorth are journalists, and their book is largely based on 
interviews with stand-up comedians, who in the referred pages explicitly state that it was important for 
them to distance themselves from the revue genre. Løvland, on the other hand, is a theatre scholar and 
the first academic to write about Norwegian stand-up, but she was also personally involved in the 
early stages of the genre in Norway, and it is clear that she invests a lot of scholarly energy in 
establishing both a historical and an aesthetical distinction between stand-up and the revue 
monologue. This is of course not necessarily a problem, but it should nevertheless be noted that the 
historical works on Scandinavian stand-up is largely based on oral first-hand sources and often written 
by people who were close to the community. It is thus largely a “We” history.  
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not be uncontroversial to assess that the Scandinavian stand-up milieus of the 1990s 
were closely knit social groups with at least a possibility to rise fast and high if you 
were talented according to the group’s standards and thus managed to gain their jovial 
help.  
Once a comedian had gained foothold within the stand-up milieu, the road to 
prime-time television was short. The connection between stage comedy and the 
production milieus for TV humour was close in all three countries (Bruun, 2011, pp. 
134, 163-166; Kaare & Kjus, 2006, pp. 29-31; Løvland, 2006, pp. 108-109; Sjögren, 
1997, pp. 156-238). Comedians in public service TV were also still relatively powerful 
in editorial and production processes, having quite a bit of room for experimenting 
with new formats and genres, and comedy was also a central part of the strategic 
initiatives to cater to young audiences after the end of the Scandinavian broadcasting 
monopolies (Bruun, 2011, pp. 139-149, 155-163; Ytreberg, 2001, pp. 236-243). This 
might be why many stand-up comedians, viewed as something new and exciting, 
found themselves working within the entertainment divisions of public service 
relatively soon after their stage debut, thus having access to the dominant forum of the 
Scandinavian public spheres of the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
So, how does this general story about the easy access into stand-up fit with the 
comedians in question, Marzouk, Rehman, and Nûjen? Marzouk, the son of an 
Egyptian born engineer turned grocery store owner, and himself a computer repairman 
before his comedy career, is the oldest of the three and the one who first entered stand-
up, through an EU anti-racism initiative in 1996 (Hjorth & Palle, 2009, pp. 99-101). 
This debut has turned into lore: Marzouk himself sometimes emphasises how terribly 
bad it was37; while other sources focus on how significant this was as the start of his 
career, both as a kick start that caught public attention38 and as the moment where the 




optr%C3%A6den-var-d%C3%A5rlig%C2%AB (Last checked February 11th, 2021 
38 https://danskefilm.dk/skuespiller.php?id=13995 (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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In the mid-1990s he learned that the European Union was sponsoring a competition to 
combat racism. He decided to enter with a stand-up comedy routine. “Until then, 
understanding between Danes and Muslims meant, ‘Come on, eat some hummus and 
see some belly dancing,’ ” he said. “I thought stand-up was a great way to talk about 
these things.” “At first I just wanted to get laughs,” he said. “Later, I started thinking 
about what I wanted to do or say.” (New York Times, August 18., 2008).  
 
In this excerpt, Marzouk’s enunciative position in the public sphere is made explicit, 
as a bridge-builder who mediates between Danes and Muslims. It should also be noted 
that this role is a self-description that becomes adapted by the media: as we shall see, 
this is shared by all three, which points towards a certain level of agency and power 
for the comedians.  
There was, however, a long road to this position. In the late 90s, Marzouk 
started to work with Jan Gintberg, one of the pioneers in Danish stand-up, as writer 
and actor in numerous shows on different public service channels, most notably DR, as 
well as touring together with the show Op på fars jihad (On my father’s Jihad). In 
2001, he was one of the actor-creators of OPM – Oplysninger om perkerne til 
samfundet (IPS – Information about the Pakis to Society), commissioned by DR and 
marketed as their first multicultural satire. Since 2003, he has been a successful stage 
comedian touring Denmark with multiple shows, as well as participating in the 
production of multiple television programmes of different genres on public service 
channels, often with multiculturalism and integration as topics.  
Unlike the two others, Özz Nûjen39 actually had formal theatre education from 
the start – albeit a vocational one, not the higher status academy education. He also 
first gained media coverage not as a stand-up comedian, but as actor and co-writer of 
various comical theatre projects involving immigrant youth. Nûjen, who is Kurdish, 
fled together with his family from Turkey to Sweden when he was 8 years old and 
settled in the Stockholm suburb Rinkeby, well known for its large immigrant 
 
39 Nûjen’s biographical information is drawn from a market-pitch of him as a speaker, 
https://talarformedlingen.se/talare/Özz-Nûjen/ (Last checked February 11th, 2021), as well as from a 
personal interview with him conducted September 28th, 2018.  
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population. Nûjen enjoyed being the class clown in school and began his stand-up 
career in 1999, when he worked as a waiter at Restaurang Engelen in Stockholm, first 
participating on open mic and eventually as responsible for the restaurant’s stand-up 
shows. In 2000, he co-founded Stockholm Comedy Klubb (STOCK), according to 
himself as an alternative to the established club scene at Norra Brunn that already had 
grown stale and conservative40. The collective eventually became a force in Swedish 
stand-up, producing multiple festivals around the country as well as the annual stand-
up gala until 2013. STOCK’s mainstream success started when the collective produced 
the television stand-up show Stockholm Live in 2004, where Nûjen was one of the 
hosts together with among others co-founder Shan Atci, who also has Kurdish 
background. The duo opened the first episode with these lines: “It is nice for guys like 
us to be allowed to be on TV. In other programmes than the news. From Iraq. Or 
Guantanamo”. This was in line with Nûjen’s role in the public sphere: the truth-teller 
narrating the experience of marginalised immigrants. In addition to his stand-up 
career, he has worked as an actor and producer, as well as hosting multiple shows on 
public service radio and television. Together with Shan Atci, he is by some considered 
as the proper starting point of professional Swedish humour made by immigrants 
poking fun at immigrants41, so-called blattehumor.  
Shabana Rehman’s trajectory from the stand-up scene to the public sphere was 
quite different from her two colleagues’. Born in Pakistan and growing up in the 
immigrant-dense Oslo suburb Nordstrand as the daughter of a chef and a stay-at-home 
mom, Rehman has often emphasised the importance of a schoolteacher of Norwegian 
in her childhood, both on a personal level and as a teacher of Norwegian language and 
fondness of literature42. It was actually not Rehman, but her classmate Zahid Ali, who 
originally participated in the young stand-up milieu in Oslo, to which he introduced 
Rehman after a class reunion. Ali later read her writing and suggested that she should 
 
40 Nûjen, personal communication, September 28th, 2018. 
41 https://www.aftonbladet.se/kultur/a/qnkmM1/invandrare-ha-ha-ha (Last checked February 11th, 
2021).  
42 https://shabana.no/aldri-mer-fremmed-del-ii/ (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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perform at open mic night at Lille Smuget in 199943. Unlike Marzouk and Nûjen, 
Rehman was not a seasoned stand-up comedian before she entered the larger public 
sphere. On an open mic night, she was discovered by journalist Tonje Steinsland, who 
at the time was making programmes covering social control of young women with 
Muslim and Pakistani background for investigative magazine programme Rikets 
Tilstand (State of the Kingdom) on TV 2. Rehman was thus filmed and interviewed 
already on her second open mic appearance (Løvland, 2002, p. 39n20), an interview 
which gained huge media attention and started a period where Rehman was a 
frequently used source in the media on matters of women and integration, as well as a 
columnist alone or together with Steinsland’s colleague Hege Storhaug. She became 
framed as a rebel against social control in the Pakistani milieu already from her first 
television interview, which paved the way for her role in the public sphere: the taboo-
breaking fool fighting oppressive patriarchy from within.  
 
Although these are the histories of three individuals, drawing on a limited source 
situation, it is nevertheless possible to induce a pattern from the three comedians’ 
trajectories into the stand-up scene. The stand-up genre was easy both to access and to 
have success within for immigrants who had grown up in Scandinavia, or descendants 
of immigrants, around the turn of the millennium. This was due to the sociological 
positioning of the stand-up genre as distinct from commercial culture and fine arts, 
thus having different mechanisms of distinction that allowed (working class) 
immigrants to avoid the exclusionary mechanisms common in the rest of the cultural 
public sphere. Furthermore, success in the stand-up milieu provided access to the 
entertainment divisions of public service television, possible because of the close 
relation between Scandinavian stage comedy and television comedy.  
Ideally, one would conduct production studies of both the stand-up scene and 
public service comedy as well as more closely discuss the social topology of the two 
fields to investigate this pattern more closely. I nevertheless view it as qualified: it 
 
43 https://www.klikk.no/produkthjemmesider/hjemmet/tora-reddet-meg-ut-av-volden-3196109 (Last 
checked February 11th, 2021). 
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repeats itself relatively clear-cut across the national contexts, and although I only 
discuss one comedian in each country, similar trajectories can be applied to more 
people, like the above-mentioned Zahid Ali and Shan Atci. One should also remember 
that becoming a professional comedian never can be a mass phenomenon, and that 
individual stories thus can tell us a great deal about the sociological mechanisms at 
work.  
According to Fraser (1992), exclusionary mechanisms in the bourgeois public 
sphere were partly based on distinction in Bourdieu’s sense. It seems clear that the 
comedians discussed in this chapter managed to get around these mechanisms of 
distinction through stand-up and gain a place, and even power, in the public sphere. I 
do not claim that stand-up stood out positively compared to other genres and art forms 
– to establish this would call for comparative research. What I do claim is that the 
stand-up genre gave access to the dominant fora of the Scandinavian public sphere for 
individuals who typically, according to public sphere theory as well as contemporary 
research on media and immigration, are portrayed as lacking access. 
This should also be seen as something more than three individual histories. 
Rather, the three biographies are symptoms of larger historical ruptures in the public 
sphere. Stand-up comedy was a part of ‘the new humour’ discussed in the last chapter, 
and the advent of stand-up comedians on television was thus a part of the larger 
aesthetical and sociological rupture that took place in Scandinavian TV comedy in the 
90s and early 2000s. In addition, the three comedians were part of the first generation 
of young immigrants and descendants that had grown up in Scandinavia and started to 
participate in public life. Their entrance into the public sphere was thus a result of 
independent but intersecting historical changes. Their individual trajectories into the 
public sphere are thus interesting on a level beyond personal biography, as they 
demonstrate how historical changes could be used to strategically overcome ethnic 
boundaries and gain access to the public sphere (See also Midtbøen, 2018, pp. 357-
359). What is particularly interesting in this regard is how the three comedians soon 
moved from the cultural public sphere to the political one, framed as important 




4.2. Comedy’s cultural value as a resource for access and a mould for 
positions. 
 
As I have demonstrated, it was ‘easy’ to become a stand-up comedian, and the road 
was short from the stage to the screen. However, this does not explain how the 
comedians gained the status as important immigrant voices in the serious part of the 
public sphere. Why would a comedian be considered a serious voice?  
I suggest that this was due to the cultural value given to comedy in general, 
and immigrant comedians in particular, and that this value became manifest in the 
media through interpretive repertoires. Elsewhere (Dahl, 2019), I have argued that 
these repertoires were partly shaped by well-established cultural understandings of 
humour, art and Islam; partly by the rhetorical doxa, the wider set of already accepted 
premises and shared commonplaces (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1973) governing 
the immigration debate in the different Scandinavian countries; but also partly by how 
the comedians interpreted themselves, as I have indicated in the excerpts from shows 
and interviews above. What we can see from the early media coverage of the three 
comedians is that these repertoires constructed their humour and comedy as important 
in different ways, and that this moulded a certain enunciative position for each of the 
three in the public sphere where they were considered immigrant voices.  
Shabana Rehman’s role became the taboo-breaking fool (Dahl, 2019), 
confronting social control, prejudice and taboos:  
 
A woman without a face, but not without opinions. Suddenly she stands on a 
Norwegian stand-up stage. Draped in black to protect herself against unclean glances. 
 
But the veil is demonstratively thrown away. Behold: a Norwegian-Pakistani girl who 
bravely confronts requirements of honour and other requirements that constrains 





Figure 4 Shabana Rehman on her second appearance on open mic, just after "dropping the 
veil" - in reality pulling of a burka-like garment. From Rikets Tilstand, TV 2, 1999. 
 
Although this excerpt states “women both in East and West”, it is clear that the 
constraining requirements Rehman confronts are understood as stemming from 
Muslim and Pakistani milieus. The excerpt is also drawn from a longer article 
discussing the veil. Rehman is thus not portrayed as someone who breaks taboos 
generally, but as a rebel from within opposing patriarchal taboos among immigrants. 
This fits with a general tendency where immigrant women are portrayed as victim-
heroes in Scandinavian immigration coverage (Brune, 1998; Simonsen, 2004; 
Tigervall, 2005), as well as the then current emphasis on honour culture in immigrant 
milieus, especially the Pakistani one (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019; Simonsen, 2004). 
Hence, I argue that two interpretive repertoires are at work here: Humour as a special 
form of truth-telling and Islam as a killjoy.  
An important part of the humour as a special form of truth-telling repertoire is 
its connection with transgression. It is regularly stressed that through breaking taboos, 
Rehman speaks a special sort of truth:  
 
I want to show the woman behind the veil. Her sexuality – and vulnerability. When I 
enter, Norwegians think: she is oppressed, poor thing. Pakistanis think: wow, she is on 
stage, but has preserved her decency. Then I surprise both when the veil falls. 






- We need brave people like Shabana Rehman who breaks taboos, immigrants say 
after the stand-up show where she ironicises over sex taboos. (Aftenposten, November 
27th, 1999). 
 
The repertoire is put to work when it is reported how Rehman appears on stage veiled, 
confirming the audiences’ prejudices, but then surprises everyone by showing her true 
self: dressed in a tight, red dress and without covering her hair. This surprise is indeed 
a humoristic device, but it is also represented as what confronts the audience with the 
falsity of their prejudice. In the second excerpt, we see how her show is represented as 
something brave and important. The idea that humour is a valuable form of 
transgression because it gives us a special kind of insight, has a long history where the 
comedian is seen as a sage fool who dares to speak truth to power (Bevis, 2013, p. 66; 
Erasmus, 1979 [1509]; Gilbert, 2004, pp. 2-3; Palmer, 1994, pp. 40-53). Humour is 
here given a special status and value, and a young female comedian with immigrant 
background, whose comedy is interpreted as breaking the patriarchal taboos of 
immigrant communities, thus becomes newsworthy in herself.  
What perhaps becomes a bit underplayed in the average interpretive repertoire 
based on cultural ideals of the sage fool is that her taboo-breaking also adds a certain 
levity to serious matters (Palmer, 1994, p. 51), similar to Bakhtin’s (1968, p. 47) 
account of the carnival as a state without fear. This is nevertheless visible in many of 
the articles covering Rehman’s stand-up debut: 
 
Khalid Mahmood, secretary general in Pakistan Workers Welfare Union, says that 
Rehman’s humorous form is comfortably relaxed, which makes it easier to talk about 
hymens and other taboo-laden topics than if she had presented an academic 
dissertation or participated in a television debate. 





Again, we see how the tensions between negative and positive emotions is put to 
work, but this time in the form of a cultural understanding of what makes humour 
important and desirable. Comedy’s levity becomes a central element of its cultural 
value, as it manages to attach positive affects like joy and mirth to topics that normally 
are associated with negative emotions, like social control of girls’ sexuality. Joy as a 
central element of Rehman’s work confronting taboos is also emphasised by herself in 
her very first newspaper interview, with Aftenposten on November 26th, 1999: “I show 
the woman behind the veil – my passion and my zest for life”. Here, Rehman’s 
comedy, but also her closely intertwined sexuality, become objects that promise joy 
and ultimately happiness. According to Sara Ahmed (2010), this has become a duty in 
the Western world, and constructing objects of happiness while others are constructed 
as destructive killjoys becomes a mean for establishing norms and deviations. In 
Rehman’s case, the contrast to comedy’s levity and promise of happiness is the killjoy 
of Islamic patriarchy:  
 
The demand that the woman should be veiled, has become a demonstration of power 
between humans to demonstrate the man’s “property” and make visible women’s 
chastity (…) With clear mimicry and body language, Shabana shows the contrast 
between the veiled and the frivolous female figure (…) With humour and self-irony, 
she disarms and includes and embarks on an important pioneer work (…) She speaks 
up against old conservative immigrant men with long beards and Norwegians with 
stale opinions.  (VG, November 28th, 1999). 
 
It is quite explicit that Rehman’s taboo-breaking is imagined on the basis of an 
interpretive repertoire that is used to understand fundamentalist Islam as a suppressor 
of women and even a suppressor of the life forces sexuality and love. In addition, this 
interplay becomes strengthened by another commonplace important in the repertoire 
of Islam as a killjoy: The belief that Muslims have no sense of humour. As discussed 
in chapter 2, this is prevalent in Western discourse (Karlsson Minganti, 2014; Kuipers, 
2011), and gains its strength both from the association of humourlessness with 
religious fundamentalism and from the emphasis of a sense of humour as an integral 
part of modern personhood. The humourless Muslim thus becomes someone outside 
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modernity (Kuipers, 2011, pp. 75-76). Although this belief is largely implicit in the 
excerpt quoted above, and in the coverage of Rehman as a whole, I would argue that 
its existence, and background for the interpretive repertoire of Islam as a killjoy makes 
it clearer why Rehman’s role as a taboo-breaking fool became especially interesting 
for the press. Not only did it fit with the then current news agenda where cultural 
practices associated with Muslim immigrants were problematised, it also fits with a 
larger discursive tendency where Islam was portrayed as fundamentally alien to 
Western modernity and thus also to the modern Norwegian nation (Gullestad, 2002a, 
pp. 16-18, 94-103; Yılmaz, 2016). This can be considered a latent interpretive 
repertoire which strengthened the manifest repertoire of the taboo-breaking fool and 
allowed it to reify into a position in the public sphere: the immigrant comedian is 
allowed into the nation’s public sphere because she humorously breaks taboos related 
to Islam.  
This might come across as speculative, as there are no explicit references in 
the coverage of Rehman to Muslims lacking humour. I would still argue that the set of 
contrasts in the quote above clearly is indicative of the construction of an opposition 
between Rehman’s life-affirming comedy and Islam. The constant emphasis on her 
humour and self-irony is used as an antithesis to the conservativeness of Muslim men, 
implicitly stating that an important part of their conservativeness and suppressive 
power is their lack of humour. The centrality of Islam as representing the opposite of 
Rehman is also clear through image of Muslim men as bearded, a trope of Islamic 
conservativism gaining popularity in Western discourse after the Iranian revolution 
and Khomeini’s striking visual appearance, but has older roots (Culcasi & Gokmen, 
2011). Even more important is the frequent mentioning of the veil, functioning as a 
metonymy for Islamic patriarchy (Kılıç, Saharso, & Sauer, 2008; Salte, 2018). It 
should also be remembered that this was in the beginning of the culturalisation of the 
immigration debate (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019; Yılmaz, 2016), and even though Islam 
had not yet turned into the clearest symbol of difference between immigrants and the 
majority population, the religion was already then often constructed as a orientalist 
constitutive outside  (Gullestad, 2002a, pp. 16-18, 94-103; Simonsen, 2004). 
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Taken together, the manifest and latent use of interpretive repertoires in the 
press coverage of Rehman can explain why she gained the kind of media attention that 
she did. This points towards a certain cultural value of comedy, which paradoxically 
gives the unserious mode a serious place. There are namely few alternative 
explanations of Rehman’s entrance into the serious public sphere: she was not 
associated with any civil society organisation or political party, and although she had 
experienced social control first hand, she was not one of multiple girls whose detailed, 
dramatic life story was brought to the forefront in the media. The perhaps strongest 
argument was that Rehman worked in the media before her stand-up debut, as a 
summer substitute and even columnist in VG, where she raised many of the same 
points in a similar style as she would do as a stand-up comedian – but without creating 
any debate or getting press coverage. Another point to support this is how Rehman, in 
the excerpt at the start of this section, was used as a source on the veil – a garment she 
had never used. It thus seems clear that it was her combined status as a female 
comedian with a Muslim background that gave her media attention and eventually 
made her an immigrant voice in the public sphere. 
At the same time, she also became moulded into a certain enunciative 
position. The use of interpretive repertoires seems to entail a sort of path-dependency, 
so when Rehman started to become a taboo-breaking fool and internal critic, it became 
harder for her to be heard from a different position. She has namely often used 
alternative repertoires in the media, where she addresses the marginalisation 
immigrant youth experiences from the majority population and official Norway, but 
these have never resonated in the same way (Dahl, 2019). It also seems like she lacks 
some credibility in this regard, as her role in the Stovner revue-affair mentioned in the 
introduction of this thesis suggests. The interpretive repertoires connected to comedy’s 
cultural value can thus be used strategically, but it seems like successful use of them 
also means that they tend to get fixated and that the enunciative position they afford 
tends to be reified.  
That being said, I do not mean that the interpretive repertoires determined 
Rehman’s trajectory into the serious public sphere, that they lived a life of their own, 
and magically brought the first Norwegian-Pakistani female comedian into the 
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limelight. On the contrary, Shabana Rehman’s story is one of strong, individual 
agents: Olga Stokke, seasoned journalist of Aftenposten with immigration and 
integration as her speciality, the staff of Rikets Tilstand Tonje Steinsland, Gerhard 
Helskog and Hege Storhaug44, and last but not least Rehman herself. It is clear that 
Rehman had her own agenda and provided the media with at least parts of the 
interpretive repertoires, through quotes in interviews as well as the content of her 
stand-up performances, and that these resonated in the public sphere and stuck to 
Rehman, as they were later used by other journalists, ordinary citizens writing letters 
to the editor, and civil society actors.  
This way, Rehman managed to get a certain enunciative position in the serious 
part of the public sphere as an internal critic of the immigrant milieus. Since her debut, 
she has not been very productive as a comedian, with only two solo shows (premiering 
in 2002 and 2009), but on the other hand very visible as an activist, with multiple 
columns in major newspapers45, performance-like stunts clearly aimed at taboo-
breaking that sparked debate46, as the founder of NGOs battling social control and 
racism47, and as a member of the governmental Freedom of Expression Commission 
 
44 These three soon become problematic friends: Rehman has later criticised the editorial office of 
Rikets Tilstand for how they treated her, and also for how they treated other young girls with an 
immigrant background, in order to comply with their pre-given agenda rather than providing them 
with a voice of their own (e.g. in Dagbladet, February 9th, 2001). She also repeatedly seeks to distance 
herself from Hege Storhaug who has left TV 2 and became editor of the online magazine HRS, known 
for its harsh criticism of Islam and Norwegian immigration policy. Rehman herself soon argued for a 
“third way” in the immigration debate, arguing for clear confrontational debate about gender in 
immigrant milieus, but also challenged the negative stereotypical images of immigrant put forward by 
the media and Frp (e.g. in ibid, and Dagbladet, June 22nd, 2001).  
45 Regular in Dagbladet from 2000 until 2007, Aftenposten, Henne, Dagbladet Information and VG 
with irregular intervals after 2007.  
46 This includes bodypainting herself in full nude with the Norwegian flag and appearing on the front 
of Dagbladet’s weekend magazine in 2000; physically lifting Mulla Krekar, a Iraqi-Kurdish 
mujahedin guerilla leader accused for terrorism residing in Norway, in 2004; and showing her bare 
buttocks at the Haugesund film festival in 2005, which I discuss briefly below. 
47 Founder and leader of Sekulær Feministisk Front (Secular Feminist Front) in 2017, and founder and 
leader of Født Fri since 2018.  
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since 2020. She thus has a somewhat different profile from her two male colleagues, 
as she is more closely associated with hard news and official politics. This points 
towards how interpretive repertoires not should be seen as determining forces, but as 
rhetorical resources agents can use to gain voice and access in the public sphere. For 
Rehman, the constellation of repertoires was a success, at it gave her a platform in the 
public sphere, but also as it provided her with a particular rhetorical ethos that gave 
her opinions and analyses meaning and value, by virtue of being performed by the 
sage immigrant fool who speaks truth to power.  
However, her role as a taboo-breaker and critic from within was also a 
precarious position, as she became an object of fierce criticism and even violence. This 
was clear already early in her public career, when social anthropologist Marianne 
Gullestad wrote an op-ed in Aftenposten (August 1th, 2000), arguing that Rehman 
overshadowed other immigrant voices. One of her points of criticism was that Rehman 
reinforced negative stereotypes about immigrants and that she contributed to an us and 
them-narrative. This criticism sparked debate, and seems to have become stuck with 
Rehman: It was repeated during the Stovner controversy, often in a much more uncivil 
form than Gullestad’s academic tone – Rehman and colleague Zahid Ali were for 
example called “Paki’s” (“Pakkiser”) on social media48.  
Gullestad also argued that Rehman’s role in the public sphere was shaped by 
her use of female sexuality. Even though I agree with this point, as I have discussed in 
the analysis in this chapter, there is a thought-provoking overlap between how it was 
used in public debate and the exact issue Rehman was battling: social control over 
women’s sexuality. Rehman’s use of sexuality, inextricably linked to her humour and 
her role as the taboo-breaking fool, was important to give her access to and a position 
in the public sphere, but was also what made this position precarious. In addition to 
fierce criticism from intellectuals, Muslim leaders and anti-racist activists, Rehman 
received threats, according to herself mainly from fundamentalist Muslims49. This 
culminated after she showed her bare buttocks at the Haugesund film festival. The 
 
48 https://twitter.com/humaf_/status/1110171275509538816 (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 




occasion was the premiere of the movie Import-eksport, a romantic comedy with a 
Norwegian-Pakistani girl and her majority Norwegian boyfriend as the main 
characters, which touched upon questions of social control. Rehman did the flash-
performance as a part of her speech when she emphasised how she controlled her own 
body – she also kissed the female Minister of Culture, Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, on 
the lips50. In addition to triggering yet another round of debate and harsh criticism of 
Rehman, it was probably the reason for a violent attack on her sister’s restaurant, when 
someone an early morning fired 15 gunshots towards it51. As a consequence of this, 
Rehman left Norway and lived in New York for some years52. 
This is yet another example of the tension between humour as conservative 
and radical. Shabana Rehman’s unserious fool role was seen as subversive, which was 
what gave her a position in the serious public sphere. Thus, it can nevertheless be 
considered a conservative, or at least hegemonic, position in some aspects, as it 
complied with strong and widely used interpretive repertoires about humour’s social 
value, but also, and more important, with repertoire’s about Islam and Islamic 
patriarchy as a killjoy and suppressor of women. On the other hand, although this 
position was popular in the mainstream and fitting with then central issues of the 
immigration debate regarding social control (Dahl, 2019), it was controversial and 
even precarious in different subcultures as diverse as the academy, the anti-racist 
movement and Islamic milieus. It seems clear that this controversiality was connected 
to Shabana Rehman as the taboo-breaking fool: it was her use of her own body and 
sexuality in her comedy routines that became too problematic. Perhaps did she not 
really shake up any taboos of the mainstream public sphere, but she certainly used her 
position in the mainstream to address taboos that were powerful elsewhere. 
 
Özz Nûjen was also seen as a fool and a truth-teller, but not as a critic from within. 
Rather, he was portrayed as an outsider who reveals the immigrants’ experience of 
 
50 https://shabana.no/rumpestuntet/ (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
51 https://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/innenriks/rehmans-restaurant-beskutt/443431.html (Last checked 
February 11th, 2021). 
52 https://shabana.no/rumpestuntet/  
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marginalisation in Sweden. This is clearly visible in an article about his first solo show 
in 2002, the stand-up/theatre hybrid Den tjocka kurdiska kvinnan säger vad hon vill 
(The fat Kurdish woman says what she wants): 
 
A heavy-set Kurdish woman serves tea and cookies. But she uses her own language, 
talking about a cup of cay, which she threateningly serves while she hoists her broad 




She has been living in Sweden for 25 years, but lots of things are still impossible to 
understand. Like that she remains an immigrant. Even her children who are born in 
Sweden are called immigrants. She thinks it sounds like a profession, like baker or 
carpenter. Should they not be immigrated soon? She is tired of immigrating and 
immigrating day in and day out, she wants to arrive now!53 (Svenska Dagbladet, May 
12., 2002) 
 
In press coverage of monologues like this, Nûjen is interpreted as someone who stages 
and performs his own – and his family’s – marginality (Gilbert, 2004, pp. 1-8, 17-25). 
Marginality should here be understood as a term to describe the status of groups who 
differ from dominant society and also are denied, in different ways, access to power by 
the dominant group (Dennis & Dennis, 2017). The term also has a history in social 
psychology, where the so-called Park–Stonequist model of marginality describes a 
personality type that as a result of modern migration find himself between two cultures 
(ibid), similar to contemporary notions of hybridity, which gives a unique perspective 
where he can combine “the knowledge and insight of the insider with the critical 
attitude of an outsider” (Stonequist 1937, quoted in Gilbert, 2004, p. 4). In 
contemporary Swedish debate, this idea is central in an interpretive repertoire that can 
be termed The marginalised immigrant (Dahl, 2019). Marginalisation of immigrants 
was widely understood as a result of structural racism in Sweden at the time. Hovden 
 
53 The Swedish original, “komma fram” is ambiguous and can be read as both “arrive” and “appear”. 
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and Mjelde (2019) demonstrate that racism as a topic and the racism-subtype of the 
victim frame were common in the Swedish press around year 2000, and my qualitative 
readings of the same press material support that an understanding of racism as a 
structural problem in Swedish society was prevalent. This understanding is used in all 
kinds of genres, by all kind of actors, and about a wide variety of issues, from 
understanding xenophobia in the population as a whole as the cause for racist violence, 
via interpreting government policy as discriminating, to an understanding of “everyday 
racism” as common in acts and attitudes of the majority population.  
A central repertoire in the Swedish immigration discourse could thus intersect 
nicely with a certain way of using the Humour as a special form of truth-telling 
repertoire, where ideas similar to the concept of marginalisation are central elements. 
The comic archetype of the fool is in addition to being foolish often also an underdog, 
from the slaves in Roman comedy via court fools, commedia dell’arte’s zanni and 
Shakespeare’s clown characters to Chaplin and Dario Fo (Bevis, 2013, pp. 63-76). 
Both Rehman and Nûjen became moulded into fool roles, but whereas the fool as a 
taboo-breaker was used to understand Rehman, the fool as an outsider was used to 
understand Nûjen. Common for both these aspects of the fool is of course that they are 
connected to a special truth. It should be noted that the idea of the comedian (or fool) 
as marginalised is extremely strong when the interpretive repertoire about humour as 
offering a special form of truth is used about stand-up comedians in academic 
literature. It is central in Lawrence Mintz’ seminal article “Standup Comedy as Social 
and Cultural Mediation” (1985), stand-up comedians are claimed to be modern day 
fools in Oxford professor Matthew Bevis’ popular textbook Comedy: A Very Short 
Introduction (2013), an entire monograph discusses stand-up comedy as particularly 
suited for the performance of marginality (Gilbert, 2004), and it has also been used to 
understand Nûjen’s comedy in the context of intercultural relations in Sweden 
(Karlsson Minganti, 2014, p. 49). It is thus no wonder that it also was used in the 
media coverage of Nûjen.  
There are, however, few intersections of folly and marginalisation in the press 
coverage of him. As such, the underdog-fool is closer to an implicit or latent role, 
while the marginalisation-repertoire is what becomes manifest in the analysis of the 
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shows. However, since this repertoire is used to understand Nûjen as a performer and a 
comedian, as someone who performs his marginality, I would nevertheless argue that 
the fool figure, and thus the humour as a special form of truth-repertoire, is at play. In 
most articles about him, the serious aspects of marginality are allowed to the forefront:  
 
[Interviewer]: You think that you have been discriminated? 
[Nûjen] -Yes, terribly. In everyday life. When I applied for work and when I tried to 
get into clubs. One has stopped me even if I had the right age and the right money. So, 
one deprives certain people the freedom to have as much fun as others. (…) He 
[Nûjen] knows where ignorance lives and where prejudice flourishes – far into what 
he calls “proper city hall racism”. (Svenska Dagbladet, May 12th, 2002) 
(...) 
I have met young boys like Zozo [the main character of his show] many times. They 
are around us all the time. You should not be sorry for him, but for society. The way 
the new young boys live is proof that society does not work.  
Özz Nûjen (born 1975) could have been a Zozo as well, he says. He is originally Kurd 
from Turkey, who arrived to Sweden as a refugee together with his family on the new 
year 1983-84. (Svenska Dagbladet, October 10th, 2001) 
 
These excerpts illustrate how Nûjen’s performances are understood as connected to his 
biography: the marginality he performs has roots in marginality he as an immigrant 
experiences in the world outside the stage, a marginality well known through the 
serious Swedish press discourse. It is also mentioned that Nûjen is Kurdish, which is 
frequently done in Nûjen’s performances and in the press coverage. Although Kurds 
often have been represented through orientalist stereotypes, there is also a more recent 
tendency to represent them as a heroic, marginalised people (Kardaş & Yeşiltaş, 2018; 
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Sheyholislami, 2001) – “the world's largest nation without a state”54. It seems clear 
that Nûjen’s identity as Kurdish intersects with the underdog-fool repertoires. This can 
perhaps also be understood as a rebranding of Kurds in Sweden, as the ethnic group 
around 2000 was the centre of debates of honorary killings and patriarchal culture 
(Bredström, 2003; Simonsen, 2004, pp. 238-245). 
There is a clear line from the underdog-fool repertoire used to describe 
Nûjen’s performances and the enunciative position he got in the serious public sphere. 
After his first solo performances, he became a contributor to Mangas, a magazine 
about multicultural Sweden within Studio Ett, a major news-oriented talk show on SR 
1. In 2002, he was one of the “summer hosts” in SR 1's popular summer programming. 
The experience of marginalisation was a central topic in these programmes as well as 
in the presentation of them: 
 
Özz Nûjen's summer programme will be about resistance. The resistance I had to grow 
up with, the resistance I met, the resistance I have seen, the resistance that gives hope 




Why do immigrants need to learn Swedish before they get a job, if it is at the 
workplace that they have an opportunity to learn the language? Is it time to accept 
Rinkeby Swedish as a natural development of the Swedish language? Conversation 
about the tolerance towards people who speak with an accent and how much accent 
one can speak with in order to be understood. (Mangas metadata, June 30., 2001)  
 
How this role became stable is visible in an interview with tabloid Expressen for the 
occasion of his third solo show in 201355, Statsminister Özz Nûjen (Prime Minister 
Özz Nûjen), where he is quoted on racist threats, his personal refugee history, how he 
 
54 http://www2.harpercollege.edu/mhealy/g101ilec/intro/clt/cltdiv/cltdivtx.htm (Last checked February 
11th, 2021). 




was type-casted to immigrant roles when he worked at the national theatre Dramaten, 
and perhaps most notably on his participation in Swedish-Norwegian talkshow 
Skavlan, where his characterisation of Frp as a racist party was edited out by NRK for 
the Norwegian version of the show. His personal experience of marginality, as a Kurd 
in Turkey or immigrant in Sweden, is still central, more than ten years after it 
accompanied his entrance into the public sphere.  
The passage from the cultural to the political parts of the public sphere is less 
clear-cut in the case of Nûjen than in the case of Rehman, since the coverage of him 
mainly took place in the cultural section of newspapers and more talk-oriented radio 
and TV. He also lacks the explicit political connection that Rehman has as the leader 
of NGOs and contributor to government policy making. However, Riegert, Roosvall, 
and Widholm (2015) and Riegert and Roosvall (2017) claim that cultural journalism in 
Sweden should be seen as encompassing not only journalism about the arts, but also 
genres like feature and commentary and debate on societal issues holding a more 
reflective level, understood as an alternative perspective to the news. In addition, 
Nûjen’s importance was understood through a repertoire dominating the Swedish 
political public sphere on matters of immigration at the time, where immigrants were 
understood as marginalised and victims of structural racism. Here, it was perhaps the 
political public sphere that spilled over into the cultural public sphere, and made one 
of the country’s first immigrant comedians into a sort of artist-intellectual specialised 
on multicultural society, with access to and a voice in the parts of the political public 
sphere oriented towards debates about ideas and cultural issues in a broad sense. 
 
Omar Marzouk differs from his two colleagues, as he not first and foremost is 
interpreted as someone who tells uncomfortable truths, but as someone who facilitates 
dialogue. Somewhat paradoxically, he is also controversial, and comes across as the 
rawest and the most satirically oriented of the three comedians. This does not go 
unnoticed, for example in Hjort and Palle’s history of Danish stand-up comedy, where 
Marzouk is portrayed as one of the few political comedians in Denmark (2009, pp. 
104-105), or when he in 2006 appeared on the front page of the magazine Ud & Se 
cloaked in a keffiyeh and wearing a football scarf in the Danish national colours, along 
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with the text “Tal om de farlige ting” – “Talk about the dangerous things”. However, 
almost every time when his potentially provocative comedy is brought up, it is also 
stressed that he does not seek provocation – but dialogue.  
 
– For some, the keffiyeh is a symbol of terrorism. Does not this text and photo 
signalise that Muslims are dangerous terrorists? […] “The important point is that this 
photo is humoristic and an expression of equality between two cultures – that is why 
the two scarfs appear together. We do not seek to provoke, but to create dialogue 
through humour” (Journalisten, January 3rd, 2003).  
(...) 
A Muslim serve full of humour, abundance and nuance in the stagnated Danish debate. 
A proof of the world being bigger, quirkier and more rewarding than the authorised 
soup-steak-and-ice-cream-Danish mother in law-joke. Stand-up lived in this dark eyed 
figure – not as anger, not as worn out platitudes, not as self-digging manners, but as 
unpretentious communication human to human, a cool show that with the smile as a 
battering ram destroyed the fortress of prejudice. (Berlingske Tidende, January 2nd, 
2002) 
(...)  
“It’s not about being blasphemous, though; it’s about things that make both sides have 
a laugh. That’s more difficult than being provocative.” (New York Times, August 18th, 
2008).  
 
The enunciative position Marzouk is assigned in excerpts like this the comedian as a 
bridge-builder. Marzouk is represented as someone whose comedy targets both sides, 
meaning both majority Danes and the Muslim minority. The aim of this, however, is 
not mainly scornful ridicule, but to appeal to some kind of self-irony and through this 
facilitate dialogue and perhaps even community. This is another variety of a positive 
humour-view, where humour is connected to sociability, an idea that got 
philosophically elaborated already by Xenophon, Aristotle and Cicero who distinguish 
between ill-natured and good-natured laughter (Amir, 2014, pp. 78-79). In the classical 
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works, good-natured humour, eutrapelia, which can be translated as cheerfulness or 
wit, is a personal virtue connected to good taste, where precisely hurtful intention as 
well as inappropriate content is what one should avoid. This view of humour does not 
only have a life among philosophers: Kuipers (2015, pp. 170-193) has in her study of 
joke culture in the Netherlands shown that joke-telling first and foremost is a part of 
sociability, and closely connected with an ability to understand what is appropriate and 
not hurtful in different contexts.  
One sub-variety of this idea is that humour not only is an expression of 
appropriateness and sociability, but that it fosters sociability, and even a cultured 
sociability of truth. This was a central point in the thought of Spinoza, and especially 
Shaftesbury, who viewed good humour as a social expression of true, intellectual 
judgement in line with God’s benevolent order of the creation (Amir, 2014, pp. 77-81). 
Although there is no trace of any religious, and definitely not anagogical, ideas in the 
writings about Marzouk, it is still clear that his exercise in bridge-building through 
humour also is connected with a higher form of truth, as it challenges, and even 
destroys, prejudice, a central aspect of wit and humour in Shaftesbury’s philosophy. 
Thus, also this can be a variety of the Humour as a special form of truth-telling 
repertoire. The specific application of the old idea about humour as truth through 
sociability in Marzouk’s case is thus through a use of this interpretive repertoire where 
he is understood as a bridge-builder who by humour overcomes prejudice among 
Danes and immigrants alike, and thus facilitates a more true picture of immigrants and 
increased understanding between the groups. The importance of dialogue being 
facilitated through humour is visible in the excerpts where it is suggested that the 
audiences laughs or smiles. 
Often, Marzouk’s role as a bridge-builder is emphasised by examples of how 
he contributes to integration, but also by how he provides an alternative Danish 
identity. Of the three Scandinavian countries, it is safe to say that Denmark has the 
strongest pronounced ethnonationalism, which also is officially sanctioned. The idea 
of a particular leitkultur is very present in Danish public debate, in strong or weak 
forms (Mouritsen, 2006, pp. 76-78). An important manifestation of this is how 
Denmark early on adapted the naturalisation process of immigrants so that it also 
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served as an integration process, including mandatory knowledge tests and oath-
taking. There is also a strong emphasis in the debate, as well as in legislation, on the 
importance of immigrants adhering to Danish values, when Sweden, in contrast, 
emphasises democratic and universal values in similar instances (Brochmann & 
Hagelund, 2012, pp. 254-260). Ten official values have even been explicitly and 
officially formulated in a government process that started in 2016, Denmark’s 
Canon56. Furthermore, Islam tends to be formulated as an antithesis to these Danish 
values (Hellström & Hervik, 2014; Mouritsen, 2006; Mouritsen & Hovmark Jensen, 
2014). Extreme consequences of this view would be that Muslims are inherently anti-
democratic, or even that they cannot be real Danes. It is this kind of position Marzouk 
is understood as an opposition to, and explicitly opposes himself:  
 
The well-known comedian was invited to Århus by the city council, who after some 
years with sad racist attacks made the initiative for the campaign ‘Respect, Dialogue, 
Tolerance’. […] The three topics were then treated by Omar Marzouk in his own 
politically incorrect manner. Among references to “Pakis” [perkere], “Pale faces” and 
hated football fans [forhatte Brøndbysupportere], he succeeded at blending in proper 
messages. For example, when covering ‘respect’, he said: “The meaning of life is to 




Omar Marzouk is preoccupied with how Danes are very full of themselves and do not 
understand how someone can be Muslim.  
“I get asked about the strangest things, for example if it isn’t sad to be Muslim, if my 
children are going to be circumcised, and what Denmark would look like if Taliban 
seized power. But I don’t want them to take over either! It is like one as a Muslim isn’t 
allowed to live like a completely normal Dane just like everybody else”, he says. 
(Jyllands-Posten, October 12th, 2002).     
 




It should be noted how Marzouk in these excerpts does not reject the importance of 
certain values as a part of the Danish civic identity, or suggests that Muslim values are 
as good as Danish values. On the contrary, he claims that he wants to be “a completely 
normal Dane”, and the quote “The meaning of life is to learn to live together with 
people one does not fit with” should be interpreted with the Danish concept (and later 
canonical value) frisind in mind. Frisind, which best can be translated as liberal-
mindedness (Edelberg, 1945), refers to a relaxed and accepting attitude to how other 
people want to live their life, in modern Denmark especially when it comes to sex and 
sexuality (Thing, 2002). It also refers to a clear standpoint where the promotion and 
cultivation of this liberal attitude is expected from everybody. What Marzouk does, 
then, is to promote frisind from the position of being an immigrant and a Muslim. He 
thus uses a dominant repertoire in the Danish immigration debate, which can be 
formulated as Adhering to Danish values is necessary in order to be a part of Danish 
society, but does so in a way that avoids, and actively counters, the construction of an 
unbridgeable difference between Danishness and Islam. Instead, he suggests that it is 
possible to be both Dane and Muslim, in other words an alternative to a thick, ethno-
nationalist identity. This more civic form of nationalism is one of Marzouk’s clearest 
contributions in the serious public sphere, when he is used as an interview object or 
public speaker, and it is clearly in line with the bridge-builder repertoire that is used to 
understand his comedy. Thus, he was able to take a middle-ground position in the 
political public sphere. 
Marzouk was of course not the only actor critical to a thick ethno-nationalist 
civic identity or the creation of an opposition between Islam and Danishness. This was 
common, to various degrees, for politicians from all parties except the Danish People’s 
Party (Mouritsen, 2006, pp. 82-83). This is probably the reason for why he could get 
the position of the bridge-builder in the media: It fitted well with an existing 
problematisation of Danish nationalism. However, Marzouk had a much clearer and 
more consistent rejection of ethnonationalism than the political parties, who in practice 
often conducted a conceptual sliding where their promotion of civic values to various 
degrees became connected to Danish heritage (ibid). In addition, he was special as he 
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spoke from a clearly religious Muslim point of view, while still being a comedian. 
This became especially visible after the Danish Mohammad cartoon crisis, where 
Marzouk’s religious identity was brought to the forefront. He took an active position 
where he, as a faithful Muslim, claimed the cartoons to be hurtful and unnecessary, but 
also unconditionally defended the freedom of speech of the papers that published the 
cartoons. 
 
(…) when Muslim mobs began torching embassies last month, protesting a Danish 
newspaper's cartoons about Islam's prophet Muhammad, Marzouk, 32, stopped 
laughing. He decided, he said, it was "time to stand up." […] Everyone's saying 
'You're either with us or you're against us.' The middle ground has just got lost - it 
doesn't exist any more." Undeterred, Marzouk, said he will use his comedic talents to 
push back against extremism. "I think that my next show will be about freedom of 
speech and cartoons. "Sometimes I think that comedy is the only way. In any culture 
you're given extra space to say things if you do it with humor," he said. (SFGate, 
August 3rd, 2006). 
(…) 
He reminded the audience that there currently is a boycott in many Arab countries 
against Danish products. He therefore asked the crowd if imam Abu Laban from The 
Islamic Society was present, and encouraged him to appear in commercials in the 
Middle East for Danish dairy produce57 in order to stop the boycott. “Please finish off 
the Friday prayer with a glass of milk”, was the call from Omar Marzouk to both Abu 
Laban and the Muslim audience.  (Jyllands-Posten, June 18th, 2006).  
(…) 
 “I think that a tendency has developed in this country where one cannot say anything. 
There are a lot of people who think that one cannot say anything about Islam or the 
 
57 Abu Laban was an outspoken, controversial conservative Muslim leader in Denmark at the time, and 




imams without getting death threats. I think that is crap”, Omar Marzouk 
says.[…]“Both due the Mohammad crisis and due to the general turn to the right, I 
think it is important to do it [criticise religion], and that the criticism of for example 
Islam not always is on the premises of the right-wing. The political right means that 
one only can make fun of religion if it is strongly scornful. I actually think one can do 
it without pissing on anyone”, he says. (Berlingske Tidende, March 19th, 2008).  
 
Again, we see how Marzouk seeks to actively use his middle-ground and bridge-
builder position. This position is in opposition to the extremes in both ends – the 
political right-wing and fundamentalist Islamic clerics. What is clear in these excerpts 
is thus that the bridge-builder also is somebody who counters polarisation and harsh 
debate. That Denmark has an especially harsh debate, especially when it comes to the 
immigration issue, is a popular belief in Scandinavia, which there also is empirical 
evidence for. It is used a sharper language from politicians criticising immigrants 
compared to for example Sweden, including a tendency to frame Islam as a threat 
(Hellström & Hervik, 2014). The immigration coverage in the Danish press has also 
been more politicised and dominated by threat-frames than what has been the case in 
Norway and Sweden (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019), indicating that the issue is politically 
polarised. Finally, there are Muslim clerics in Denmark who at the best have been 
ambiguous when asked if Danish law stands over Sharia (Mouritsen, 2006), and in 
some cases clearly have opposed the dominant articulation of ‘Danish values’. The 
best known was the above mentioned Abu Laban, a Palestine imam with connections 
to the Egyptian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood (Khader, 2008) and then leader of the 
largest Muslim congregation in Denmark, Islamisk Trossamfund. He was a skilled 
media strategist, and took a central role in the caricature controversy as a promoter of 
an unreserved criticism of the caricatures in the Danish public sphere including 
encouraging protests and taking initiative to legal action in the EU court system 
(Jensen, 2007). He was also one of the imams instrumental in bringing the attention of 
the Arab world to the caricatures (Khader, 2008). Finally, it seems to exist a position 
of a certain kind of freedom-of-speech-fundamentalism in Danish political debate, 
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where the right to criticise something or someone in a confrontational mode is seen as 
non-negotiable (Mouritsen, 2006, p. 70), a position that was much used after the 
caricature affair. To put it short, the polarisation of Danish immigration debate worked 
along many dimensions. What is as important for the discussion in this chapter is that 
this also was an interpretive repertoire used by actors in the Danish debate to conduct 
meta-debates, and also attack political opponents by accusing them for being the cause 
of this kind of polarisation (Hervik & Boisen, 2013). The repertoire can be termed The 
tone of the debate, which also is a phrase recurrently used in this meta-debate by the 
participants themselves (“tonen i debatten”).  
Omar Marzouk’s ability to get assigned a middle-ground position in a 
polarised debate was thus probably also because of this existing interpretive repertoire 
that posed the tone of the debate as a problem. Marzouk could hence again be seen as 
part of the solution of an already formulated problem. This also intersected with his 
Muslim identity, even more so after the cartoon crisis. The controversy was an 
important humour scandal where a moral and political rift between the Western and 
the Muslim world was dramatized (Kuipers, 2011), which suggests that like in the case 
of Shabana Rehman, the interpretive repertoire of Islam as a killjoy and the 
commonplace of Muslims lacking a sense of humour were important as latent means 
used to understand Marzouk and mould him a position in the public sphere. However, 
unlike Rehman who refuses to address her faith or lack thereof in public, and was 
represented as a contrast to humourless Muslims, Marzouk was portrayed as a Muslim 
with humour. His participation in the cartoon crisis was thus the clearest illustration of 
how a position was given to, and taken by, him in the public sphere: as the bridge-
builder who uses humour that goes in both directions to create community in the 
middle ground, removes the difference between being Danish and being Muslim, and 
thus provides an alternative to the polarised Danish debate.  
Like the case was with Rehman, Marzouk’s enunciative position in the public 
sphere was both sought after and precarious. He also received death threats, both from 
Islamists and nationalists, but did unlike Rehman not receive criticism from the anti-
racist movement, but rather from the right wing. Especially fierce was his debate with 
the artist Firoozeh Bazrafkan, active participant in Danish debate, when she accused 
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him of being too soft against Islamist terrorists and ended the debate by giving him the 
finger58. It thus seems that the bridge-builder role became increasingly difficult for 
Marzouk, according to himself due to the increased polarisation of Danish 
immigration debate. After having been a proponent of combining Muslim and Danish 
identities, he declared in 2016 that he “did not feel Danish anymore” and wished to 
move to another country59. It is also telling that his comeback to the stand-up scene 
after a five year hiatus, in the winter 2020, was a solo show with the title 
“Afdanskningsbal” (“De-Danification Ball”). Like Rehman, it seems that also 
Marzouk had a position which was both compliant with hegemonic positions and 
something radical, both safe and controversial.  
 
4.3 Conclusion: Balancing on the boundaries. 
 
Since their first appearances in the public sphere, relatively consistent interpretive 
repertoires have been used about Nûjen, Rehman and Marzouk. Although there are 
significant differences between how the three comedians were understood, a shared 
trait is that their humour was understood as something important because it was 
connected to a special kind of truth. This points towards the cultural value comedy and 
humour has in the Scandinavian public spheres, and even that being comedians and 
immigrants was enough to not only get access to the public sphere, but also get an 
enunciative position where they would be considered immigrant voices, in line with 
how their shows and first media appearances were interpreted. The unserious mode of 
humour thus gained a value as a serious contributor to the debate. At the same time, it 
is clear that the repertoires to a high degree stemmed from themselves, which points to 
how the cultural value of humour could be used as a rhetorical resource by the three 
comedians, as individuals, to get access to the political part of the public sphere. 
 
58 https://www.bt.dk/danmark/paa-live-tv-her-giver-kvindelig-debattoer-kendt-komiker-fingeren (Last 
checked February 11th, 2021). 
59 https://www.bt.dk/danmark/standup-komiker-overvejer-at-flytte-til-et-andet-land-jeg-foeler-mig-
ikke-dansk-me (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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It is also significant that the three were doing stand-up comedy. The genre was 
new in Scandinavia and provided an easy road into the world of stage and TV 
entertainment. It probably also had some news value in itself, especially as the 
comedians were immigrants. Although it is not directly visible in the coverage of the 
three comedians, it can be argued that stand-up comedians with an immigrant 
background were good symbols for the new, cosmopolitan urban lifestyle of 
Scandinavia (Løvland, 2002, p. 28), and thus interesting in themselves for the mass 
media. What is explicit in the cases of Rehman and Marzouk is that the two often 
would be understood as political comedians – and the ‘rest’ of their colleagues were 
often criticised for being apolitical, as Scandinavian stand-up typically was inspired by 
their contemporary Jerry Seinfeld, with his observational lifestyle comedy, rather than 
the political rebel and underdog Lenny Bruce (ibid, pp. 76-84). There are some 
instances where the media clearly interprets the two as stand-up comedians one 
‘finally’ can take seriously. This also demonstrates the usefulness of investigating 
opinion formation in the public sphere as historical processes of ruptures and 
intersections between different historical series: The new genre of stand-up comedy 
intersected with the development of a young generation of immigrants and 
descendants who were seeking for ways to gain access and voice in the public sphere.  
Both the comedian’s access into the world of stand-up comedy and their own 
and the media’s use of interpretive repertoires to understand them as politically 
relevant can usefully be understood as boundary struggles, in the third sense 
conceptualised by Midtbøen et al. (2017), where such struggles are seen as processes 
of inclusion and exclusion of and by individual actors. In a different study, Midtbøen 
(2018) has argued that immigrants participating in the Norwegian public sphere has to 
manage their background as immigrants in order to gain access and create a role for 
themselves, in a careful interplay with existing power mechanisms. This seems to be 
the case with the three comedians in this chapter as well, but they have also used their 
background as comedians as a strategic tool in this regard. This was done by 
mobilising different versions of a well-established interpretive repertoire, Humour as a 
special form of truth-telling, which each of them strategically adapted so that it would 
fit both with their own background and with broader tendencies in the immigration 
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debate in each of the three countries. Rehman entered as a participant in a larger 
debate about social control over women in immigrant millieus, Nûjen’s focus on 
marginalisation resonated well with the Swedish immigration debate, and Marzouk 
took a middle-ground position, preaching civic nationalism, dialogue and respect in a 
debate climate that often has been characterised as ethnonationalist and polarised.  
This points towards another way the tension between humour’s conservative 
and radical aspects is put at work. The comedians were all, in different way, 
understood as someone who did something new and daring with their comedy, but this 
appreciation was again build on well-established understandings of humour’s cultural 
and political value, as well as well-established themes and points of view in the 
broader immigration discourse. I have previously argued (Dahl, 2019) that Nûjen and 
Rehman’s trajectory into the public sphere demonstrate how comedy has a limited 
power to bring something new to the serious debate: the comedians who manage to say 
something in the serious public sphere are the kind of comedians the press already 
look for. I still think this is somehow correct, but it has to be qualified. Although 
Rehman and Marzouk were moulded into roles that were sought after by the media, 
they were also very controversial to the point of being precarious in different 
subcultures. They also gained relatively unique positions as immigrant comedians who 
were respectively a critic from within and a bridge-builder. Even Nûjen, who appears 
as less controversial and more celebrated than his two colleagues, was unique in the 
sense that he managed to build up an immigrant led comedy club, and through being a 
comedian being a recurring participant in cultural debates. It thus seems that although 
comedy could not really challenge status quo in the radical way humour optimists 
seem to imagine, it could at least be used as a strategic resource for immigrants to 
enter the public sphere and create new kinds of enunciative positions. 
Albeit the three comedians sometimes have been controversial, the general 
tendency in the reception of them has been celebration and endorsement. This mirrors 
more general tendencies in the reception of Scandinavian immigration comedy, but the 
reception of these three stands out due to the level of detail: we actually see the 
arguments and repertoires behind the celebration of comedy. The only other cases with 
this level of detail are humour controversies, when the celebratory tendency is 
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challenged, and public service comedy becomes accused of racism.  These cases point 
toward how not only humour optimism, but also humour alarmism can contribute to 

























Chapter 5: When is a joke racist, anyway? Public service comedy 
controversies on racism 
 
Ali: What else can one say? 
Morten: Well, you can say what you want, when it is freedom of speech…down in the 
Middle East…  
Ali: Call me a Paki then! 
Morten: … 
Ali: Come on, call me Paki! Or I don’t want to be integrated. 
Morten: You’re…Paki 
Ali: Sick! What else? 
Morten: You’re stupid…Wrong-coloured! 
Hassan: What?? 
Ali: Heeey, respect!! 
Yallahrup Færgeby, episode 3: 100 % Dane. 
 
Humour does, almost by definition, balance on a fine line between transgressing and 
respecting moral, aesthetic and political boundaries. When it stays safe, it is seldom 
very funny; when overtly transgressive, many will find it vulgar and offensive. This 
play with discursive borders makes comedy a good lens where cultural and social 
tensions in society are made visible (Kuipers, 2011; 2015, p. 124). This is especially 
true when someone finds comedy offensive and this becomes a topic in the mass 
media. Through such a humour controversy, which may evolve into a fully-fledged 
humour scandal (Koivukoski & Kuipers, 2019; Kuipers, 2011), public debate on the 
boundaries of the public sphere can occur. Following public sphere theory (Fraser, 
1992; Habermas, 1996), these kinds of debates are necessary in order to include new 
topics and actors into the fold of the public sphere.  
In this chapter, I will look at three different humour controversies in the 
Scandinavian countries and analyse them both as boundary struggles (Midtbøen et al., 
2017) in the public sphere, referring to the contestation about what types of speech 
acts that are deemed as legitimate or illegitimate as well as to the public sphere’s 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion (25-27); and as attempts of politicisation (Fraser, 
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1989), referring to how concerns that get political attention are not simply given, but 
subject to interpretive conflicts where issues formerly seen as belonging to the private 
sphere – and thus as the concerns of each single individual – enter the social and the 
public sphere, and may become political and thus common concerns. The two 
concepts – boundary struggles and politicisation - are used in tandem as my material 
shows that boundary struggles about racist humour – what should be accepted in the 
public sphere – also is an interpretive conflict about what (discursive) racism 
ultimately is. Using a combination of simple actor analysis and an analysis of the 
interpretive repertoires used by the different stakeholders, I suggest that the 
development of such controversies partly depend on how strategically placed actors 
use the humour controversies rhetorically, partly on the potential the show that sparked 
the controversy had for different kinds of interpretation. The cases in question are the 
sketch “All skit försvinner” (“All shit disappears”)60 from the Swedish programme 
Lorry (SVT) in 1989, the Danish Christmas calendar puppet show Yallahrup Færgeby 
(DR2) from 2007, and the Norwegian sitcom Ali Reza and the Rezas (TV2) from 
200961. Unlike the other chapters in this thesis, I will not treat each case in a separate 
section, but rather structure the chapter after the development of the three 
controversies, in order to highlight their differences as well as their similarities.  
 
5.1. Spark of the scandals: the programmes and their earliest reception 
 
October 26th, 1989, the sketch “All skit försvinner” was broadcast on SVT as a part of 
the second episode of a new comedy show, Lorry, named after the comedy group 
behind it, formed by a group of friends from the national theatre academy62. The show, 
marketed as humour for “divorced and mature youth”, gained positive critical 
 
60 The sketch can be viewed on https://twitter.com/mickek69/status/919199015413133312 (Last 
checked February 11th, 2021 
61 Most episodes of Yallahrup Færgeby and Ali Reza and the Rezas can be viewed as bootleg on 
YouTube, posted by different users. 
62 https://www.gp.se/livsstil/tv%C3%A5-dagar/det-finns-inget-lorry-g%C3%A4ng-1.9546388 (Last 
checked February 11th, 2021).   
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reception and was generally understood as novel, shaking up a stale Swedish comedy 
scene. However, it would also be known for transgressive and offensive humour, of 
which “All skit försvinner” was an example. The sketch shows two scenes where a 
woman, dressed as a housewife from the 50s, uses a can marked with the Swedish flag 
to spray different messy areas in the house, while she in a jolly voice proclaims, “All 
shit disappears”. In the third scene of the sketch, she walks past a dark-skinned man 
sweeping the street and sprays him. He vanishes, and she repeats the same, “All shit 
disappears”, but in an even jollier tone and with an emphasis on the word “shit”. One 
week later, the first media report appeared in Dagens Nyheter about an immigrant 
initiative that had reported the sketch to Radionämnden, the Swedish broadcasting 
tribunal, as well as arranged a demonstration in front of the TV house. November 12th, 
Lorry was the main topic of the TV programme Tycka om TV (Thoughts about TV), a 
magazine/debate programme where TV staff discussed with a “Vox Populi” consisting 
of both letters and videotapes sent in by viewers as well as a fixed studio panel of 
laypeople. 
Almost 20 years later, Yallahrup Færgeby, a loose parody of the classic 
Jullerup Færgeby, was broadcast in Denmark on December 1th, 2007. The show was a 
Christmas calendar, originally a popular Nordic children’s serial format where one 
episode is broadcast each day of advent with a grand finale on Christmas eve. Since 
the 1990s, adult parodies of the format have been popular in Denmark and Norway, of 
which Yallahrup Færgeby, written by Nanna Westh and Alex Haridi, is an example. 
The plot revolves around 12-year-old Ali, alleged descendant of gangsta rapper Tupac 
Shakur, who in the first episode, after bragging about his “big bollocks (“store 
nosser”), gets publicly humiliated when he during a visit to the school doctor learns 
that his testicles actually have not fallen down to the scrotum, a message that by 
mistake gets broadcast over the school’s intercom. The rest of the show circles around 
how Ali and his friend, the poet Hassan, desperately tries to assert their manhood and 
gangsta image in various ways, for example by starting a hash smokers’ lounge in the 
school. In addition to Ali, voiced by Danish-Turkish Özlem Saglanmak, and Hassan, 
there are several important side characters: the school inspector Hanne, who gets 
sexually aroused by integration, the school librarian Morten, who suffers a stress-
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related depression and frequently is taken advantage of (in all senses) by Hanne and 
Ali, the girl gang Crazy Girls, whom Ali and Hassan try to impress, the pusher Dennis 
and finally the imam Abu Babu, who tries to recruit the boys as suicide bombers. 
Although the characters are cute, fluffy puppets, there are many elements that do not 
belong in your average puppet show: the gloomy background of a concrete jungle, the 
use of slang and swearwords, and especially the explicit sexual imagery of genitals 
and masturbating puppets. Yallahrup Færgeby received some attention before it was 
broadcast and was already then labelled as ‘controversial’, probably due to successful 
PR63. The show received positive reception after its first episode, but the critical 
reactions came after the third one, when three teachers from the immigrant dense 
Copenhagen suburb Hvidovre wrote a critical op-ed. Simultaneously, the show 
sparked multiple letters to the editor as well as reactions on different online fora. All 
these reactions became the basis for a syndicated news story about how controversial 
the show was, which was printed in numerous newspapers64.  
 
 
Figure 5 Hanne, the school inspector, starring in her homemade educational video about 
integration. From Yallahrup Færgeby, DR 2/ DR Ung/ Nordicom, 2007. 
 
63 See for example https://www.berlingske.dk/kultur/ornli-syge-gangstere-i-jullerup-faergeby (Last 
checked February 11th, 2021). 





The Norwegian case, Ali Reza and the Rezas, broadcast in 2009, was a sitcom about 
Ali Reza, a young Norwegian-Iranian who wants to become a celebrity. The plot 
circles around Ali’s attempts to become famous through his music, as well as his 
flirting with the neighbour Anja. This leads him into multiple conflicts with society 
around him, but also with the traditional family that he lives with. For example, one 
episode is about a forced marriage between Ali and his cousin from Iran, while the 
plot of another episode is structured around cultural conflicts between the Reza family 
and their neighbours during the celebration of Nowruz, the Iranian new year. Ali Reza 
was played – in drag – by Lisa Tønne, adopted from Iran to Norway as an infant. 
Tønne was also was the scriptwriter together with Irasj Asanti, Bahareh Badavi, 
Yngve Skomsvoll and Per Olav Sørensen, of whom the first two had an Iranian 
background. Already after the first episode, the show was accused of being racist on 
different online discussion fora, on Facebook, and in letters to the station TV 2. The 
newspaper VG picked up on this and wrote an online story65 on it on December 2nd. 
The three controversies were very different from the outset, especially in 
scope. However, they shared two elements: direct accusations of racism or 
discrimination from people with an immigrant background, paired with an aesthetic 
debate of the shows. Dagens Nyheter (November 2nd, 1989) reported about Abdolreza 
Soltani, an immigrant from Iran, who had reported Lorry to Radionämden as well as 
reached out to multiple immigrant organisations to organise protests against the 
“increasing racism in Sweden”. Soltani emphasised how strong the reactions were in 
the immigrant communities, that immigrants were angry and ready to act to combat 
racism. There was also a clear disrespect-theme connected to the sketch’s script: “Us 
immigrants were literally treated like shit”. A more aesthetically oriented criticism was 
voiced in an anonymous letter to SVT undersigned “working immigrant woman in 
Stockholm”, read aloud in Tycka om TV’s episode on Lorry ten days later. She 
expressed how surprised she was that SVT could broadcast something so “tasteless 
 
65 https://www.vg.no/rampelys/tv/i/3v1XL/tv-seere-anklager-ali-reza-for-rasisme (Last checked 
February 11th, 2021). 
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and foul” and criticised how the station had so “poor imagination” that they went after 
“already weak groups like immigrants and children”. It should be noted that the letter 
writer also criticised another sketch from the Lorry show, which rather graphiocally 
showed incest.  
Her criticism became the leitmotif in the debate that night. It was clear that 
most members of the studio panel agreed with the letter writer: the show was tasteless 
and crude. However, most of them were reluctant to attribute racist intention to SVT 
or the Lorry gang. Many acknowledged the comedians and station’s points of defence, 
that the sketch was made as a criticism of the ignorance (“aningslöshet”) that allowed 
racism in Swedish society, but they nevertheless claimed that it was so crude that it 
could be misunderstood by immigrants who already were mocked and marginalised.  
Some of the panel members explicitly self-identified as immigrants and drew upon 
their own experiences, but it should be noted that they had Finnish or Hungarian 
background and thus were racialised in a different way than the dark-skinned actor of 
the sketch. Crude humour as disrespectful and opaque, concealing any satirical intent 
and thus only being hurtful and even harmful against those who already are in 
precarious positions, were typical talking points used to criticise the show in the 
following debate, and can be summed up as an interpretive repertoire, Offensive 
humour causes real harm.  
Crudeness was also a central objection against Yallahrup Færgeby, albeit on a 
slightly different note: the three teachers Kamilla Elleby, Kashif Ahmad – who also 
was a MP candidate for the party New Alliance – and Asif Ahmad wrote that: 
 
Yallahrup Færgeby largely uses as its starting point our prejudice about a classical 
ghetto with classical immigrant youth in the dominant role, with accompanying 
offensive language, drugs, gambling, sex, violence and scenes that can be experienced 
as discriminating and frightening (Politiken, December 4th, 2007).  
 
The teachers furthermore claimed that the show was counterproductive for their own 
attempts to teach their students to avoid bad language as well as prejudice against 
immigrants. As we can see, the teachers’ op-ed follows a quite classical formula for 
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media panics, worrying about media content’s destructive effects on vulnerable youth 
due to how much violence, sex and bad words there is in the show (Drotner, 2006). 
The media panic dynamic can partly explain how the controversy developed but will 
not be inspected in detail here: media panics happen recurrently (ibid), while both the 
controversy as a whole and the teachers’ op-ed stands out as a debate about racism and 
the boundaries of the public sphere. Despite following the ‘recipe’ of adults worrying 
over how the media corrupts the youth, their objections and analyses of why the show 
was discriminatory were actually much more detailed and multifaceted than the attacks 
on Lorry almost 20 years earlier, as they argued that the show was damaging both by 
perpetuating stereotypes about immigrants to the majority and by encouraging a sort of 
undesirable gangsta-identity. Through their role in civil society as teachers and 
politicians, they also had ready-made points of access to the public sphere, something 
Abdolreza Soltani and the anonymous letter writer probably lacked in 1989. 
 The Yallahrup Færgeby-controversy was in general more detailed and diverse 
than the Lorry-case already from the onset, which can be seen by how it engaged 
actors from the opposite sides of the polarised Danish immigration debate: 
independently of the teachers’ op-ed, the show had sparked hefty online debates on the 
blog of Helen Latifi66, a well-known blogger with an immigrant background, and 
Uriasposten67, a right-wing alternative news blog with a very active commentary field. 
On Latifi’s blog, the discussion started with critical posts along similar lines as the op-
ed, emphasising how the show was based on generalisations and stereotypes about 
immigrants – but also with the added aspect that humour targeted towards Muslims 
always would be acceptable in Denmark, while Muslims could not joke freely about 
the majority. There was thus also traces of an analysis concerning humour regimes, 
social norms about who are allowed to joke about what (Kuipers, 2011, p. 69), and the 
power mechanisms associated with these regimes. On Uriasposten, one point similar 
to the teachers’ criticism was reformulated, and one new point of criticism appeared. 
Some commenters agreed with how the gangsta image of the characters was 
 
66 web.archive.org/web/20071203100823/helenlatifi.wordpress.com/2007/11/22/dr2-jul-i-yallahrup-
f%C3%A6rgeby/ (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
67 http://www.uriasposten.net/archives/5262 (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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problematic, as they claimed this was a glorification of social losers that made them 
idols for immigrant youth. The commenters on the blog did however go one step 
further and claimed that this was a particular form of racism from DR’s side, as 
“ghetto-behaviour” was portrayed as the only thing immigrant youth could do, and 
even actively encouraged. It is thus clear that similar kinds of criticism towards the 
show could be used by actors with diverging interests and widely different framings of 
social problems. The commenters’ particular take on this criticism was also connected 
with the second prevalent point, which was introduced on Uriasposten: The show 
being multicultural propaganda, and especially inappropriate as a Christmas calendar. 
These two topics also appeared some days later in a couple of letters to the editor in 
Jyllands-Posten.  
This sums up the two dominant repertoires in the criticism of Yallahrup 
Færgeby. One of them was again Offensive humour causes real harm, but in this case, 
what was central was the perpetuation of harmful stereotypes rather than how the show 
was a crude, opaque and disrespectful representation of anti-immigrant attitudes. This 
repertoire was used arguing two different standpoints: that the show maintained 
prejudice; and that it glorified social misfits. However, the further conclusion of these 
two standpoints was shared: The show maintained an existing and problematic ethnic 
divide. The second repertoire was more closely connected to the immigration 
discourse at large than to humour per se and can be termed The media advocate a 
multicultural agenda. This was used to understand the show as an attack on Danish 
culture in general, and Christmas in particular. The stereotype-variety of the Offensive 
humour causes real harm-repertoire builds on the classical media panic-repertoires 
that draw on the Hypodermic needle theory of media influence, where the media is 
seen as duping passive consumers (Drotner, 2006), but also on the humour negative 
view I have sketched in the theory chapter, exemplified in scholarly literature by 
authors like Pérez (2013, 2016), where comedy based on stereotypes is viewed as a 
strategy to get away with the promotion of racist and dangerous stereotypes. The 
second repertoire is not connected to cultural understandings of humour but draws 
more on the Eurabia conspiracy, where the political and cultural elite is seen as 
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complicit in fighting an imagined European culture and make the continent culturally 
and racially Muslim (Carr, 2006).  
Diversity and detail were not characteristics of the debate about Ali Reza and 
the Rezas. In VG on December 2nd, 2009, the only interviewees were the show’s 
director and TV 2’s press liaison, who defended the show and simultaneously 
explained the reactions by how the main character Ali “encounters many problems we 
rarely dare to joke about”, while none of the many minority cast and crew of the show 
were interviewed. The complainants were referred to as “multiple TV viewers”, only 
represented by one anonymous quote: “The programme is too brutal and shows too 
strong signs of racism”. On online discussion fora, discussants were mostly positive, 
but a couple of self-identified Iranians were critical: 
 
What a bullshit serial. Embarrassing, directly embarrassing for us Iranians to be 
represented this way. I would have laughed if it was something I, as an Iranian, could 
have related to, because I have the self-irony it takes, but this was directly 
embarrassing (“samey999” at the VG Debatt thread “Ali Reza and the Rezas - 
terningkast 6!”, November 25th, 2009).  
 
Further contributions by this and other participants claimed that the show did not get 
the stereotypes right, that Ali Reza seemed more like a Pakistani than an Iranian, or 
even more like a general immigrant cliché coloured by the Norwegian majority’s 
prejudice rather than ‘actual’ mannerisms in the various immigrant communities. The 
main repertoire was thus again a version of Offensive humour causes real harm with 
an emphasis on how stereotypes are harmful, but it was not put forward as a criticism 
of stereotypes per se, but of wrong stereotypes, still claiming that they created 
prejudice. Notably, this criticism was not referred to at all in the VG story – although 
praise of the show from the same forum was. In fact, the news story did not 
substantiate the claims about the show’s racism at all, and there were no other news 
stories during the controversy – the rest of it played out on social media.  
The three controversies thus all started by public statements from immigrants 
about the experience of racism. Following Fraser (1989, 1992), this can be seen as the 
start of the politicisation of racist media representations. Speaking publicly about an 
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issue, thus moving it from the realm of private experience to the realm of social 
discourse, is the first step towards the politicisation of it, necessary to create an 
oppositional public around the issue as well as eventually putting it on the policy 
agenda proper (1989, pp. 301-304). I do not claim that my cases represent the first 
contestations of racist comedy representations in the Scandinavian countries. As Fraser 
argues, such contestations are likely to be unsuccessful from the point of view of the 
oppositional public seeking to politicise an issue, as it battles with hegemonic forces 
on different levels. Later in this chapter, however, I will argue that these cases were 
especially interesting, and that the Danish and the Swedish case should be seen as 
ruptures in the need interpretation contests about racism. 
I also view it as fruitful to understand the onset of these scandals as public 
display of the experience of being disrespected. According to Axel Honneth (2007), 
the experience of disrespect, grounded in denial of social recognition, is what fuels the 
moral demands that are voiced in the public sphere and is thus also a motor for social 
change (pp. 69-72). For my purpose, this notion is useful with its phenomenological 
focus on experience, and thus on emotion and affect, creates an entry point to a richer 
understanding of why it mattered that it was comedy shows, as well as just these 
particular comedy shows, which sparked the controversies. As we have seen, the 
criticism of racism goes hand in hand with an aesthetical, i.e. an experiential, critique 
of the shows, and understanding this as articulations of disrespect connects it to social 
theory and makes it possible to better understand the controversies as attempts of 
politicisation.  
 
5.2. A step back to the shows: the sources of disrespect 
 
As mentioned above, Lorry was critically acclaimed, but also controversial. Although 
they may not be entirely representative, newspaper enquêtes with titles like “What did 
you laugh of this year?” (Aftonbladet, December 26th,1989) or “What do you do on 
your spare time” (Aftonbladet, April 27th, 1990) indicate that especially youth and 
cultural workers enjoyed the show, while many older viewers voiced their criticism, 
for example in the episode of Tycka om TV. This indicates a generational gap – which 
 
 157 
again reminds us of the so-called ‘new humour’ of the 1990s, which I discussed in 
chapter 3. I would claim that Lorry was a forerunner, or perhaps even a premature 
instance of the new, ironic humour of the 90s, especially by virtue of its detached 
irony used to handle touchy subjects. This was visible from the “All skit försvinner” 
sketch, where racial slurs and hateful attitudes were represented in an ironic coupling 
with the idyllic and cheerful aesthetics of a commercial, and also in the incest sketch 
from the same episode, where a family engages in graphic incestual behaviour before 
the eyes of a shocked guest as if it was socially acceptable – and the characters’ 
groping and kissing would be inappropriate even if they were not related, at least at 
your average dinner party. Finally, Stefan Sauk’s “Tilfälligt avbrott” (“Random 
interruptions”) were fresh talk monologues similar to Otto Jespersen’s a decade later, 
where irony would be used as a carte blanche for aggression and insults.  
This kind of detached irony is normally not associated with strong emotion. 
However, Hutcheon (1994, p. 43) discusses the emotional element connected to how 
any instance of irony must be imagined as possible to misunderstand: an utterance that 
was intended as ironic can be interpreted as literal, and real offense can thus be taken. 
There is also emotion at play on the edge between those who do and those who do not 
get the irony, as the latter can feel excluded, the former intellectually superior – and 
possibly superior again if the misunderstanding sparks emotional reactions in the other 
group. This mechanism was probably at play in the case of “All skit försvinner”, as the 
use of racist metaphors and a dark-skinned person disappearing seem to have been 
taken literally. Furthermore, users of detached irony have often been accused of 
nihilism and moral cynicism (Sconce, 2002; Ytreberg, 2000), accusations that often 
have been delivered with a certain amount of emotional indignation. This might be yet 
another explanation of the provocative potential of the show – especially taking into 
consideration how it’s ironic aesthetics might have been ahead of its time. The 
tensions between humour as serious and unserious and as emotional investment and 
emotional detachment were thus at play in this controversy.  
Yallahrup Færgeby was built on exaggerated stereotypes about immigrants – 
and the people working with them, rather than an ironic treatment of hate-speech and 
prejudice. An important part of the scriptwriting process was interviews with youth 
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from immigrant dense suburbs68 – a technique that became famous with the 
Norwegian youth TV success Skam almost ten years later (Sundet, 2020). The slang 
and the stereotypes were thus founded not only in the colloquial debate on 
immigration and integration, but also in the lifeworld of those who were represented in 
the show – even though this representation was satirical, unserious and exaggerated. 
For example, “Crazy Girls” was a real name of an infamous girl gang in the 
Copenhagen area, and the ideals from hip hop culture were emphasised as important 
by the show’s informants, as well as by groups of immigrant youth interviewed in the 
wake of the show69. That being said, Yallahrup was a smorgasbord of stereotypes – 
repeated and varied in each and every episode. I would argue that this saturation of 
stereotypical representations probably was the reason for why the show triggered so 
many and various reactions. The humour of this kind of aesthetic lies precisely in the 
tension between serious and unserious, and thus between conservative and subversive: 
by some, a serial only consisting of stereotypes can be seen as mocking and derisive 
towards immigrants – if they are interpreted as serious, meaning read as intended to be 
a truthful representation of how immigrant youth ‘really is’. By others, the sheer 
number of stereotypes cancels such a reading since it clearly signals that this is not to 
be taken as a serious representation: it is obvious that the ‘real world’ in no way is like 
that. There is an ironic dimension also in humour of this kind. Therefore, the latter 
audience position also thrives on the tension between serious and unserious, 
conservative and subversive since the stereotypes somehow need to be viewed as 
credible for the show to be funny. Irony is based on quotation of something that can be 
recognised as serious, so if it is to work, the ironic quotation has to resemble an un-
ironic quotation to a certain degree (Tjønneland, 1999, 2004). How this works with 
ethnic stereotypes will become clearer when I discuss Ali Reza and the Rezas. To sum 
up, immigrant stereotypes are both reproduced and rejected in Yallahrup Færgeby. 
This ironic mechanism also happens through another important humour 
technique of the show: incongruence through juxtaposition. Cute puppets were 
 
68 https://www.berlingske.dk/kultur/yallahrups-halalhippe-mor (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
69 See note 64, as well as https://jyllands-posten.dk/kultur/ECE3458817/Fuck-Yallahrup-
F%C3%A6rgeby/  (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
 
 159 
swearing, fighting and masturbating; educational staff behaved completely 
inappropriate and irresponsible; the character Hassan participates in Ali’s gangsta 
project, but is also a polite and sensitive poet; and the jihadist imam, who also is gay, 
sings the song “A hug for Osama” (“En krammer for Osama”), about how you can be 
vain even though you are a terrorist. This way, the stereotypes of the show – but also 
our everyday scripts, like how teachers should be responsible – are played with, in a 
way that foreruns the shows that will be discussed in the next chapter, and thus 
signalled to be unserious. This is also a way to make stereotypes such as violent youth 
or religious fundamentalists humorous instead of threatening, demonstrating how 
humour works with both negative and positive emotions. Again, this can be interpreted 
as subversive, as a way to address stereotypes without claiming them to be true – but it 
can also be interpreted as yet another way to repeat and reproduce a stereotypical 
understanding of immigrants.  
Stereotypes were also central in Ali Reza and the Reza and were also here 
marketed as a way to poke fun at “immigration policy relevant questions” (Utrop, 
August 3rd, 2008). However, we remember that the first critical reactions that we know 
of questioned the credibility of those stereotypes. Ali Reza does not talk with a Persian 
accent, but with an undeterminable immigrant one. The language humour does not 
consist of slang or so-called “kebab Norwegian”, a mix of Norwegian and various 
immigrant languages, but of how Ali consequently uses the wrong prepositions and 
fails at pronouncing long words. He has decorated his room with the post-
revolutionary flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a controversial symbol in the 
Iranian diaspora (Khayambashi, 2019). This diaspora is generally very secular, 
including the Norwegian wing (Alghasi, 2010a), so Ali’s female relatives wearing the 
veil can be seen as a representation with little credibility. The same is the case for the 
episode about an arranged marriage, a very rare custom amongst urban Persians 
(Afary, 2017), the ethnic group we know that the Reza’s belong to due to their name 
as well as scenes when they speak Farsi. 
It is both tricky and controversial to argue that some stereotypes are more or 
less fitting, apt or even true than others. However, it can be argued that for ironic 
communication to be successful, the interpreters have to recognise the codes the ironist 
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draws on. The ironist and the audience therefore need to belong to the same discursive 
community, sharing various culture specific markers and signals (Hutcheon, 1994, pp. 
98-99), which include cultural ideas of what the world ‘really’ is like. For example, the 
ironic asocial behaviour of the O.J. character needed to resemble real asocial 
behaviour in order to be recognisable as an ironic representation, and elicit the 
evaluations associated with irony. This was done through various culturally sanctioned 
signs of asocial behaviour like shouting or insulting his conversation partner. Along 
the same line, the ironic representation of ethnic stereotypes needs to comply with 
shared cultural understandings of what, and who, these stereotypes represent. The 
textual elements I discussed above, taken together with the early reception of the show 
on discussion fora, indicate that this failed in the case of Ali Reza and the Rezas, as the 
stereotypes there were seen by some as not credible or relatable – at least as 
stereotypes about Iranians. I would argue that this is an important explanation for why 
the show was read as racist and disrespectful: it came across not only as a parade of 
stereotypes, but as an ignorant and belittling such from the point of view of the 
majority. The divide between the the serial’s makers belonged to, and the discursive 
community of the Norwegian-Iranian audience, was probably not so deep that the 
latter did not understand that there was an ironic intention. However, it was deep 
enough that the emotional elements inherent in the irony’s evaluative dimension failed 
to come across – since it was not credible, it also failed to be funny and was thus only 
offensive. It probably added to the insult that although Lisa Tønne was born in Iran, 
she seems to be read as part of the Norwegian majority by Iranians discussing the 
show, and it is notable that her character Ali never speaks Farsi during the show even 
though his family often does – he only nods. Hence, it became another factor 
contributing to a reading of the show as the majority ridiculing the minority, based on 
wrongful and demeaning stereotypes.  
That being said, Ali Reza and the Rezas was not univocally criticised by 
immigrants. There are many comments from users with names indicating an 
immigrant – sometimes even Iranian – background on Facebook and YouTube who 
clearly appreciate the show. I do not claim that the way Ali Reza used stereotypes has 
to be read as offensive – rather, it can serve as an explanation for a particular reading 
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where it is seen as disrespectful and racist for some particular reasons. However, 
although stereotypes with little credibility can be seen as offensive when coming from 
the majority, I will also argue that they give little fodder for discussion and debate – 
which will become clear in the next section, where I look at how the controversies 
developed further.  
 
5.3. From offense to debate: the controversies develop 
 
Although immigrant voices were prominent in the criticism of Lorry’s “All skit 
försvinner”, they were virtually absent during the rest of the controversy. The Tycka 
om TV episode caused a couple of columns, deeply critical of the reactions against the 
sketch – and the show as a whole. Margareta Schwartz, long time journalist in 
Expressen and later political advisor for Social Democrat PM Mona Sahlin, wrote an 
especially elaborate column on December 13th:  
 
(…) “Lorry” is the first show in ages that pokes fun at something else than priests 
saying bad words and owning bedchambers.  
 
In “20:00”, a Bulgarian explained that he chose to fly to Sweden for the sake of 
freedom. If he had been able to watch “Tycka om TV” before he left, God knows if he 
would have stayed at home.  
 
”Lorry” is not a pretty in the middle of the road-show. Your blood freezes when you 
watch it. The hair on your head stands up. You laugh to get them down and sometimes 
you don’t do that either. (…)  
 
I do not know what would happen if Picasso painted “Guernica” in Sweden. 
 
He probably would have a lot to answer for, I think, for slander about the dead. 
Someone would have pointed out how difficult it would be for the next of kin to see 




This excerpt illustrates the two major interpretive repertoires in the debate. The first is 
yet again Humour as a special form of truth-telling and serves as a defence of Lorry. 
Here, truth is connected with transgression: We see how the shock effect one gets by 
watching Lorry is described in vivid detail, and implicitly, this is presented as 
important and valuable – as something new and out of the ordinary, and even 
compared to the canonical artwork Guernica. Other columnists express this explicitly, 
for example Thorleif Hellbom in Dagens Nyheter on December 15th: “sketches that are 
sharp and pressing (…) funny and just on the spot”. This enthusiastic valuation of 
Lorry was already visible in the columns before the Tycka om TV episode, where many 
journalists praised both the originality and the transgressions of the show.  
The second repertoire can be termed The Swedish Nanny Society. This is 
rather an attack on Swedish mentality and debate climate than a defence of the Lorry 
sketch per se. Here, the Swedish public sphere is characterised as overtly prude, 
politically correct, and even with totalitarian tendencies. This is performed in rather 
harsh tones, with implicit claims of how Guernica could never be accepted in Sweden, 
or that communist Bulgaria is preferable over Sweden when it comes to freedom. This 
critique often went hand in hand with statements claiming that people offended by the 
sketch had “misunderstood” and that their criticism was embarrassingly off the mark. 
Sometimes, their immigrant status was explicitly mentioned. 
None of the columnists dug deeper into the accusations of racism. I would 
therefore argue that we saw a two-sided boundary struggle in this phase of the 
controversy: on the one hand, attempts to start a politicisation of racism was 
effectively blocked by the newspaper commentariat. It is worth noting that this was the 
work of the cultural elite, which statistically – and, as I showed above, individually for 
at least one of the columnists – belong to the left wing. These columnists supported 
the fight against racism and were sure that it existed in Swedish society – they namely 
interpreted the sketch as a poignant critique of this. Ironically, by doing so they used 
rhetorical moves that served as exclusionary mechanisms towards immigrants and 
their concerns about racism, labelling the critical reactions as totalitarian. This 
happened before the term “political correctness” became prevalent in the US and the 
Western world at large (Wilson, 1995), but I see clear conceptual and ideological 
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links. However, unlike the typical popular belief of how the PC-term is used now, it 
was the left wing commentariat who voiced these concerns, and they did not refer to 
how the difficult matters regarding immigration were silenced in the debate, which we 
will see in the two other cases in this chapter.  
On the other hand, this was a boundary struggle about how coarse satire 
should be allowed to be. Its value – not clearly formulated but at least forcefully stated 
– was contrasted with the description of a more general tendency where the Swedish 
debate climate was seen as overtly prudent and sensitive. There are few arguments put 
forward in this debate, other than that offensive satire seems to have a value in itself 
by virtue of the emotions it causes, and possibly hence can function as a way to renew 
a stale public life. Many columnists did also acknowledge that Lorry often could be 
plump and fail in their transgressive satire, so it does not seem like their stand is based 
on very principled views about freedom of speech – offensive satire needs to be good 
if it is to be endorsed. The problem is thus when people find the wrong shows too 
coarse and fail to ask the right questions about them in public (i.e., the ‘correct’ 
analysis of Swedish racism) or even move towards censorship by reporting them to 
Radionämnden. Thus, this debate is more of an aesthetical debate based on taste, in a 
very Bourdieuan sense, than a debate on the fundamental principles of freedom of 
speech. A certain type of satire is good and even important. Those who do not get the 
irony are ridiculed, and even portrayed as flirting with totalitarianism.  
This became even more visible after the verdict of Radionämden on April 5th, 
1990, where Lorry and SVT were convicted of violation of the Democracy Clause in 
the Radio Law, concerning broadcasters’ responsibility for human dignity and the 
rejection of racism and discrimination. “All skit försvinner” was considered so opaque 
and unclear that it came across as prejudiced and offensive towards immigrants. The 
verdict was unanimous (Radionämnden, TV 341-89). I have unfortunately not been 
able to access the written complaints to Radionämden nor the minutes of their 
meetings, but it is clear from the verdict that they seem to have accepted the premises 
voiced by Abdolreza Soltani the autumn prior. This was not noticed by newspaper 
journalists or columnists. The decision was univocally condemned, and in addition to 




Radionämndens decision adds fuel to the lukewarm prudishness that characterises 
public debate and makes self-censorship spread in even wider circles (Jörgen Eriksson, 
letter to the editor in Dagens Nyheter, April 8th, 1990). 
 
Columns, letters to the editor and interviews using the nanny society repertoire became 
more frequent after this verdict, and also even sharper in tone. Fritiof Haaglund in 
Svenska Dagbladet (April 9th, 1990) compared the nanny state and Radionämnden 
with Queen Victoria, well known for her prudishness and alleged influence over social 
morals, and Margareta Schwartz went even further than before and claimed that 
Radionämnden had committed a “violation” (April 22nd). The verdict also led to a 
couple of interviews with the writer of the sketch, Rolf Börjlind, who elaborated on 
the Humour as a special form of truth-telling repertoire. Firstly, he claimed that he was 
only telling the “truth” by working from existing social types. Secondly, he claimed 
that transgressions like the comedy he and the rest of the Lorry-gang did was the only 
way “for other people to leave behind prejudice, bigotry and estrangement” 
(Expressen, April 29th, 1990). More arguments for the value of offensive satire were 
thus given: It is a way to reveal the truth, and to make sure that this revelation gets 
consequences – due to the shock effect of transgressive satire.  
Satirical transgression and the value of strong emotion was less important in 
the debate about Yallahrup Færgeby, but satire’s ability to convey controversial truths 
was prominent here as well. In addition to the initial positive critical reception, the 
early criticism was answered through interviews with the creators, letters to the editor, 
and even an editorial in Jyllands-Posten on December 17th, 2007, with the title “Ornli’ 
syg satire” (“Real sick satire”): 
 
The shortest way between an immigrant and a Dane is, among other things, through a 
good laugh. It is therefore great that humour finally is used in the interest of 
integration and the common good. Besides delighting us, humour can serve as an eye-




Humour with satire, irony and self-deprecation creates community and shared identity. 
Satire should provoke both by virtue of form and content and provoke debate.  
 
Danish humour is not always that funny, but used with wit and a sting and without fear 
of taboos like in “Yallahrup Færgeby”, it serves integration much more than the first 
thousand acceptable and politically correct integration projects.  
 
Although this quote has references to satire’s form and provocative force, note that it 
is not substantiated how Yallahrup Færgeby provokes, nor is there given any vivid 
descriptions of its emotional force, which was the case in the Lorry-controversy. 
Instead, emphasis is on how the serial breaks taboos of the immigration debate. Note 
the explicit link to political correctness in this excerpt. Satire is thus again given a 
special truth-value: not only does it manage to treat taboos, but it does it in a way that 
can be both revelatory and disarming. In other words, taboos and difficult topics 
becomes less dangerous and more accessible through satirical treatment. This is by far 
the dominant way to use the humour as truth-telling repertoire in the defence of 
Yallahrup Færgeby. It does, however, come in two sub-varieties. By columnists and 
the creators of the show, it is clear that the show is seen as addressing taboos in order 
to bring difficult matters related to integration into the public sphere, thus countering 
an imagined political correctness dominating the immigration debate, but also to 
combat prejudice surrounding these matters, like the show’s writer Nanna Westh 
argued in an interview with Berlingske Tidende on December 8th:  
 
“It looks like they [the 3 teachers] just react on default. And actually, I understand 
them. On the surface, Ali and Hassan are stereotypes, but we have conveyed them 
with sympathy and depth. Ali does for example want to be a gangster, but he has tiny 
balls. Hassan is a poet and quite nerdy and also does not fit inside the boxes of the 
stereotypes  
(…) 
You cannot make a Christmas calendar about young Muslims and not address 
extremism. It is something people are afraid will happen and something that happens. 
So, it would just be too weak if we did not dare address it. On the other hand, it was 
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extremely important for me that the message in that episode is very clear. Ali and 
Hassan are not extremists.  
 
Westh argues that by building the characters around stereotypes, but also adding depth 
to them and even contradicting some elements of the stereotypes, the show avoids 
being discriminatory and does not create distance between Danes and immigrants. 
Even though she implicitly addresses political correctness, her argument is 
aesthetically warranted – like in the Lorry case, she does not really advance a 
principled defence of satire, but argues why the satire she has created is good and even 
socially beneficial. The boundary struggle on offensive satire is thus framed in the 
ethos of public service: how it can do good. The answer is that satire by handling 
difficult taboos in the public sphere make them less powerful. At the same time, Westh 
actually addresses her adversaries’ concerns in a more direct and responsive way than 
anybody did during the Lorry controversy. The politicisation of racism initiated by the 
three teachers is thus not rejected and put to a stop, as I argue the case was in the 
debate about Lorry. Instead, Yallahrup Færgeby is defended as an anti-racist use of 
stereotypes, and the politicisation of racism, which necessarily includes an interpretive 
contestation about what discursive racism actually is, can continue. 
As mentioned above, the idea that satire breaks taboos was used in two 
different ways, and the other way was by contributors in the comments sections and 
right-wing blogs like Uriasposten. Here, Yallahrup Færgeby was interpreted as a 
highly authentic mirror showing the real social problems in Danish suburbs: 
 
I agree that the serial is deeply “racist” or at least prejudiced, but that being said, it just 
shows the multicultural reality on Nørrebro or Ishøj. (“Casper” on Uriasposten’s 
“Samfundskritik eller folke-opdragelse – DR2’s voksen-julekalender”, December 3rd, 
2007). 
 
I still do claim that the writers through the obvious comparison with the idyll of 
Jullerup Færgeby wish to make visible the brutalisation and the increased division of 
Danish society. I can of course not explicitly prove that. (“Anonymous” on 




On the one hand, these comments engage in the politicisation of racism, serving as 
rebuttals of the claims that Yallahrup Færgeby was racist or discriminatory by 
claiming that the stereotypes are if not directly true, at least mirrors of real cultural and 
social problems and thus cannot be racist. On the other hand, comments like these seek 
to turn the debate away from matters of racism to matters of integration and the social 
problems caused by mass immigration. They can thus be understood as a way to derail 
the debate about racist representations, but also as participating in their own, specific 
boundary struggle where any critical voices about immigration and integration are 
represented as being silenced. It is interesting to note that both Yallahrup Færgeby and 
the criticism of it is seen as ‘multicultural propaganda’, which according to some of 
the contributors on these blogs seems to cloak the truth about all the problems 
associated with the immigrant population and integration policy. Although interesting, 
it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse this part of the controversy, as it does 
not directly concern the accusations of racism and also mostly was reproduced on 
right-wing blogs, and thus seems confined to a specific counterpublic.  
It is, however, worth noting that neither the idea of how problems concerning 
immigration are hushed away nor the reference to how ‘things really are’ were unique 
for the right-wing undergrowth as a defensive tactic. It was also used by the show’s 
creators, like Nanna Westh, and in editorials, albeit on a more implicit and less 
aggressive note, through statements like the above-cited reference to the existence of 
Muslim terrorists or how the show can serve as an “eye-opener”. It is clear that the 
imagined adversary in this case is political correctness, and we can hence see how the 
manifestation of the interpretive repertoire defending humour as truth is intimately 
connected with ideas and repertoire that are central in the immigration discourse at 
large, concerning its alleged political correctness. Furthermore, even though it is clear 
that these interlocutors defend interlocutors defend Yallahrup Færgeby on the basis of 
how it can break prejudice, these references to ‘real-life problems’ still position them 
in the dominant problem-oriented immigration discourse, where the differences 
between Danes and immigrants are emphasised and problematised (Hervik, 2004, 
2011) and where threat-frames and a politicised discussion of integration is prevalent 
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in the press coverage (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019). The defence of the show is based on 
an acceptance of the premise that immigration brings about tensions between 
immigrants and the majority, which, as I will discuss in the next chapter, does not have 
to be the case even though a comedy show is based on joking with ethnic stereotypes 
and differences. 
Unlike Lorry, the Yallahrup Færgeby-controversy can be understood as at 
least the initiation of an effective politicisation of discursive racism. A related 
difference between the two cases is how the debate did not come to a stop after one 
round with criticism and another round of defence. Instead, it spread out and took 
different directions. I have already mentioned how it got a life of its own in the fora of 
a right-wing counterpublic, but more interesting for the purpose of my chapter is how 
it was discussed by actors with an immigrant background. A likely reason for the 
longevity of the controversy was probably that Manu Sareen, at the time member of 
the municipal council of Copenhagen and deputy member in Parliament for Radikale 
Venstre (Social Liberal Party), arranged a meeting with different cultural workers with 
an immigrant background with the purpose of discussing the show, and also to write a 
joint statement about how the media represented immigrants70. This can be seen as the 
clearest merging of the politicisation and the boundary struggle over racist 
representations. Sareen also advanced a version of the “Harmful stereotypes”-
repertoire that was connected to a disrespect-logic rather than to a media panic-logic, 
namely how the serial normalised “perker-Slang”: 
 
«I think that what the problem with «Yallahrup Færgeby» is for many minorities (...) 
is that everybody starts to talk that way. So many Danes say: «Cool, man, we talk like 
you, and now, that’s humour». They do it in good faith, but being made into a part of 
the satire at work or other places annoys many minorities. And it is quite hard to 
correct if you don’t want to be hit below the belt and accused of being against freedom 
of speech» (Berlingske Tidende, December 4th, 2007).  
 
 
70 https://www.avisen.dk/indvandrere-vrede-over-yallahrup-faergeby_4000.aspx (Last checked 
February 11th, 2021). 
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Here, Sareen addresses the experience of people with a minority background, rather 
than departing from how the majority allegedly gets their attitudes formed by 
stereotypes. It is also worth noting that he thematises the “problem of the killjoy”: how 
criticising humour can be difficult, and how this also can make it hard to take a 
position where one speaks about one’s own experience of offence and even racism 
(Ahmed, 2010; Graefer & Das, 2020).  
This kind of disrespect-criticism was also voiced by a group of immigrant 
youth interviewed by Jyllands-Posten on December 8th, under the title “Fuck 
Yallahrup Færgeby!”. The boys, living in the Århus suburb Bispehaven, expressed 
strong emotions about the show, and argued that the show was “too flat”, “we do not 
talk like this all the time” and that “it is like they want to make us into scapegoats” – 
similar objections like those voiced against Ali Reza and the Rezas. The perhaps most 
interesting dimension of this rather long feature article was how the boys articulated 
the background for the attractiveness the hiphop and gangsta culture had for them, and 
thus substantiated their emotional reactions on Yallahrup Færgeby as they viewed it as 
poking fun of something that for them resonated deeply with their own lifeworld, and 
also was a mode of survival. This might also point towards a more fundamental 
difference in discursive communities and humour regimes, where some spheres of life 
are seen as inappropriate targets of humour and irony as it is opposed to the respect 
one for example gains in certain milieus through the gangsta lifestyle.    
Some days later in the same paper (December 14th), an almost opposite point 
was made by Mehmet Umit Necef, lecturer in Middle Eastern Studies at the University 
of Southern Denmark. He argued that being satirised was a way of being included in 
society as equal citizens, and that the show thus promoted integration. This again 
emphasises how the value of satire lays in crushing taboos, albeit again from the 
immigrant perspective, since it focuses on the experience of inclusion and recognition 
rather than any attitude change in the majority population. I would argue that the 
difference between Necef’s defence and the criticism voiced by respectively Sareen 
and the boys in Bispehaven is based on two fundamentally different views of what 
humour is. If humour is ridicule, the latter’s views are obvious and valid, if it is a way 
to be sociable and inclusive, Necef’s view is more on point. As they are based on 
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fundamental assumptions, these views are unlikely to change. What is interesting, 
however, is that they all figured in the controversy. Especially the feature article with 
the boys from Bispehaven stands out as a rather rare occurrence in the Danish 
immigration debate, where not only immigrants, but ‘problematic’ immigrants, are 
given voice and space to elaborate on their own lifeworld, values, and their 
experiences of media representations of this (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019; Riegert & 
Hovden, 2019). Furthermore, unlike in the Lorry-controversy, the references to 
political correctness in the Yallahrup Færgeby-debate do not seem to have blocked the 
discussion and delegitimised the concerns of immigrant voices. Hence, the controversy 
was rich and served as an opportunity to introduce new voices and perspectives, 
analysed both as a boundary struggle on immigration comedy and as politicisation of 
racism in the media.  
The same cannot be said for Ali Reza and the Rezas. As mentioned above, 
there was only one single story about the controversy in the media, but the debate went 
on for a while in online discussion fora71. This was a rather polarised debate, where 
two stands soon formed. One, already mentioned, sided with the original critique that 
the show was disrespectful as it promoted bad stereotypes, which again did nothing 
but fuel prejudice against immigrants. The other was a relatively principled defence of 
humour, claiming that a humoristic use of stereotypes cannot be racist. In addition, the 
critical voices were accused of being politically correct and for lacking a sense of 
humour and especially self-irony. This repertoire, which can be termed It is just a joke, 
was effectively used to rebut, and perhaps even delegitimise, the attempts to start a 
need interpretation contest about racism in the media. If a joke is always just a joke, 
i.e. unserious, it can also not be racist or discriminatory. This is a well-known move in 
the literature on ethnic humour, but what is interesting here, is how the forum 
participants that originally criticised the show seem to have been caught in this logic 
as well, maintaining their original point about how the show was built on ill-fitting 
 
71 This analysis is based on comments on https://vgd.no/musikk-tv-og-film/tv-
program/tema/1527488/tittel/ali-reza-and-the-rezas-terningkast-6/side/1 and 
https://freak.no/forum/showthread.php?t=144928. (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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stereotypes, but specifying that this was not about racism, as well as that they 
themselves were not sensitive, offended, nor lacked self-irony. 
Criticising the show thus seems to have been a precarious position, where 
participants modified their standpoints during the debate to avoid coming across as 
offended, and also avoided to call the show ‘racist’ in public. This is in line with 
existing research both on offensive television (Graefer & Das, 2020) and on the 
Norwegian public debate on racism (Hagelund, 2003). The difficulty to point out 
racism in the Norwegian public sphere can be one explanation for why the controversy 
around Ali Reza and the Rezas never developed like it did in the case of Yallahrup 
Færgeby, just two years prior. However, the lack of people with an immigrant 
background who took an interest in the case, placed strategically in the public sphere, 
is probably a better explanation. No teachers or politicians raised their voices against 
Ali Reza and the Rezas, and the accusations of racism was thus not given legitimacy or 
substance in the mainstream venues of the public sphere. Although there might be 
many reasons for this lack of engagement, one possible contributing factor could be 
the show themselves. As I argued above, Yallahrup Færgeby and Ali Reza and the 
Rezas handled stereotypes in two different ways. I would argue that the script of 
Yallahrup Færgeby was aesthetically better than the script of Ali Reza and the Rezas, 
in terms of how stereotypes were represented, but also in terms of how the former has 
more complex characters as well as employs different humour techniques. Ali Reza 
and the Rezas is largely a traditional farce, exemplified in details like how his bride to 
be is revealed to be very ugly, and Ali mixing the CD with the Mosque’s call for 
prayer with his own hiphop sample. Yallahrup Færgeby uses exaggeration and 
surprising twists of talking points in the immigration discourse, like when Hanne, the 
well-meaning school inspector who dresses in bright colour and enjoys belly dancing, 
gets an orgasm from thinking about integration, or when the extremist imam turns out 
to be gay. There is thus both more to like and more to be offended by in Yallahrup 





5.4. Conclusion: The scandals fade away…or do they? 
 
As per usual with media events, the humour controversies in this chapter did not last 
very long. The debate about Ali Reza and the Rezas fizzled out rather quickly, and it is 
most interesting as an example of how a controversy was not allowed to develop, and 
how concerns about racism were ignored. The Yallahrup Færgeby case lasted from the 
start of December into January the following year and gained some media attention 
again when the show was nominated to a European TV prize for integration, although 
this did not rekindle any debate. Being the only one of the cases that can be 
characterised as a fully-fledged humour scandal according to the quantitative criteria 
of Koivukoski and Kuipers (2019), where it should be mentioned in 14 or more 
journalistic stories, it is especially interesting to ask if the controversy had anything 
that can be called an ‘outcome’, for example if the beneficial inclusion of minority 
voices and perspectives continued in the public debate at large. This is a hard question 
to answer empirically, and perhaps also a question which is unrealistically optimistic 
on behalf of satire. A possible way to research any historical significance of the 
controversy, however, can be to look at similar controversies before and after. Just 
seven years earlier, DR was accused of racism in their online game “Perkerspillet” 
(“The Paki game”), and was even asked by the Committee for Ethnic Equality to take 
the game down – to which the station refused, rather changing the name to “The 
Mujaffa-game”72. Although this controversy was as heated – or even more so – than 
the Yallahrup Færgeby scandal, it is notable that besides Omar Marzouk, the debate 
was led by members of the Danish majority population. There were also few 
arguments presented in the defence of the satirical game beyond mere supportive 
expressions of the value of offensive satire73.  
Six years later, however, the picture was different again when the sketch show 
Det Slører Stadig created debate. Rosenfeldt and Hjarvard (2017) argue that the debate 
 
72 https://www.dr.dk/historie/webfeature/mujaffa. (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
73 See https://jyllands-posten.dk/premium/indland/ECE3570300/DR-afviser-protest-mod-Perkerspillet/ 
and https://jyllands-posten.dk/indland/kbh/ECE3301099/Virkeligheden-som-Mujaffa-spil/  (Last 
checked February 11th, 2021). 
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about the show demonstrates how the cultural public sphere can serve as a corrective 
to the political one, as more frames and voices than normal were included in this 
debate. It is daring to say that this change in the debate over immigration comedy 
happened due to Yallahrup Færgeby. One should also take into account that immigrant 
voices probably had gained a stronger position in the public sphere by time, and that 
online media facilitated access in new ways. That being said, the Yallahrup Færgeby 
controversy did present a richness in voices and perspectives on both racist media 
content and satire as a genre. Following public sphere theorists like Nancy Fraser 
(1992) and Bernhard Peters (2008), this has a democratic value in itself, but is also a 
part of a long, complex process of societal learning not only about the issues in the 
public sphere, but also about who we are as a public. Hence, the Yallahrup Færgeby 
controversy was a rupture in the public sphere that advanced a shared understanding of 
satire and of racism, which happened through the intersection of expressive culture 
and politics. There is a clear ‘before’ and ‘after’ Yallahrup Færgeby in the discussions 
of symbolic racism in Denmark. 
A more definite outcome was apparent in the Lorry case, as the sketch was 
found violating the Democracy Clause in Radionämndens verdict. The consequences 
of such verdicts are that the programme in question cannot be shown in reruns, but 
also that the TV station has to take the points from the verdict into consideration for 
further productions. It has, unfortunately, fallen outside the scope of my work with this 
dissertation to interview editors and programme makers in the public service channels, 
so I cannot know for sure how this was done in practice after the Lorry case. What I 
can establish, however, is a relatively clear change in Swedish immigration humour on 
the public service channels after this verdict. Before 1990, I could see little difference 
between the three countries in how stereotypes and harsh prejudice was represented in 
comedy – if anything, Swedish humour was harder than its neighbours, of course 
always with the intention to ridicule xenophobia as discussed in chapter 3. After 1990, 
however, representations of for example hate speech becomes extremely rare in 
Swedish immigration humour, and it also comes across as very cautious in its use of 
stereotypes – that is, until the advent of Lilla al-Fadji and Syster Khadidje, which I 
will discuss in the next chapter, and which notably were not shown on the main TV 
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channels. It is of course not certain that this caution occured because of the verdict 
against Lorry, but it is at least an interesting path for further research, which also could 
shed light on how the small differences in media systems between the three countries 
influence immigration comedy, satire and the public sphere at large.  
Regardless of tangible consequences like this, the shows discussed in this 
chapter contributed to the boundary struggles of the public sphere, both by being 
discussions about the limits of humour, how offensive satire should be allowed to be; 
and by discussing what symbolic racism actually is and why it is harmful. The 
controversies were all sparked by emotional reactions where immigrants claimed to be 
disrespected, and developed into controversies where the parties used different 
interpretive repertoires about the social and political functions of humour. These 
repertoires stemmed from fundamentally different, and mutually exclusive, ideas about 
humour and stereotypes, which again stem from the tensions in the humorous mode 
between its conservative and subversive aspects, tensions that were also traceable in 
the shows: is humour using stereotypes necessarily bad and oppressive, or can it give 
new insights and be socially radical – and can a humorous representation of serious, 
emotionally laden issues be turned into something unserious we can watch with 
emotional detachment? The most central repertoire criticising the shows was Offensive 
humour causes real harm, which sometimes was used to criticise the representations 
of immigrants as disrespectful, sometimes to criticise them for perpetuating harmful 
stereotypes. What they share was how they were used to argue how the offensive 
humour shows were racist representations in one way or another. The most central 
repertoires defending the shows was Humour as a special form of truth-telling, where 
humour is seen as valuable because it reveals the truth through transgression, both by 
means of different desirable effects of humorous treatment of an issue, but also by 
being the opposite of political correctness, thus addressing things the serious debate 
cannot address. We can thus see that the defenders of the shows participated in a 
boundary struggle that was framed differently than the boundary struggles initiated by 
the critical immigrants: It was about freedom of speech rather than racism. Although 
the positions in these debates appear as irreconcilable with each other, the 
controversies nevertheless dramatised the difference of opinion in the public sphere, 
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and thus contributed to increased plurality. This was especially the case for Yallahrup 
Færgeby, which was exceptional when it comes the inclusion of actors and 
perspectives, but also regarding how participants who disagreed with each other to 
some degree actually entered in dialogue, however rudimentary. There was thus a 
potential not only for the dramatisation of differences of opinion, but even for 
reflection around the boundaries of the public sphere.  
As we have seen in this chapter and presented already in the theoretical 
discussions in chapter 2, ethnic stereotypes are heavily contested when it comes to 
immigration comedy. This makes it pertinent to investigate through textual analysis 
how they actually are used, especially by comedians who are immigrants themselves 
and thus seem to have more leeway in this regard. This will be the topic of the 











































Chapter 6: Diaspora humour and playful recognition in the 
Scandinavian nation states. 
 
The world is such serious business 
for all who forgot how to play 
Where nations and tribes are so many 
The continent sinks, so they say 
Erik Bye, Norwegian TV personality, singing his own song “We are the climbers of tomorrow’s 
mountains” in what was probably the first Norwegian talk show episode dedicated to immigration and 
immigrant guests, December 1973.  
 
In the early 2000s, Scandinavians with immigrant background started to make 
television comedy. The earliest artists came from the stand-up milieus, with Omar 
Marzouk as writer and comedian in a number of Danish shows from 2001 on, 
including the self-declared multicultural satire Oplysninger om perkerne til samfundet 
(OPS) (“Information for the society about the Pakis”), and Özz Nûjen and Shan Atci 
as writers, co-producers and comedians on stage in Stockholm Live from 2004 to 2007. 
The latter was the breakthrough of the so-called blattehumor (from “blatte”, originally 
pejorative name for dark-skinned person) in the Swedish public sphere: humour where 
immigrant mannerisms, prejudice and the relationship between immigrants and the 
majority population are the butts of the joke – and where the joke-tellers themselves 
are of immigrant background.  
Blattehumor and its Danish and Norwegian equivalents, perkerhumor (from 
“perser”, Persian, and “tyrker”, Turk) and utlendinghumor (“foreigner humor”)74, are 
the closest one gets to American and British forms of ethnic comedy in Scandinavia. 
However, there is one major difference: while the Anglo-American – especially the 
American – tradition tends to categorise ethnic humour following traditional ethnic 
divides (Gillespie, 1995, p. 91; 2003; Gillota, 2013; Musser, 1991) – African 
American humour, Asian American humour, Jewish humour, Polish humour – it 
 




makes little sense to do the same in Scandinavia. Norwegian, Swedish and Danish 
humour of this kind seems to have as its starting point in a shared immigrant 
experience: what it is like to be a part of the new, ethnic minorities in general rather 
than what it is like to be Pakistani, Kurd or Arab in Scandinavia. As such, perhaps it 
should rather be called diaspora humour than ethnic humour, referring to the diaspora 
as both a physical and a cultural ‘contact zone’ between different cultures as a result of 
global migration (Hall, 2017). This does not mean that there are no traces of national 
or ethnic cultures in this humour: Muslim cultural traits are almost always central, 
Nûjen and Atci often underline that they are Kurds, and more fine-grained stereotypes 
and play with different languages are important as well. However, the experience of 
being a minority through having been relocated in a new country, and the mixed 
culture which as a result of this has developed in the modern Scandinavian cities, seem 
to be the most important both in the dimension of representation and in the subjectivity 
dimension. Traditional ethnicities are often not foregrounded in the comic material, 
and although there are exceptions, comedians rather refer to themselves as “dark” or 
“foreigner” rather than “Kurd”, “Iranian” or “Somali”.  
Diaspora studies tend to see migration as a process of displacement and 
estrangement (Alghasi, 2010b; Gillespie, 1995). This implies an emphasis on 
difference from the host society, and often an attachment to a historical homeland. 
However, while the emphasis on difference is clear in my material, the attachment to a 
historical homeland is less so. In many of the sketches and episodes I have watched, 
there are no signs or mentions of any historical homeland or primordial culture. The 
characters are clearly immigrants, formed by living in a diaspora where they are 
strangers rather than Swedes, Danes or Norwegians, but any connection to anything 
ancestral that made them strangers is opaque – Islam being an important exception.  
This points towards a different conception of diaspora, where notions like 
hybridity, in-betweenness and third space are important, referring to a space rather 
than a place, which is neither the homeland nor the new country where the immigrant 
settles (Bhabha, 2004). Here, the diaspora becomes a space where cultural differences 
become visible, but also where cultural translation becomes possible (Hall, 2017). The 
third space has often been seen as a space where old forms of authority collapse, 
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dichotomies are challenged and the opportunity to talk back to power arises  (Alghasi, 
2010b; Bakøy, 2010; Bhabha, 2004; Hall, 2017), which is similar to how many studies 
that are positive to ethnic comedy view it as a way to negotiate and even question the 
very concept of ethnicity (Gillespie, 2003; Gillota, 2013; Musser, 1991). However, 
this view might be too celebratory (Alghasi, 2010b; Anthias, 1998; Eide, 2004), and 
diaspora studies taking this stance has often lacked an analysis of the actual context of 
the third space, be it social or textual (Alghasi, 2010b; Bakøy, 2010).  
The benefit of viewing the modern Scandinavian ethnic humour as diaspora 
humour, as a form of third space, lies in how these concepts emphasise how cultural 
difference becomes a pressing issue as well as how culture never is something ‘clean’, 
but a continuous project of change and cultural translation (Bhabha, 2004; Hall, 2017). 
These features are clearly visible in the comedy texts in my material. I will argue that 
the core of this comedy is to treat differences between the diaspora communities and 
the majority populations that traditionally have been equated with nation states of 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark, thus being constructed as ethnonationalist states. That 
being said, I do agree with the above-mentioned criticism of diaspora studies, as I find 
it more important to see what the implications of this third space are rather than to just 
identify that it exists. In this chapter, I will propose that the implications in my case 
way can be conceptualised as playful recognition. This is an extension of the concept 
of recognition as developed by Hegel (1991), Taylor (1994) and especially Honneth 
(1995), where the struggle for recognition is seen as the main driver in social conflicts 
and social change. The tension between “struggle” and “playful” should be noted: it 
points towards an apparent paradox, but I would argue that it rather is a fertile way of 
understanding the special potential that humour and comedy can have in the public 
sphere. Through this playful recognition, diaspora namely contributes to public 
opinion formation by being a part of the boundary struggles seeking to define who 
legitimately belongs to the nation state.  
I will move from analysing how difference and cultural translation is handled 
in four case studies – the show Lilla al-Fadji & Co. (2008) and the YouTube character 
Syster Khadidje (2010) from Sweden, Det Slører Stadig (2013) from Denmark and 
Svart Humor (2017) from Norway – before I use the insights from these to discuss 
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playful recognition in the public sphere. First of all, however, I will discuss how the 
new Scandinavian diaspora comedy not only was a change in the field of humour, but 
also a part of technological and cultural changes in public broadcasting that had great 
implications for how audiences and publics are understood – a central issue in order to 
understand this new comedy’s location and character as a rupture in the modern public 
sphere.  
 
6.1. Diaspora comedy in the multi-channel society 
 
Like most other European countries, Norway, Denmark and Sweden started out with 
only one television channel – public service and state-owned, broadcast through 
analogue signals from terrestrial transmitters. As technology progressed, especially 
with the advent of cable and satellite TV in the 1980s, more and more viewers gained 
access to multiple channels – foreign and indigenous. However, the end of the legal 
monopoly of the public broadcasters, and subsequent broadcasting of nationwide 
commercial channels, happened quite late – 1988 in Denmark, 1991 in Sweden and 
1992 in Norway. There were relatively few commercial channels until the 
digitalisation of the terrestrial transmitter system, which happened around 2005 in all 
three countries, after which the number of channels skyrocketed.   
This is not the place to go into details about the development of the 
Scandinavian TV landscape from the 1980s, but the short summary above provides the 
background to understand how technological changes allowed changes in how TV 
audiences were understood by the TV stations. As Syvertsen (1992), Søndergaard 
(1994, 2003), Edin (2000) Ytreberg (2001), Moe (2009) and Gripsrud (1995, 2010) 
have argued, the development from monopoly to competition in Scandinavia and the 
subsequent digitalization made public broadcasters understand their viewers as 
consumers who should be catered to – but still also as publics to whom a certain kind 
of quality content should be delivered. In other words, the logic of the market started 
to intersect with the logic of public service. This trend had an impact on in-house 
programme production (Ytreberg, 2001) as well as the acquisition of foreign 
productions (Gripsrud, 1995), often leading to formal invention, as I also discussed in 
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chapter 3 (Ytreberg, 2001). After the digitalisation of television, the market logic 
seems to have intensified, and turned more and more into a system of narrowcasting 
rather than broadcasting in all three Scandinavian countries (Mjøs, 2010). The advent 
of online TV fuelled this tendency further, but the public service ethos seems to be not 
only surviving but even adapting to the new technological and commercial 
circumstances (Bruun, 2016, 2018; Ihlebæk, Syvertsen, & Ytreberg, 2014). 
Parallel to this, one audience group grew rapidly in the Scandinavian 
countries: the immigrant population. One thing they (typically) shared was a tendency 
to watch Scandinavian TV in a different way than the majority population, and to be 
more oriented towards foreign TV channels, often from their country of origin, 
broadcast via satellite (Christiansen, 2001, 2004). This was a challenge for the 
Scandinavian public service stations, obliged as they were to cater to the whole 
population. At the same time, the development of narrowcasting afforded them with 
both the technological and the ideological opportunity to develop a variety of 
programming specifically directed towards the immigrant population. This is also 
visible in the new Scandinavian diaspora humour. The production of these shows 
accelerated from 2005 on, and they were often broadcast on the new niche channels, 
clearly addressing immigrant audiences not only by joking with their (presumed) 
experiences, but also by basing the humour on premises only (parts of) the immigrant 
population would understand – or at least people with extensive knowledge of and 
experience with immigrant life and culture. Thus, the diaspora comedy can be 
understood as a top-down construction of minority audiences, where technological, 
economic and cultural forces of the media created objective relations that formed a 
background for the construction of a “we” (Alghasi, 2010b). This “we”, ethnic 
minority audiences with an immigrant background, was also related to the nation as a 
whole since the stations producing these shows did this as a part of their public service 
mission of contributing to democracy and national culture, which with the advent of 
narrowcasting was interpreted as being a matter of catering to the different needs and 
tastes of the diverse population.   
It is, however, important to note that history was not so simple as I perhaps 
give the impression of here. Firstly, the new ethnic comedy arrived in bulks – probably 
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because of the commercial success of a single show, a daring producer, or the 
combination of both – rather than being a staple in the Scandinavian TV landscape. 
Secondly, I do not claim any cause-effect relation between TV segmentation and the 
development of ethnic comedy. Some of these shows were broadcast on the main 
channel of the public service broadcaster, indicating that there was room for them in 
the ‘old’ TV format. It is, however, worth noting that the idea of producing content 
addressing a specific part of the population while still maintaining the public service 
mission, hereunder some sort of national unity, seems to be at play, an idea that 
developed in the specific historical context of narrowcasting that was sketched above. 
Thirdly, this story is made even more complicated both by commercial channels and 
by the internet. Two of the cases discussed in this chapter, Syster Khadidje and Svart 
Humor, started out as private productions on social media, and much of the new 
diaspora humour seems to first and foremost be an online phenomenon – primarily 
watched on YouTube or Facebook, and often not even broadcasted on linear TV 
although it is produced by a public service channel. Lilla al-Fadji & Co., on the other 
hand, was broadcasted on one of the commercial, non-public service channels that had 
benefited from the digitalisation of TV, Kanal 5.  
These nuances are however not reservations to my point, which is to show 
how the development of a new comedy style should be located as a part of a larger 
historical development in the Scandinavian public spheres, both material and 
ideological. It was a part of a media logic based on narrowcasting, which nevertheless 
intersected with the logic of public service directed towards a national public – a logic 
that also sometimes influenced the purely commercial channels as well as homemade 
internet content. The result was the development of an idea of the immigrant audience 
in Scandinavian television.  
An adjective often used to characterise the development towards 
narrowcasting is fragmented, but one could also use diversified – two words that give 
quite different connotations and often are connected to a negative versus a positive 
evaluation of this development: prophesies of the erosion of a common ground and the 
development of echo chambers and ideological trench wars are contrasted with visions 
of an increased possibility for specialised publics and subaltern counterpublics to gain 
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access to the public sphere (Gripsrud, 2010). I would say that looking at the comedy 
programmes discussed in this chapter, the latter is a better characterisation. The 
immigrant audience these shows cater to are namely addressed as immigrants (or 
descendants), but they are also addressed as Norwegians, Danes, or Swedes – as is the 
majority population, who is another imagined audience of these shows. Together, they 
are addressed as a national public dealing with the differences modern immigration 
has caused in the Scandinavian nation states.  
 
6.2. Lilla al-Fadji & Co.: The stereotypical antiheros’ wonderful adventures 
through Sweden 
 
Lilla Al-Fadji & Co. was broadcast on Kanal 5 in 2008 and was the first show 
dedicated to the character Lilla al-Fadji, played by Felipa Leiva Wenger, who made 
his first appearance in the Humorlabbet episode “Sen kväll med Pierre” on SVT in 
2006. The plot in Lilla Al-Fadji & Co centres around Lilla’s quest for his dad, whom 
he never has known, but believes to be incredibly rich. Lilla, who lives a financially 
scarce life with his mom in the Stockholm suburb Husby, asks his friend, the 
businessman Abu Hassan (Fredrik Eddari, who also is the show’s main writer) to 
come with him to the northernmost Swedish landscape Norrland, where the last sign of 
his father came from. They travel by multiple detours, starting by going the opposite 
way to the southernmost landscape Skåne (Scania), also stopping by the island of 
Gotland and downtown Stockholm before they finally arrive in the north. The journey 
can be read as a very loose parody of the famous Swedish children’s novel The 
Wonderful Adventures of Nils, where the protagonist, similarly to Lilla, is an antihero 
who travels across Sweden from Skåne to Norrland. 
 However, Nils develops and becomes a better human being after his journey, 
which is not the case for Lilla Al-Fadji. The comedy of the show is based on the 
opposite: how Lilla and Abu Hassan remain the same in all the different situations 
they encounter on their way. Thus, it is less similar to epic quests or a bildungroman 
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than to comedic quests like Adventures of Huckleberry Finn or Don Quixote75, where 
the comdy is achieved through the protagonist’s rigid personal qualities, described by 
Bergson as “something mechanical encrusted on the living” (1914, p. 49). The core 
humour technique is thus caricature, but of social types rather than specific persons: 
Lilla Al-Fadji and Abu Hassan embody two different stereotypes of the immigrant 
man from ‘förorten’, the troubled multicultural suburb, an important trope in the 
Swedish immigration debate from 2000 on (Riegert, forthcoming)76. Lilla is a boastful 
macho, obsessed with sex, fame and money as well as his own appearances. He has an 
impressive mullet of black curls, which he is very proud of, and constantly talks about 
“Hälliwüüd” and his career there – sometimes referring to future dreams, but often 
lying to impress people, especially girls. His nemesis is Hermes Saliba, whom he 
fights through rap battling and throwing shade. Lilla is also a (very) petty criminal and 
has disgusting habits – he cheats on the welfare system, throws trash in the walker 
basket of elderly women, pees in the swimming pool and constantly scratches himself 
on his penis.  
Abu Hassan is a hustler kind of character, who always sees an opportunity to 
make money. He portrays himself as an “international businessman”, but operates out 
of a café table and his old Mercedes. At the same time, he is conservative and 
paranoid: he owns a yellow budgerigar named Mujahedin, often talks about that things 
are not allowed (“tillåtet”), referring to the Islamic concept haram, is very preoccupied 
with homosexuality (which he calls “boy who like other boy”) and is convinced that 
windmills are bugging devices for Israel and USA. Thus, Abu Hassan becomes the 
 
75 There are more parallels between these two novels and Lilla Al-Fadji than just shared (super)genre, 
for example the windmill motif discussed below and similarities between Lilla and Huck Finn and 
Abu Hassan and Tom Sawyer.  
76 The suburb, ‘förorten’, public project satellite towns, seems to be important not only in the Swedish 
immigration discourse, but in the social imaginary of modern Sweden at large. There are numerous 
books and movies about the social democratic dream of suburban paradise and the problematic reality, 
and this has been a central political issue over many years. See Wirtén (2012) for an interesting 
account of the dreams and debates on the Swedish suburb.  
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criminal variant of a yuppie, but also a caricature of the stereotypical social and 
political views of an Arab man.  
These personal characteristics frequently bring the two into conflict and 
hampers their quest. In the fourth episode, the two companions arrive in central 
Stockholm, where they apparently have never been, despite living in one of the city’s 
suburbs. While in a parking lot, Abu Hassan panics when he spots the large, dome-
formed sporting arena Globen, as he is convinced it is an Israeli laser weapon. Lilla 
Al-Fadji is not scared, leaves Abu Hassan by the car and goes alone into the city, 
where Stockholm Pride is going on. Lilla befriends a woman, and eventually charms 
her with his bragging about “Hälliwüüd”. After a while, he calls Abu Hassan and 
manages to convince him to travel downtown to take advantage of all the business 
opportunities of the packed pride festival. After walking around the festival area and 
observing various obviously queer people, Abu Hassan puts up a stand where he sells 
the North African chili paste harissa as a cure for homosexuality, “an opportunity to 
cure the boys who like boys and the girls who like girls and at the same time earn a 
penny”, as the narrator describes it. However, two men dressed in leather 
enthusiastically approaches and want to buy the harissa as it is “Persian Viagra”. 
When Abu Hassan understands their planned use of his goods, he panics, grabs all the 
harissa jars and runs away. He then calls Lilla Al-Fadji to convince him that his new 
flirt probably is a man dressed as a woman, which makes Lilla abruptly leave her in 
anger.  
For Lilla Al-Fadji, his machismo, or perhaps rather his worry that he is not 
macho enough, ironically impedes him from getting to have sex when he refuses to 
talk or listen to his flirt as he is convinced that she is a man just because the possibility 
was brought up; while for Abu Hassan, his conservative and conspiratory views 
interrupt his business plans. In his book Laughter, Henri Bergson argues that the 
comical character is not ridiculed because of his lack of moral, but his lack of 
sociability. This is done through making an inner quality appear through automatic 
gestures. Bergson’s examples are drawn from Molière’s comedies, where the 
stinginess of Harpagon and the hypocrisy of Tartuffe is explained as traits that totally 
control the characters, while at the same time being external to them: the traits are not 
 
 186 
integrated in them as persons, but take control over them automatically in the least 
opportune situations. As we see, this mechanism is also at play in Lilla Al-Fadji & Co. 
Lilla and Abu Hassan’s traits make them into social misfits who cannot manage to 
fulfil their own projects. Read this way, the laughter the show elicits is a corrective 
kind of laughter, as the stereotypical immigrant men are ridiculed through being 
portrayed as restrained by their cultural traits. 
 In this respect, it should also be noted that the people and situations they 
encounter can be read as representing a contrasting normality. Different sides of the 
white majority population’s Sweden, from rich boat owners in Skåne to rural people in 
Norrland to the participants on a medieval fair on Gotland, represent the ordinary life 
that the two immigrants from the suburb struggle to fit in with. Even the drag queens 
and leather gays of the pride festival are portrayed as more normal than Abu Hassan 
and Lilla, as they are more flexible and function better socially.  
An important dimension of Lilla Al-Fadji & Co is thus to ridicule a stereotype 
of immigrants. A possible reading could perhaps even be that the show suggests that 
immigrants of this kind do not fit in modern Sweden. This was indeed an empirical 
reading when the show premiered, as clips from it were appropriated on YouTube to 
support racist views77, and there was a lively online debate about whether the show 
was racist or not78. In light of this, it can be argued that the show was conservative, as 
it endorsed and perpetuated stereotypes. However, this is only one possible reading of 
the show. It is also a reading that ignores how many of Lilla and Abu Hassan’s traits 
are less connected to mainstream and xenophobic stereotypes, but first and foremost 
recognisable for people who themselves are of immigrant background, for example 
Abu Hassan’s love of sandals and “biskvit till qahva” (“biscuit for the coffee”). These 
are stereotypical traits, but they are also more closely connected to first-hand 
experience, and they are of such a kind that they add texture to the two characters and 
make them rounder and even lovable. This is also done through the many humorous 
elements of the show that play with the stereotypes. 
 
77 https://www.expressen.se/noje/tv/lilla-al-fadji--co-utnyttjas-av-rasister-pa-internet/ (Last checked 
February 11th, 2021). 
78 https://www.svd.se/humorsucce-i-kanal-5-orsakar-debatt (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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Although Lilla Al-Fadji and Abu Hassan embody stereotypes, they also 
subvert them both by exaggerating and by breaking them. This is a running joke in the 
case of Abu Hassan, especially when it comes to his appearance. He wears a blazer 
over the traditional Arab robe and sandals, poking fun at his combined identity as 
conservative Arab and international businessman, but he also has a high pitched, even 
squeaky voice that contrasts with his serious image. His world views and their 
consequences are also exaggerated to the absurd: he makes more and more elaborate 
stories about how USA and Israel surveil everybody, and he profits from social control 
over young women by locking them up in a small cellar, “Svensk Dotterförråd AB” 
(“Swedish Daughter Storage Ltd”), where fathers pay Abu Hassan to keep their 
daughters until they are ready to get married, and where he also keeps the goat he is 
looking after for a friend who is on holiday. On the other hand, the threatening parts of 
his world-views, like the implied sympathy for militant Islam, collapses as he gives the 
name Mujahedin to a tiny yellow bird, who also follows the two anti-heroes through 
Sweden and is shown great affection from Abu Hassan. His hustler qualities are also a 
source of playfulness, as there is a not insignificant amount of creative joy invested in 
how he always finds a new way to make money, consistently emphasising how he 
actually has a positive and optimistic outlook, for example when he agrees to look 
after the breast implants of an old friend – who happens to be former Big Brother 
contestant and glamour model Carolina Gynning – and  possibly sell them if he finds a 
good buyer, something he is convinced will happen, as “Little boy, he buys little dog. 
Big boy, he buys donkey. Huge man buys horse. And I know he who buys the horse. I 
will sell to him.” This is a scene with no motivation or consequence in neither the 
main nor the episodic plot – except Gynning being from Skåne, where our heroes 
currently are – and can hence be seen as nothing more than an opportunity for play and 
humour around the Abu Hassan character.  
Similarly, playing with Lilla Al-Fadji’s macho image is the central comic 
premise in many of the show’s scenes, and established already in the very beginning. 
Lilla has a large Scarface Dollar Bill poster in his room, he constantly swears, and runs 
through the streets accompanied by music from martial arts movies, but he is clearly 
subordinated his mom (played by Ettari in drag), he eats her homecooked meals with a 
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bib on, and he never questions anything she says or does. The potentially threatening 
sides of his macho, or gangsta, image are also challenged. In the start of the first 
episode, we see Lilla looking all over his room for money, and as he does not find any, 
we see him covering his face with a balaclava outside a supermarket, before he runs in 
and grabs for something in his bag. However, our expectations of a robbery are 
subverted when we see that he does not reach for a gun, but for a bag of empty bottles 
to collect the deposit. The stereotype of the criminal immigrant thus collapses, both 
cognitively by creating an incongruity between the audiences’ expectations based on 
the stereotype and the actual plot, thus pointing out how our mental scripts are based 
on stereotypes; and affectively by making the situation of a young, masked immigrant 
male into something unthreatening, calling for a giggle and perhaps even some 
sympathy rather than a scare – the same mechanism that is at play when a budgie is 
named Mujahedin.  
This way, Lilla Al-Fadji & Co addresses the stereotypes as representations, 
and thus parodies them. Hutcheon defines parody as “repetition with critical distance, 
which marks difference rather than similarity” (2000, p. 6). Furthermore, the target of 
a parody is “another work of art or, more generally, another form of coded discourse”. 
It is not problem-free to argue that a stereotype is coded discourse, but I will ignore 
this for the time being and return to it below. Hutcheon’s definition is useful as it 
manages to separate parody from satire, where the latter necessarily has an extra-mural 
butt and a moral and social agenda. In order to understand Lilla Al-Fadji & Co.’s 
social force, it is – ironically – necessary to understand how the show is formed more 
by an aesthetic than a social agenda. This is where the critical, or ironic, distance in 
Hutcheon’s parody definition becomes useful. The central element of a parody is in 
fact not similarity to the parodied text, but how it departs from it, how it uses irony to 
signal that it is means something different than the original. Hutcheon also stresses 
that parody is fundamentally pragmatic and hermeneutic: it is made with an intention 
to parody another text, and to be decoded so that it is possible “to find and interpret the 
backgrounded text in relation to the parody” (ibid). 
In the case of Lilla Al-Fadji & Co, this means that to be able to appreciate the 
humour of the exaggerations and silly deconstructions, it is necessary to know what 
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they are based on, which means that it is necessary to recognise the base stereotypes as 
being stereotypes. To laugh triumphantly of the failures of a macho or conservative 
immigrant man, one needs knowledge about the content of the stereotype, but to laugh 
about the subversions of the stereotype in Lilla Al-Fadji & Co, one needs to 
reflexively understand that this is a stereotype, a representation, and to understand 
what it is about this stereotype that makes some particular subversions of it funny. To 
get the joke about a conservative Muslim naming his budgie Mujahedin, one needs 
some knowledge about political Islam, but also about how the image of jihad is 
connected with images of masculinity, aggressiveness, and danger – everything a 
budgie is not79. This is not to say that exposing the stereotype as stereotype means that 
we necessarily laugh at the stereotype and not its target. That would be a simplification 
of both stereotypes and parody, which ignores how it is not random why joking with 
some stereotypes is funnier than joking with others, a question which ultimately must 
be answered by social explanations. It is, for example, perfectly possible to laugh at 
Abu Hassan and Lilla Al-Fadji not because one enjoys per se that the stereotypes they 
represent are subverted, but because one enjoys that through the subversion of their 
stereotypes, the two are portrayed as Arab men who become emasculated. In this case, 
the joke becomes more enjoyable because it provides us with a way to direct 
aggression towards a target that we harbour difficult feelings towards (Freud, 1976; 
Gripsrud, 1990), something which explains the attractiveness the show had for racist 
appropriation. However, this parodic subversion is nevertheless what makes another 
reading possible, where the show is something more than merely ridicule. 
This becomes clearer when one sees that the show’s parody extends to more 
than just some stereotypes of immigrant men. Most notable is perhaps the visual 
parody of immigrant interiors in episode 1. Both Lilla Al-Fadji’s home and Abu 
Hassan’s car are filled with crochet mandala tabletops on expected and unexpected 
places and baroque interior elements. Abu Hassan owns a golden object that is both a 
 
79 This is a less intellectually charged operation than it probably seems when described in academic 
discourse: as we all are competent language users and familiar with our everyday culture, we quite 
intuitively understand when and how a stereotype is subverted, probably without making the mental  
note “aha, this is a stereotype”.  
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lamp, a clock, a telephone and a music box. Lilla’s relationship to American pop 
culture is also a part of this parodic sensibility, as he wants to appear like a “gangsta”, 
hinted at through his way of speaking, the posters in his room and the musical score, 
such as the martial arts movie style music mentioned above. These are of course 
elements in the caricature of Lilla as a machismo stereotype, but they also constitute a 
parody of American culture in its own right. Seen this way, the show fits better with 
Hutcheon’s emphasis on how a parody always has another coded discourse as its 
target. Although she writes about parodies of art - individual artworks as well as 
styles, techniques and motifs – I see no problem in extending her definition to 
encompass expressive cultural practices outside of the art institution, be it interior 
design or gangsta rap, which often are connected to aesthetically marked lifestyles. 
This way, Lilla Al-Fadji & Co. becomes a parody of immigrant lifestyles in the 
suburb, which also makes it possible to view stereotypes as a coded discourse, as they 
are embedded in the performance of a lifestyle.80  
An important part of this parody is the peculiar mixing of completely different 
styles of music in Lilla Al Fadji’s two battling scenes. In the first episode, Lilla goes to 
the public bath, where he encounters his nemesis, Hermes Saliba, in the sauna. Hermes 
sings the popular Swedish children song “Lilla Katt” (“Little Cat”), but he 
appropriates it and sings it in the style of the crooners of Arab pop music. Lilla moves 
to the showers, and when Hermes follows, they embark on a rap battle, but not exactly 
in hip hop style: the songs they use are appropriated from dance pop and Swedish 
nursery rhymes, but mostly consisting of obscenities rather than the original lyrics. 
The second battling scene takes place in the penultimate episode, where Lilla and Abu 
 
80 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to expand further on this point, but I will nevertheless add some 
examples for clarity: The macho immigrant is a stereotype that can be caricatured, but his gangsta 
and/or thug lifestyle, which is aesthetically marked, can be parodied. The whimsy professor is a 
stereotype, his middle-class lifestyle with many markers of cultural capital can be parodied. Drag 
queens are caricatures of women, but specific subcategories of drag queens like pageant queens 
parody certain aesthetically marked ways of performing femininity. In these examples, we do not only 
focus on the aesthetical, but also move from stereotypes as mere sets of reified beliefs to something 
broader: larger systems of belief and order. This is how I read Bakthin’s account of parody, where the 
carnival is a parodic inversion of the official world represented by the church.   
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Hassan encounter some local people sitting outside a gas station in Norrland. Lilla 
spots a black man playing the accordion and dressed in a Swedish folk costume. Lilla 
starts to beatbox, which sparks a battle session that is a clear parody of the banjo-
guitar duel in the horror movie Deliverance, complete with Lilla’s opponent refusing 
to reciprocate his greeting gesture at the end. 
These two scenes make Swedish folk culture clash with forms of cultural 
expressions that would appear less homebound for a Swedish audience, but probably 
not less familiar. Both American pop culture in general and its appropriation by the 
diaspora communities in Sweden are staples of the Swedish cultural public sphere. 
These two parodies make the normally separate genres and styles interact in a playful 
way. It is hard to find any sort of comic aggression towards neither foreign pop culture 
nor Swedish folk culture in this parodic mixing. There is certainly an ironic distance to 
the parodied works and styles, but I would argue that this used to create a playful, even 
joyful, ethos, rather than a satirical and scornful one (Hutcheon, 60). This is due to 
how the parodic contrasting is used as a source of creativity. For example, the musical 
phrasing of the song “Lilla Katt” is surprisingly fitting to the crooner style of Arab 
pop, and the combination of accordion and beatboxing creates some quite interesting 
rhythmic play. Thus, the mixing of Swedish and foreign becomes creative, productive, 
and filled with joy – a joy that depends on knowing the parodied references. It is also a 
diasporic ethos, as culture is showed as something that is created through encounters 
and translation – and it is not without significance that this happens in the suburb. I 
would also argue that a playful ethos characterises the visual parodies of the interiors, 
although of a different kind: it exhibits the baroque, or camp, joy of sheer 
exaggeration. This is also instrumental for making the two characters objects of both 
sympathy and ridicule.   
However, the parody is to some degree used for satirical means. Although it is 
hard to read any negative evaluation of Swedish nursery rhymes, dance pop, 
Deliverance or hip hop battling per se in the parodies of Lilla Al-Fadji & Co., the use 
of the latter genre as a way to perform and assert Lilla’s (and Hermes’) masculinity is 
ridiculed. Through the contrasting of the traditionally masculine genre of battling with 
non-masculine dance pop and nursery rhymes, in addition to the exaggerated amount 
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of obscenities, the attempts to assert masculinity become silly and forced. The bodily 
gestures also play an important role here. During the beat box-accordion battle, Lilla 
Al-Fadji scratches his own penis even more often than usual, and in the first episode, 
Hermes wiggles his butt towards Lilla when the latter sings “I’ll fuck you so hard”, the 
very opposite of the normal machismo strive to avoid any association with receptive 
homosexuality. The camera work of this scene is also notable, with super close shots 
of the two battlers from the point of view of the opponent, making them appear 
uncomfortably close to the viewer, and a frog perspective that emphasises Hermes’ 
crotch as he plays with his trunk and sings “Eat my cheese”.  
 
 
Figure 6 Lilla al-Fadji battling with his nemesis, Hermes Saliba. From Lilla al-Fadji & Co., 
Kanal 5, 2008. 
 
The body and its functions are important in Lilla Al-Fadji & Co. The show is very 
preoccupied with sexual and scatologic elements, as well as a joy of ugly bodies. 
Lilla’s grotesque hair is of course central, but so is the red bulge of Hermes Saliba, a 
fat naked man who appears in the sauna with whom Lilla bickers, and the translucent 
breast implants Abu Hassan looks after. In addition to scratching himself down below, 
Lilla constantly farts in the car, which upsets Abu Hassan. He, on the other hand, often 
sees his businesses being reduced to shit or sex. I have already mentioned how what he 
believes is medicine against homosexuality actually is used as a gay aphrodisiac. In 
another episode, Abu Hassan enters the bathroom in a bar and starts collecting money 
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from the users, listening at the door of a bathroom stall so he can catch people who 
defecate when they only payed for urinating. Lilla and Abu Hassan’s great ambitions 
of earning fame and money are also degraded when Lilla exits the car where he and 
Abu Hassan has made their deal. As they were both very excited, they jump up and 
down and make the car shake, which a gang of pre-teen boys spot. Upon Lilla Al-
Fadji’s exit, they ask him “Did you fuck in there?” and get chased away by Lilla. This 
little encounter is not only emasculating for Lilla, as it is suggested that he is gay, but 
it is also a mockery and degradation of his main project: to become rich and famous. I 
would argue that this is the main function of the sexual and scatological jokes in Lilla 
Al-Fadji & Co.: it is not a case of high, elevated status becoming bodily degraded, as 
in Bakhtin’s original account of the carnival, but high, elevated social projects, like 
becoming a successful businessman or a Hollywood star.  
These projects are again connected to the stereotypes that Lilla al-Fadji and 
Abu Hassan embody. The show is thus playing with stereotypes in three different 
ways: by subverting them through exaggeration and collapse, by using them as 
springboards to play with the mixture of the Swedish and the foreign, and by 
degrading their social projects. Through this play with stereotypes, the show also deals 
with cultural difference, which becomes a laughing matter. This is the core theme of 
Lilla Al-Fadji & Co. Both the hustler and the macho man – stereotypes connected to 
the social imaginary of “förorten”, the Swedish immigrant dense suburbs – are  turned 
into projects that we laugh about. This also includes the dangerous, fearful sides of 
them, like excessive machismo or social control. To some degree, the butt of the joke 
is thus immigrant stereotypes, and there is potential for a reading where immigrants in 
the suburb are ridiculed, and “the Swedish way of life” is portrayed as superior. This is 
the kind of reading that was done in the racist appropriations of the show. However, 
the playful way of subverting the stereotypes, and especially the way cultural mixture 
is used to create playful and productive parodies, point in a different direction where 
the show is about something more than ridiculing stereotypes. There is a joyous 
atmosphere connected to this kind of comedy, which points towards the shared 
humanity that the emotion of joy can construct, as opposed to the in-grops and out-
groups of ridicule (Willett, 2008; Willett & Willett, 2014). In the recent affective turn 
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in cultural and social sciences, with their critical ethos, there have been few studies of 
positive emotions or affects like joy – and the clinically oriented science of psychology 
has also paid little attention to the emotion. A literature review does however suggest 
that joy is characterised by things like gracious disposition toward humankind, a way 
to train our affections through imagination and a way to feel more deeply connected to 
others (Johnson, 2020) – all traits that point towards universality, or at least 
communality, rather than tribalism. The universal aspects of the show can also be 
found in its more teasing elements where Lilla and Abu Hassan fail or are bodily 
degraded: ambition and masculinity are recognisable human traits in any modern 
cultural context, as is their potential stupidity. As the Swedish columnist Abraham 
Staifo wrote about Lilla: “There are many persons like that, but this one is Arab with a 
mullet and slippers”81. In Lilla al-Fadji & Co, common human aspirations are given 
the unmistakable flavour of contemporary Swedish immigrant communities – but, 
contra Nussbaum, instead of providing compassion, we join in in laughing about them 
as we could do with all the other instances of human shortcomings that are visible 
through our existential and social projects (Lippitt, 1996). Lilla al-Fadji & Co. is thus 
an alternative to the problem-oriented accounts of the suburb, a comedy show that 
handles the differences between the diaspora Swedes – Lilla and Abu Hassan – and the 
majority populartion – everyone they meet on their way – by basing the comedy on 
these differences and thus emphasising them, but also by through playfulness 
constructing them as laughable, sympathetic and human rather than fearful and 
fundamentally different, so that despite an emphasis on ‘us vs. them’, boundaries 






81 https://www.expressen.se/gt/abraham-staifo-sverige-behover-mer-av-al-fadji/ (Last checked 
February 11th, 2021). 
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6.3. Syster Khadidje: Laughing of and together with the veiled 
fundamentalist 
 
Syster Khadidje is one of Gina Dirawi’s characters, who first appeared on her vlog 
Ana Gina, meaning “I am Gina” in Arabic, in 2009. Dirawi, who was only 17 when 
she started her blog, was born in Sweden of Palestine-Lebanese parents, and her 
grandfather was imam at the mosque in the small northern Swedish town Sundsvall, 
where Dirawi also grew up as a pious Muslim82. Her vlog, originally a mix of 
autobiography and comedy sketches but eventually mostly comedy, became 
immensely popular – she had 177 000 followers in 201483, and the most popular video 
about Khadidje currently has 1.2 million views. After working as a journalist in local 
media, she was hired by SVT to vlog about the Swedish election in 2010, and 
eventually got her own online TV show on SVT Play, The Ana Gina Show, where 
Khadidje and other characters appeared. She really became famous in the Swedish 
public sphere in 2012, when she was one of the hosts for the Swedish national final of 
Eurovision Song Contest, Melodifestivalen. 
Dirawi also fits in the dynamic described in chapter 4, as comedy was a way 
for her as a person with immigrant background to access the public sphere. This will 
however not be the focus in this section, although it is worth noting how the specific 
comedy Dirawi made paved the way for here into the serious part of the public 
sphere84, indicating that it was an attractive, albeit difficult, form of comedy for the 
Swedish media. The social relevance of Dirawi’s comedy cannot be fully understood 
without paying attention to the reception material, including Dirawi’s own blog85. In 
 
82 Dirawi has for example stated that she observes the fast during Ramadan, does not drink alcohol, 
and will not have sex before she is married – but she does not wear the hijab.  
83 https://www.resume.se/insikt/helgintervjuer/19-aringen-som-erovrar-natet/ (Last checked February 
11th, 2021 
84 It should be mentioned that it did not pave a way of roses. Dirawi has received a lot of intimidating 
and hateful reactions of both Islamist and racist motivation, including death threats. 
85 Which unfortunately no longer exists, but can be accessed on the Internet archive waybackmachine: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20100801000000*/anaginas.com (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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addition to indicating Dirawi’s intentions as well as what made her comedy attractive 
in the public sphere, it points towards an interesting tension between the her comedy 
material and how that material was talked and written about: a very persistent theme in 
the reception of Dirawi’s characters, especially Syster Khadidje, was namely that they 
were understood as extreme caricatures meant to draw the attention towards and 
ridicule prejudice, especially about Muslim women. Although Syster Khadidje is said 
to ridicule prejudice, there are few, if any, textual cues in the sketches to support such 
a reading. I would therefore argue that a critical reading of the Khadidje-sketches 
rather supports seeing them as statements that handle difference by asserting that Gina 
herself, but also the immigrant youth in her audience, are fully Swedish despite their 
immigrant background. 
Khadidje, who shares her name with the Prophet’s first wife, is a woman 
dressed in black, including a tightly worn hijab, with a moustache and converged 
eyebrows. She talks broken Swedish with a very thick Arabic accent, always starting 
her videos with the greeting “Salaam aleikum”, often turning to Arabic when she gets 
agitated. She lives with her husband, her teenage daughter, Soraya, and her teenage 
sons, Suleyman and Hassan, and is very preoccupied with things that are not allowed, 
“tillåtet”, especially concerning her children but also when interacting with her 
ethnically Swedish neighbours, Svennmorskan (“The Swedish Mommy”) and her 
daughter Fjortisen (“The Teenybopper”).  
Khadidje is an aggressive, uncompromising defender of the faith; a hyperbolic 
caricature of a pious Muslim woman. This is already established in the first video of 
her86, where she discusses the concept ‘ikhlaak”, meaning the disposition for virtue 
and good manners87, and makes a case for how important it is for women to cover 
themselves up.  The main comic conflict in her sketches is between Khadidje’s strict 
enforcement of rules like this (implicitly what is halal by Islamic standards, though 
rarely referred to as such) and the unruly people around her, which goes hand in hand 
with the sub-conflict between Khadidje’s fierce temper and those who become 
 
86 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6C2sH-pfVU (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
قالخأ 87  , normally transcribed Akhlaq.  
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exposed to it. This is often related to gender and sexuality. The underlying value 
conflict thus lies between a modern-romantic and a family-oriented view of gender, 
love and family – where Khadidje represents the traditional family-oriented view, 
while the people around her, but also Gina Dirawi herself, represents the modern-
romantic view. 
This is most obvious in one of the sketches that was part of Ana Gina Show88, 
where Khadidje has a sex ed lesson aimed at converting Amir Akrouti, who at the time 
was one of Sweden’s most famous bloggers with “Gaybloggen”, to heterosexuality. In 
the sketch, he wears makeup and has some stereotypical gay mannerisms, including 
painting his nails during class, which makes Khadidje very angry. Her first pedagogic 
point is to argue that it is more beautiful with a leaf and a flower in a bouquet than two 
leaves, whereas Amir argues “But I can think two leaves are nice”. In her second 
attempt, she points out that if there are two men in a couple, there will not be any 
children: “All baby die”. Amir points out that love has nothing to do with children, 
which Khadidje answers with “Love comes later”. Increasingly aggressive, Khadidje 
forces Amir to pick a picture of a woman over a muscled man when she asks him to 
choose a partner, although she does not realise that the woman actually is a man – 
Christer Lindarw, one of Sweden’s most famous drag queens.  
Even though Amir himself has a stereotypical persona with some comical 
potential, Khadidje and her futile attempts to convert him clearly are the main butts of 
the joke. Amir even represents some sort of normality and rationality, whereas 
Khadidje is obsessed with rules that seem out of touch with reality: rigid, stupid and 
old-fashioned. This is connected to the value conflict that drives the sketch. Khadidje 
propounds a traditional view of love as intrinsically connected to family and 
procreation: couples are formed with the purpose of getting children, to extend and 
maintain kinship relations (Coontz, 2005). Love is valued, but it should be a lucky side 
effect of family life, not the reason for entering into a relationship (ibid, p. 18). Amir, 
on the other hand, understands love as a goal in itself – couples should be formed on 
the background of mutual attraction and for no purpose other than the pure 
 
88 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rI4hE9YV9A (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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relationship, where the loving relation exists for its own sake (Giddens, 1993). The 
pure relationship is a development of romantic love, an essentially modern invention 
(Coontz, 2005; Giddens, 1993) where love and couple formation is understood as a 
means of self-realisation. Thus, love becomes an expression of authenticity and 
individuality (Giddens, 1993). This connection between love and the authentic 
individual is emphasised at multiple points in the sketch: Amir underlines that he is 
born gay, that it is an intrinsic part of him, but he also makes it a question of personal 
preference when he argues with Khadidje that a bouquet composed only of leaves can 
be beautiful. Hence, he is authentic in two logically, but not colloquially, incompatible 
ways: following both his personal taste and his biological destiny. His mannerisms, 
although stereotypical and thus to some degree inauthentic, can also be seen as an 
expression of “I am who I am”, especially since Khadidje, obsessed with explicitly 
extra-personal rules of proper conduct drawn from sharia, is infuriated by them. 
In other sketches, the consequences these rules have for individual freedom is 
explored further. The sketch “Khadidje and the Teenybopper”89 introduces the 
teenybopper for the first time, a young girl with her face covered in fake tan and with 
exaggerated teenage mannerisms, also played by Dirawi. Khadidje is very puzzled by 
the Teenybopper’s appearance and asks why she is allowed to be outside at 6 PM. 
Most of the sketch is devoted to Khadidje criticizing the young girl for her makeup, 
which she thinks looks like faeces: “You should not wear this things, girl. You look 
like caca [poop], which boy wants caca, you think if they can marry flower, they 
choose caca instead (…) it does not look good, you do not look allowed”. In another 
sketch90, she argues with her son, Hassan, who does not want to come along to a 
wedding. According to Khadidje, it is because he wants to spend time with a girl, 
Felicia, whom she does not approve of (“she is disgusting, she is not allowed”), but 
Hassan himself seems more preoccupied with his bad looking hair and nose. Khadidje 
threatens to throw a shoe at him, as she is very stressed since the wedding is an 
opportunity to find Hassan a future spouse for a good price. She is actually so upset 
 
89 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A94vii4ZDpo (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
90 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4d9YlMTRkE&t=14s (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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that she collapses on the bathroom floor with symptoms reminiscent of a heart-attack. 
In a third sketch91, Khadidje presents her daughter, who is completely covered (she 
even wears sunglasses) in white since “she is innocent” and acts like a servant for 
Khadidje, who after having been served tea and an orange in the garden sends her 
daughter back in, shouting in Arabic: “Yallah go away, go home, don’t go out, watch 
out” and at a later point throws the orange at her, as it has gone bad, screaming “This 
is not fresh, motherfucker [literally ‘son of shit’]!” in Arabic.   
Both Hassan and the Teenybopper are very exaggerated and laughable 
characters, and Khadidje’s daughter appears as an ironic exaggeration of the 
stereotype of the suppressed Muslim woman. Despite this, Khadidje is the star of the 
show, and the protagonist of the comic conflicts through her insistence of the rules of 
proper conduct, always somehow related to traditional marriage. Her daughter has no 
say on her own since she belongs to her family; the Teenybopper’s makeup is judged 
from the perspective of how attractive it makes her for potential husbands; and 
Hassan’s reluctance to go to a wedding is worrying both because it challenges 
Khadidje’s parental authority and because it hampers his marriage prospects. The 
comical stems from how hyperbolically invested she is in these rules, to the point of 
the mechanic quality discussed by Bergson, and thus she and the rules become 
ridiculous. The corrective element of this humour relates to how Khadidje’s stiff, 
mechanical obsession with the rules is contrasted with the living, organic individuality 
of her environment. Hassan and the Teenybopper are perhaps not very individualist or 
authentic, as they are pure teenager caricatures. They are, however, representatives for 
a different view of love and the self than Khadidje, a view which opens up for self-
development and freedom rather than obedience and tradition – and a view which 
maybe enjoys a particularly hegemonic position in Sweden. According to Berggren 
and Trägårdh (2006)92, a modern, individualistic view of love is especially evolved in 
Sweden compared to the rest of the Western world, and has multiple connections to 
other parts of Swedish mentality. 
 
91 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3xbO-kQmsM (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
92 Who curiously never refers to Giddens, but discusses modern love and family life in almost exactly 
the same terms. 
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As such, it is perhaps not so strange that the tension between a traditional and 
a modern conception of love was central in the Swedish immigration discourse of the 
1990s and 2000s. It was especially central in a number of popular and critically 
acclaimed fiction movies made by immigrant directors and screenwriters around the 
turn of the millennium, such as Josef Fares’ Jalla! Jalla and Reza Bagher’s Vingar av 
glas (Wings of Glass) from 2000, and Susan Taslimi’s Hus i Helvete (All Hell Let 
Loose) from 2002. Here, conflicts between the traditional immigrant family and their 
young, individualistic second generation children are central, conflicts related to 
couple formation and proper gendered conduct (Tigervall, 2005; Wright, 2005). The 
dramatic and comic potential in the tension between a romantic couple love and a 
sceptical family is of course extremely well-known and much used in Western culture 
(Frye, 1981; L. O. Larsen, 1998; Simonsen, 2004), so it is not strange that it has been 
used by a new generation of filmmakers, growing up being exposed to the Swedish 
theory of love (Berggren & Trägårdh, 2006) but with parents from predominantly 
Muslim countries where the ideals of romantic love are less hegemonic (Fortier, Kreil, 
& Maffi, 2018; Friedland, Afary, Gardinali, & Naslund, 2016). A more current, and 
sadder background for the centrality of this tension in the serious part of the 
immigration discourse was however a number of honour killings, most notably the 
killing of Swedish Kurd Fadime Şahindal by her father in 2002. Fadime was already a 
public figure, after having fled from her family in 1997, reported her father to the 
police and made a number of media appearances due to a violent conflict over her 
being engaged not to a Kurd, but to a Swedish-Iranian (Simonsen, 2004). This sparked 
massive media coverage, with an emphasis on how Kurds in Sweden came from a 
patriarchal culture and were unsuccessfully integrated into modern Sweden (ibid). It is 
interesting to read excerpts from the newspaper debate at the time, where there are 
multiple references to the tension between a collective, family-oriented Kurdish 
culture and the Swedish strive for individual freedom, often also with strong pathos: 
Fadime’s father refused her the right to be “true to herself” (Dagens Nyheter, 
23.01.2002), i.e. to be an authentic being.  
Syster Khadidje is a comical parallel to the tragic social control of the serious 
immigration discourse. At the same time, she represents a manner in which to 
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symbolically present immigrants as well integrated, since the Khadidje-videos are 
made by an immigrant who ridicules the norms of her parents’ culture and favours the 
Swedish way of life. Syster Khadidje thus goes along with dominant tendencies in the 
serious discourse, and Gina Dirawi herself fits with what Ylva Brune (1998) identifies 
as the victim-hero type in the Swedish press coverage of immigration: (young) women 
seeks to break with their traditional background, represented by oppressive fathers and 
brothers, and become Swedish – a type Brune connects to the major colonial trope 
Gayatri Spivak (1988, p. 92) called “White men are saving brown women from brown 
men”. This should however be qualified in the case of Gina Dirawi, as she clearly 
saves herself – but it could be argued that she saves herself on the terms of white men. 
Although Khadidje in light of this can be interpreted as going along with the 
dominant Swedish discourse, perhaps even with colonial roots, there are many 
elements of the sketches and its reception that make the matter more complex. The 
most striking is that there are no oppressive men neither in Khadidje’s nor in Gina’s 
lives. If anyone practices any oppression in the house of Khadidje, it is herself. She is 
angry, strict, and (comically) violent, and exerts social control not only over her 
daughter but also over her sons – and over neighbours and Swedish celebrities when 
she gets the change. Thus, she is an inversion of a stereotype: in her world, it is the 
women, not the men, who are conservative and powerful. She also breaks with the 
stereotype of the miserable Muslim woman, as she has her sensual sides: she enjoys 
arak, giggles loudly, hugs people to the point of crushing them when she gets 
enthusiastic, and she likes to dance. Although she is far from a round character, she is 
more than just a stereotype, which probably is one element that makes the Khadidje 
videos funny as well as their ridicule acceptable, as its aggressiveness somehow 
becomes mitigated through playful inversion. Gina Dirawi’s biography probably also 
plays a mitigating role. As mentioned above, she is a pious Muslim, and her 
grandfather, the imam, is portrayed in multiple interviews with her as a spiritual guide 
as well as a great supporter of Gina’s comedy.  
This leads me to the second element of Syster Khadidje that breaks with 
mainstream Swedish immigration discourse: the emphasis on Islam. While patriarchal 
oppression of women has been central, it has almost never been constructed as a 
 
 202 
question of Islam – whereas the opposite has been the case across the border, in 
Norway, where the coverage of the Fadime murder largely was explained as the 
unavoidable result of a problematic view of women inherent in the Muslim faith 
(Simonsen, 2004). The Swedish press has also covered immigration and religion 
consistently less than its Norwegian and Danish colleagues (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019).  
On the other hand, in the Khadidje-videos and in interviews with Gina Dirawi 
like the one quoted above, the link between Islam and the traditional, oppressive and 
anti-individualistic view of gender and family is explicit. Those who subscribe to the 
view of the Sweden as an exaggeratedly politically correct place with strict rules for 
what can be said or not, “åsiktskorridoren” (“the opinion corridor”), would probably 
argue that comedy on YouTube was the only way to criticise Islam in the Swedish 
public sphere. There is probably something to the mitigating function of comedy in 
handling controversial issues, as I have discussed above. However, Khadidje appeared 
just after a media controversy around Islam, regarding SVT’s magazine programme 
Halal-tv in 2008. Here, SVT was criticised both for propounding an extremist version 
of Islam and for stereotyping Muslims, and the controversy has been interpreted as an 
indication of a public understanding of Swedish values as opposed to religious values 
(Lövheim & Axner, 2011). Critique of Islam was thus not completely absent in the 
Swedish public sphere at the time. I would argue that the Khadidje videos rather 
should be seen as a way of demonstrating that Islam can be something other than 
oppression, and thus comply with Swedish values and the Swedish way of life. This 
reading is supported by the reception material, including paratexts by Gina Dirawi 
herself. Although she consequently emphasised that she ridiculed prejudice, not 
Muslims, she often attacked fundamentalist interpretations of sharia, most commonly 
as a reaction to the reception her sketches got from Muslim milieus. Her vlog was also 
framed by SVT1 as provocative, as she starred in an episode of the documentary serial 
“Provokatörarna” (“The Provokers”) in December 2012. Here, her pious Muslim faith 
was a topic, along with the strong reactions she had received both from Islamic and 
xenophobic milieus – where one side accused her of insulting Islam, and the other side 
for propagating it. She reacted to these accusations by claiming to be Swedish, and 
that she through her videos wanted to show that “it is possible to be a Muslim and also 
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be yourself (…) People believe that us Muslims are a homogenous group. They think 
we all are pro burka and want women to sit at home. But we are all different, just like 
any human. Me and my friends are ordinary girls who like to laugh”. (Svenska 
Dagbladet, October 10th 2010). 
What Gina Dirawi does through statements like this, together with the 
Khadidje videos, is to handle the construction of difference between immigrants and 
Swedes along the axis of gender and sexuality by ridiculing how a traditional view of 
gender and family suppresses the authentic individual and by adhering to the modern 
one. The contrast between herself and Khadidje is central here: Gina is pious, but 
obviously not like her character – she is more similar to the imagined average Swede, 
a similarity that becomes even more profound since she can ridicule conservative 
Muslims. In this respect, it should also be noted how, in the interview quoted above, 
she says that she and her girlfriends “like to laugh”. As discussed in chapter 4, 
Muslims’ lack of humour is a well-established notion in modern Western countries. 
Through obviously having a sense of humour, Dirawi demonstrates in yet another way 
how well integrated she is – something she also does on behalf of her audience with an 
immigrant background, as they, at least to some degree, need to appreciate the ridicule 
of Khadidje in order to enjoy the sketches. This way, they, too, can prove their 
Swedishness. 
That being said, Khadidje offers more to her immigrant audiences than 
symbolic subordination under Swedish values. The tension between traditional family 
values and romantic love has been experienced as a central and difficult part of life for 
young Muslims, both in the Middle East (Fortier et al., 2018; Friedland et al., 2016) 
and in Sweden (Karlsson Minganti, 2008). The Khadidje sketches are a way to process 
this for young Swedish Muslims, as well as non-Muslim second generation children 
experiencing similar tensions. There are also many elements of the sketches that are 
accessible only to people who are familiar with Islam and/or speak Arabic, for 
example the concept ikhlaak. This kind of insider humour is perhaps the strongest 
argument against Dirawi’s own interpretation of her humour as a way to ridicule 
prejudice about immigrants. After all, the average prejudiced Swede probably has little 
knowledge about the terminology for Islamic virtue. Elements like these make 
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Khadidje extra funny for people who experience these kinds of pious religious actions 
and attitudes as a part of their everyday life. In this respect, Khadidje is ethnic humour 
in the sense of Werner Sollors (1986), where communities of laughter develop a we-
ness (pp. 132). For young people living in a public sphere where a difference is 
constructed between Swedish values and religious values, and in a family life where 
one is urged to adhere to tradition, Khadidje and Gina provides a comic relief from the 
demands from both sides, as the central premise is that the “we” is Muslim and 
Swedish.  
Khadidje and Lilla al-Fadji share this form of address, where their audiences, 
or publics, are addressed as both immigrants and Swedes and where the difference 
between the groups is negotiated in a way that makes it appear less important and 
problematic. The difference between the two shows lays in how it places itself on the 
scale between play and satire, which also can be connected to the serious-unserious-
tension. While both shows play with stereotypes on one hand, and ridicule their main 
characters on the other hand, Khadidje is clearly ridiculed from the viewpoint of a 
moral standard based on Swedish and Western views of self and love, and she is 
explicitly and recurrently marked as a fundamentalist Muslim. In Lilla al-Fadji, on the 
other hand, the ridicule of ethnic stereotypes is indeed present, but it is at the best less 
clear how it is connected to a Swedish or Western moral position, since the show’s 
structure as a comedic quest make the characters rounder, more sympathetic, and 
emphasises unserious and aesthetically oriented play and parody over serious and 
morally oriented satire. This points towards two different strategies of addressing 
immigrant’ publics and negotiating the ethnic boundaries of the public sphere, which I 
will discuss in the conclusion of this chapter.  
 
6.4. Det Slører Stadig: From fearful to playful 
 
Det Slører Stadig (“Still veiled”, hereafter DSS) was broadcast in one season on 
Danish DR 2 in 2013, starring the four young women Sara Al Naser, Ellie Jokar, 
Naghme Ashabi og Ajla Prohic, with Parminder Singh as director and co-writer. The 
four girls were relatively unknown, while Singh was an established director.  DSS is 
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traditional sketch comedy, with some candid camera pranks. Many of DSS’ sketches 
use classical comic inversion pieces, where the roles and scripts of a well-known 
situation are turned around (Bergson, 1914), a staple in ethnic comedy where it is used 
to twist the logic behind stereotypes and ethnic relations (Gillespie, 2003). For 
example, in the sketch “For HELLIG til Love” (“Too HOLY for love”), the character 
Güla, a pious Muslim girl, goes on a movie date with Kasper Abdul, an ethnic Dane 
converted to Islam. Most of the sketch is a parade of stereotypes of how the pious 
Muslim should behave, and the fun comes from how it all is framed as a dating show. 
However, the sketch ends with Kasper Abdul abruptly ending the date since Güla buys 
jelly candy for the movie, which is not halal as it contains gelatine from pigs. Güla, 
quite disappointed, states: “Should a convert teach me about my own religion? No, I 
was here first!”. The satirical intent of this sketch is quite clear: to point out the 
ridiculousness of fixed beliefs about how Muslims necessarily behave this or that way 
due to a fundamentalist interpretation of religion.  
This kind of explicit thematisation of prejudice is a staple in DSS. Other 
examples are when a white Danish pharmacist refuses to sell condoms to a dark 
skinned woman because she is unmarried “and sex outside of wedlock is not allowed 
in your religion”, or when a TV crew desperately searches the suburb93 hoping to find 
people with poor Danish skills, as well as violence, ethnic tensions and social control, 
only to find peaceful co-existence and educated professional women. It turns out that 
the only person the find who speaks broken Danish is an ethnic Dane, who clearly has 
some problems with substance abuse – but the crew still insists that they discovered 
terrible social problems and tensions between Danes and immigrants. These sketches 
are relatively straightforward social satire where Danish prejudice about differences 
between immigrants and the majority is the butt of the joke, and are clearly influenced 
by the British modern classic Goodness Gracious Me, which in similar ways to these 
DSS sketches use comic inversion to expose prejudice and even racist tendencies in 
the everyday ethnic relations (Gillespie, 2003).  
 
93 Which in Denmark is called “ghetto” (sic!) by the media and in official political discourse. 
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Other times, DSS works with comic inversion in more subtle ways. Among 
the more interesting recurring sketches are the ones about Sara El Sheikh, reporter 
from the fictitious programme Dubai News, who is obsessed with money, status and 
looks, and quite puzzled about how Denmark and Danes fail to live up to all her 
standards in this respect. In stunt interviews with people in Copenhagen, she asks 
questions about “Danish stuff” like freedom of speech and “hygge”94, interviews that 
develop into sessions where she lectures and bashes them – for example consequently 
calling people ugly in the sketch about freedom a speech.  
Sara el Sheik is a Middle Eastern stereotype, but probably not the kind of 
stereotype that is immediately recognisable to the average Dane. Being a caricature of 
the excessively rich jet set of the Gulf Countries, she is actually the opposite of the 
stereotype of a Middle Eastern immigrant in Denmark, who is conservative, traditional 
and poor (Albertsen, 2013). This is a comical inversion in itself, but also adds 
something extra for audiences with a Middle Eastern background who will recognise 
the stereotype. In addition, el Sheik is a woman with power, and a foreigner who 
arrives to Denmark to question, judge and belittle the Danish way of life. This is an 
inversion of the dominant societal norms, where immigrants are lectured about how to 
behave. It can be argued that this inversion loses some of its power since Sheik herself 
and her opulent, arrogant behaviour often is the butt of the joke, so that Denmark 
represents the normality. Still, the sketches largely manage to make the Danish 
customs seem strange, for example when Sara el Sheik visits a Danish family to 
experience hygge, and sits under a blanket with a cup of coffee waiting for it to 
happen. Another example is from a sketch about “frisind”, where she first asks 
multiple people if it is acceptable to be naked on beaches, and then asks if the burka is 
acceptable, whereas everybody answers yes to the first and no to the latter. Danish 
normality is the contrast that makes el Sheik funny, but she is also the contrast that 
makes Danish normality funny. Her outrageousness can thus be seen as a mitigating 
 
94 Cosiness, a concept that carries many cultural connotations and is highly valued in all three 
Scandinavian countries. The Danish word for it has been especially well known internationally due to 
intense commercialisation in the latter years. 
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factor which makes it possible to question and ridicule Danish culture, “so that the 
citizens can criticise themselves and yet still have their city”(Hariman, 2008, p. 252) .  
In the Sara el Sheik sketches as well as the typical ethnic comedy sketches, 
comical inversion is used to handle the construction of difference between immigrant 
and the majority, through satire over the belief that cultural difference is essential and 
necessary and that Danish culture is normal and commonsensical, thus diminishing the 
hegemonic construction of difference, a quite common strategy in ethnic humour 
(Gillespie, 2003; Gillota, 2013; Musser, 1991). Other sketches are more ambiguous in 
this respect, and circle around relationships between a Muslim (or, as it is called in the 
sketches, “ethnic”) girl and a Danish man. One of them, “An exotic girl”, is about a 
man who fetishises the girl he is dating because she is “exotic”, and is in the build-up 
thus quite similar to the sketches discussed above. The twist lies in how he goes from 
well-worn clichés, like how she is filled with passion, to quite elaborate, clearly 
sexually charged, fantasies about how her brothers and cousins will arrive to destroy 
the cafe and kill him to protect her honour. Two normally separate orientalist 
stereotypes are here brought together, and thus become ridiculous, which also turns 
something that normally is perceived as fearful into something funny.  
Two more complex sketches not only mention, but also show, brothers and 
cousins executing social control. In one of them, the girl and the boy walks around in 
the park, and the boy is clearly nervous – which becomes understandable when we see 
how the couple are followed by a gang of buff men, whom the girl introduces as “just 
my brothers”. In another sketch, a candid camera is used to film a girl asking different 
men to pose as her boyfriend so she can avoid forced marriage. Most men are quite 
sceptical, especially when her male relatives turn up. The girl, however, insists that the 
pranked man is her boyfriend, which leads to increased tension, not because her 
relatives become aggressive but because the pranked men become increasingly 
uncomfortable and even visibly afraid.  
These scenes are only funny with the knowledge about the stereotype of the 
controlling, patriarchal Muslim man, and although the sketches do not necessarily 
endorse it, they do not subvert it either. However, they do turn it into an image that 
can be laughed about, and thus turns negative emotions into positive ones. The same 
 
 208 
mechanism is at play in a set of recurring sketches about the burka. In one of these 
sketches, a candid camera first films clearly puzzled people in the main shopping 
street of Copenhagen, and we soon see the reason for their puzzlement: a woman 
dressed in a bright pink burka, with golden and lace details, holding a designer bag and 
a chihuahua dressed in the same pink fabric. In another sketch, “Babushka Burka”, a 
tall woman dressed in a black burka elicits sceptical looks from the crowd, until a 
smaller woman, then yet another and yet another, jumps out from behind her, until 
there is a row of four veiled women resembling a set of matryoshka dolls. In the last 
sketch, a woman in a bright blue burka is running through the streets, and after a 
while, we see that she is chased by Pac-Man. They enter into a building, and soon 
come back out again – but this time, the woman is dressed in a bright red burka and 
chases Pac-Man.  
 
 





Figure 8 Pac-Man burka 
 
This is very visual comedy (but also musical – the soundtrack of the sketches is 
important) that nevertheless relies heavily on cultural references. What makes them 
interesting is how they are related to the veil debate in Denmark, which has been 
especially harsh. Face-covering clothing has been forbidden since 2018, often termed 
“the burka ban”. It can be argued that the veil, especially the burka, was a metonymy 
for immigrants being treated different from Danes, as well as for Islamic 
fundamentalism, in the Danish public sphere (Andreassen, 2011; Yılmaz, 2016, pp. 
160-161). Andreassen (ibid) has even argued that the Danish veil debates not always 
are about a concern about immigrant men’s social control over immigrant women, but 
rather are a way to construct Denmark as a white society with gender equality as a 
core characteristic. Thus, the veil, and especially the burka and the niqab, become 
threats in themselves to the Danish society. It is thus notable that DSS makes the burka 
in itself into something laughable.  
This is not satire in the traditional sense, as it is hard to pinpoint any reference 
to a moral norm system. What DSS’ burka sketches do can best be understood 
affectively: they created a space where the burka can be laughed about instead of 
feared. This is a central part of carnival theories of laughter. Bakhtin (1968) writes 
already in the introduction of Rabelais and His World that in the spirit of carnival, 
“All that was frightening in ordinary life is turned into amusing or ludicrous 
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monstrosities. Fear is the extreme expression of narrow-minded and stupid 
seriousness, which is defeated by laughter” (pp. 47). Heavily influenced by Bakhtin, 
Hariman (2008) argues that this fearlessness becomes possible only by “prior 
conversion of some part of the world into an image” (pp. 255), as the fearful thing 
itself is hard to laugh of. In the virtual world of carnival and parody, however, it is 
possible to be liberated from the serious aspects of an image and instead handle it in a 
playful and fearless way. 
DSS’ play with fear is central in how it deals with the constructed difference 
between Danes and immigrants. It can be argued that xenophobia – in the very 
affective sense – has an especially strong position in the Danish public sphere, and that 
it is deeply connected to the portrayal of Islam as fundamentally different from Danish 
values and as a threat to social cohesion. This is in line with Yılmaz (2016), who 
argues that the Danish hegemonic view of immigrants as culturally different partly 
came about as a set of historical moral panics around Islam, and Hellström and Hervik 
(2014), who argue that Islam has been given the role of the Beast in Danish 
immigration debate, representing a highly stigmatised extreme Other that is impossible 
to negotiate with. Finally, quantitative findings by Hovden and Mjelde (2019) support 
such a reading, as they find that the Danish press covers both social customs and 
religion relatively more than its Scandinavian neighbours, combined with a relatively 
higher frequency of a frame where immigrants are portrayed as a threat to social 
cohesion.  
The immigration debate is thus loaded with fear in Denmark, especially when 
it comes to the intersection of immigration and gender. The sketches about social 
control and the burka in Det Slører Stadig thus create a moment of freedom from the 
deadly serious manners in which immigration is treated in the public sphere. One can 
of course argue that matters like social control and patriarchal religious practices 
should be considered deadly serious. Following Bakthin and Hariman, a 
counterargument to this is that strict seriousness is limiting as it imposes necessity and 
closes down new potentialities. A less theoretical, and more serious-friendly, 
counterargument will remind us that in Denmark, these questions of social control are 
not only parts of a discourse about solving political problems. They are also parts of a 
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discourse where Danes with an immigrant, especially a Muslim, background are 
constructed as essentially non-Danish and even dangerous to social cohesion. Seen as 
such, DSS intervenes in and works against this construction of difference, not only by 
explicitly contradicting it as it does in the comic inversion-sketches, but also by 
breaking it from the bond of the serious and turning it into something that can be 
played with. 
 
6.5. Svart Humor: The carnival of difference 
 
Svart Humor (Black Humour) was originally released on Facebook and YouTube as a 
private initiative in 2015, but was soon picked up by NRK, as the station saw that the 
clips were popular among young people with an immigrant background. Initially, 
NRK released clips on different online channels, and the show appeared in 30-minute 
episodes on their web player and linear TV in 2017. Made and lead by Yousef 
Hadaoui, the show mixes candid camera pranks with stunt interviews and sketches. 
The stunt interviews are the most prominent, and the joke here is often based on a 
gameshow parody, “Do you want to be a thousandionair”, where immigrants through 
multiple choice questions with tricky alternatives are lured into giving wrong or 
strange answers on questions about Norwegian language, history and society95; or on 
asking immigrants questions based on figurative idioms, whereas they often answer 
literally. Although the premise of the show seems demeaning towards the immigrant 
population, it gained success among young Norwegians with immigrant background, 
visible from the activity on the show’s Facebook page. 
Even more than the other shows discussed in this chapter, Svart Humor is 
based on the explicit addressing of differences between immigrants and the majority 
population. This is visible already in the opening of the first episode, where Hadaoui 
asks a black man: “Brother, I try to find out about Norwegian values. How much are 
they worth?”, and gets a complicated calculation in reply, with the conclusion “it will 
 
95 See for example https://tv.nrk.no/serie/svart-humor/2017/MUHH45000317/avspiller#t=14m24s 
(Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
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be a trillion values every hour every second”. This question refers to the big debate in 
2016 and 2017, about “Norwegian values” (“Norske verdier”), which escalated during 
the 2017 summer’s election campaign. This debate does however have a long history 
in Norway: Marianne Gullestad (2002a, pp. 94-108) argues that the mobilisation of 
“Norwegian values” in the immigration discourse is a central means for constructing 
an interpretive frame that creates a division between immigrants and Norwegians, and 
at the same time places unspecified demands about integration on the immigrant 
population.  
This lack of specificity is made visible in the next sequence of the episode, 
where Hadaoui asks a number of white Norwegians if it is important to maintain 
Norwegian values. Everyone emphatically answers yes, only to get in trouble when he 
challenges them to define these values. This scene is typical for how the Svart Humor 
show plays with the explicit and implicit interpretive frames about Norwegians and 
immigrants – even though this is one of the most explicitly satirical scenes. Talking 
points from the immigration debate, prejudice and stereotypes, and immigrant 
mannerisms, in other words premises of the immigration discourse, are addressed 
directly through relating them to an abstract, unspecified idea of “the Norwegian” as 
well as everyday life on the more multicultural streets of Oslo. They are never 
debated, but made to seem strange, and thus also visible, through novel juxtapositions, 
exaggerations, and pranks. In many ways, Hadaoui embodies the in-betweenness of 
the diaspora, and his enunciative position is that of a mediator between the Norwegian 
and the immigrants. This position is implicit in all the shows discussed so far, but 
clearest in this case where Hadaoui plays himself. He thus appears as a kind variety of 
the trickster, somebody who conducts mischief and breaks the rules but also is a 
boundary-crosser and thus often a mediator of new knowledge and cultural 
development (Hyde, 1998). 
A lot of this is realised through an inventory of rhetorical devices. For 
example, as the name alludes to, the juxtaposition of black/brown and white people is 
important in the show. In the stunt Hadaoui asks one kind of questions to people who 
are dark-skinned, for example the tricky quiz questions mentioned above, and different 
kinds of questions to people who are white, typically questions who would challenge 
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the taken for granted-Norwegian normality, as the interview about Norwegian values. 
However, Hadaoui’s interviewees are often different in other ways than race and 
ethnicity: people in eccentric clothing and substance abusers. This enhances the 
impression of the show as a way to play with normality – and deviations from it. 
The most important rhetorical device in Svart Humor is probably Hadaoui’s 
interview style. He comes across as extremely friendly, charismatic and jovial, while 
also a figure of authority. He always smiles, small talks and comes across as an 
immigrant himself through slang and a slight accent, but he is also firm and in control 
in the interview situations, sometimes clearly controlling the course of the 
conversation as well as clearly knowing the answers to his trick questions – and the 
tricking itself, and the knowledge it is based on, is also of course a form of authority. 
This form of authority is perhaps best compared to that of a cool youth worker. A 
friendly and joking authority is of course no lesser of an authority than more serious 
and authoritarian styles, but can in fact be quite effective in maintaining social order, 
as classical studies of humour in the workplace have shown (Bradney, 1957; Coser, 
1960). This can thus be a background for a reading of the show where immigrants are 
ridiculed and kept in check by demonstrating their lack of knowledge and thus 
legitimating the Norwegian normality and superiority, mitigated by humour and 
friendliness (Zijderveld, 1983, p. 55). 
However, a different reading is possible as Hadaoui never sanctions the wrong 
answers – another element that adds to his trickster-persona, breaking the rules. 
Instead, he will give the interviewee a hug, a consolation prize (for example a date – 
either the fruit or the social event), and often start a conversation. The prize for 
winning is also nothing to write home about: NOK 50, if Hadaoui has remembered to 
bring money. This way, the entire competition aspect is made less important. Instead, 
the emphasis is on the friendly and playful atmosphere surrounding it, which is helped 
by the fact that a large part of the sketches consists of Hadaoui walking around 
greeting people, doing small dances, or just filming the diversity on the streets, 
accompanied by music from the Berber music band Inouraz. There is also a 
playfulness in the quiz game’s reference to popular culture, the game show Who Wants 
to Be a Millionaire, as it is played with the seriousness of the show’s big prize as well 
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as many of its well-known formal elements like the visual design or the lifelines and 
safety nets participants can use in the competition. This kind of play with formal 
elements of popular culture is commonplace in the show, for example when the thug 
life-meme is placed on the head of an angry man who has just ended a rant about 
Norway with the phrase “Kiss my arse”96. Finally, there is quite a lot of playfulness in 
the quiz’ multiple-choice alternatives, where language puns as well as obviously 
wrong but entertaining alternatives are common.   
These sketches, along with many others in Svart Humor, are quite 
idiosyncratic and untraditional97, which is perhaps why I find it hard to discuss single 
sketches in this analysis. The style and format of the show seems both more pertinent 
and easier to retell in writing. There are namely no narrative build-ups or punchlines 
like in Det Slører Stadig, no satirical character comedy or comic conflicts like in Lilla 
al-Fadji & Co. or the Khadidje videos. The humour of Svart Humor appears more like 
a state of being rather than a narrative text leading from A to B with a reference (butt) 
to the world. Thus, it is reminiscent of the carnival and the carnivalesque as described 
by Bakhtin (1968). One should of course not stretch this parallel too far. As Bakhtin 
himself stressed (pp. 120-121), the carnival was a pre-modern cultural form closely 
intertwined with medieval and renaissance European folk Christianity and cannot be 
used directly to analyse modern cultural phenomena. There are for example no traces 
of the often violent aggression of the carnival in Svart Humor, nor any visible links to 
the idea of Earth’s power to devour what exists in order to give birth to something new 
(p. 91). However, there are many points of similarity. The amicable and playful 
atmosphere is the most central one. The carnivalesque laughter is namely: 
 
…not a subjective, individual and biological consciousness (…). It is the social 
consciousness of all the people. Man experiences this flow of time in the festive 
marketplace, in the carnival crowd, as he comes into contact with other bodies of 
varying age and social caste. He is aware of being a member of a continually growing 
 
96 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ur4i9eotsiY (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
97 It should be noted that he most common complaint made about the show to NRK was not that it was 
offensive, but that it was incomprehensible.  
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and renewed people. This is why festive folk laughter presents an element of victory 
not only over supernatural awe, over the sacred, over death; it also means the defeat of 
power, of earthly kings, of the earthly upper class, of all that oppresses and restricts 
(Bakhtin, 1968, p. 92). 
 
Even though the carnival played with existential matters like life and death, this was 
permutated by a light, joyful98 atmosphere, grounded in how the carnival was not 
about individuals but about the people as a collective, universal body, which thus 
removed the fearful aspect of death and hence also of authority. Thus, the carnival 
functioned as a temporal suspension of the official world, its interpretive frames and 
its seriousness (pp. 88-89). In the same way, the amicability and playfulness of Svart 
Humor is a temporal suspension of the seriousness of one particular system that 
oppresses and restricts: the immigration discourse. 
The role such an alternative conception can play in the public sphere becomes 
clearer if it is compared to what Gullestad (2002a, pp. 82-85) argues is an 
ethnonationalist and hegemonic interpretive frame in the immigration discourse where 
a culturalised and problem-oriented understanding of immigrants has become 
important. In Gullestad’s words, “Those who are different, lack something essential” 
(p. 83). This means that even trivial cultural differences become important markers of 
how un-Norwegian immigrants are (Gullestad, 2002b), a perspective in line with 
Billig’s (1995) theory of banal nationalism – although turned around, as it is not 
Norwegian-ness that is constantly flagged, but the immigrants’ lack of it.  
Svart Humor explicitly addresses trivial cultural difference. In Svart Humor, 
however, the individual’s failure to integrate, by not answering questions about 
Norway correctly, becomes of secondary importance. This does not mean that 
integration as a concept or a value is rejected. The show is not (or at least rarely) a 
satire over news coverage or the hegemonic interpretive frames, but rather an 
alternative space, functioning by its very own logic characterised by a constant play 
with meaning as well as an amicable, solidary atmosphere. The latter is important as 
 
98 Bakhtin uses the word “веселая” (veselaya), in the English versions of his works commonly 
translated as “gay”. 
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the demands of integration are put upon the immigrant as an individual – but in Svart 
Humor, the failures to integrate are laughed away together, as the show is a place 
where everybody laughs and is laughed about. Thus, an unconditional feeling of 
community prevails over division based on cultural diversity. 
Community in diversity is a recurrent theme in Svart Humor. As already 
mentioned, diversity is visually cued as the show takes place on the streets of Oslo and 
has a clear preference for showing visually striking bodies. This is evident already in 
the title sequence, where we see multiple smiling and waving people with colourful 
clothing, impressive beards, or forming a row of hijabs and Canada Goose jackets 
together, but we also see dogs, birds, and mountains of fruit. On Hadaoui’s interview 
rounds, the multiple ways of talking, working and playing that take place in the city 
are showcased. Taken together with the importance of references to popular culture as 
well as a fair share of sexual and scatological joking, this is reminiscent of another 
element of the carnivalesque, the language of the marketplace: 
 
The marketplace of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance was a world in itself, a 
world which was one, all “performances” in this area, from loud cursing to the 
organized show, had something in common and were imbued with the same 
atmosphere of freedom, frankness and familiarity. (…) The marketplace was the 
center of all that is unofficial; it enjoyed a certain extraterritoriality in a world of 
official order and official ideology, it always remained “with the people” (Bakhtin, 
1968, pp. 153-154)  
 
It should be noted that most of the show is filmed at Grønland, an immigrant-dense 
inner-city neighbourhood in Oslo. Like the suburbs in Sweden, Grønland has its place 
in the serious immigration debate, where the area is often framed as a problem area 
with high rates of criminality and social problems. In the alternative logic of Svart 
Humor, it rather becomes an arena for the playful, anarchic unfolding of life in many 
different forms – but always with a tie to different immigrant vernaculars. Thus, 
immigrant culture, or perhaps more precisely diaspora culture, is – similar to Lilla al-
Fadji – used to creative and productive ends. This is for example done when Hadaoui 
makes a sketch where young dark-skinned boys and one white man, who probably has 
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a history of substance abuse, improvise the weather report99. Being a country with 
quite temperamental weather compared to most of our European neighbours, the 
highly formalised TV weather report is not only a parody-friendly format but also has 
an important place in Norwegian public culture – and is of course also a daily ritual 
reminding us of Norwegian geography, thus constructing the imagined community of 
Norway (Anderson, 1983). Although the boys demonstrate a complete lack of 
knowledge about Norwegian geography, they also show a high level of energy and 
charisma and an impressive ability to (apparently) improvise lines relating the current 
agenda about refugees or stereotypes about immigrants and make them fit to the 
weather report. In another sketch100, two dark-skinned boys, very much in the process 
of adolescent voice change, act as talk show hosts, where Hadaoui acts as a guest who 
sings Norwegian folk songs – whereas the boys laugh and “show him how it is done” 
by an improvised rap.  
The most interesting example is perhaps in the last episode of the show’s first 
season, where “kebab Norwegian” (“kebabnorsk”), the sociolect mixing Norwegian 
with words from English and different immigrant languages, is the running theme. 
Hadaoui asks an elderly, white woman about Norwegian language, who without 
further ado starts complaining about its sad state as many people speak grammatically 
incorrect. Surprisingly, she also tells that she has bought a book about kebab 
Norwegian, and when challenged to speak it with Hadaoui, she demonstrates quite 
some proficiency in it. This develops into a musical medley of multiple lines said by 
different people in the show101. Common for all these sketches is again the atmosphere 
of play and familiarity – this is a place where difference is not threatening or a lack, 
but welcoming and a contribution.   
None of these sketches seem particularly funny when retold in writing. 
Spontaneous response from real audiences has proven the opposite: many people find 
 
99 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JNyl6_90wCU (Last checked February 11th, 2021). 
100 https://tv.nrk.no/serie/svart-humor/2017/MUHH45000417/avspiller#t=15m27s  (Last checked 
February 11th, 2021). 
101 https://tv.nrk.no/serie/svart-humor/2017/MUHH45000617/avspiller#t=15m31s (Last checked 
February 11th, 2021). 
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these sketches funny, even hysterical. This reminds us again that Svart Humor, like the 
carnival, is best understood as a state of being or as a mood – which again points 
towards the importance of the affects permutating the public sphere. Where the 
affective makeup of hegemonic discourse is fear of the unknown and an 
uncomfortable sense of not belonging, Svart Humor is not a rebuttal, but first and 
foremost an affective alternative through being a playful vision of another way of 
living with cultural difference.  
A final point that has to be made is Svart Humor’s character of ethnic humour 
in Sollors’ (1986) sense. In order to appreciate Svart Humor, it is necessary to 
understand at a minimum how it plays with the divide immigrant/Norwegian and the 
immigrants giving the wrong answer in the quiz sketches. However, the combination 
of quite complex play with Norwegian culture and equally complex play with diaspora 
culture privileges people who have grown up in, or at least had extended contact with, 
the mixed diasporas of Norway. Thus, the target group are people like Yousef Hadaoui 
himself – young people with an immigrant background who grew up in Norwegian 
immigrant dense neighbourhoods. By constructing an in-group in this particular way, 
the show represents these people as what the mainstream discourse does not: both 
Norwegian and different.  
 
6.6. Conclusion: The playful recognition of difference. 
 
Celebratory accounts of ethnic comedy claim that it is used to construct ethnicities as 
fluid and debatable (Gillota, 2013, p. 39), or even to take “a more ironic look at the 
larger question of ethnic identity itself” (Musser, 1991, p. 41). This argument is based 
on how different humour techniques are used to invert or conflate the fixation of 
ethnic difference (Sollors, 1986, p. 141). This is also central in the shows I have 
discussed in this chapter. However, it cannot be ignored that ethnic comedy and 
diaspora comedy also draws heavily on stereotypes and fixated markers of ethnic 
difference in order to poke fun at them, which potentially can lead to the perpetuation 
of ethnic boundaries rather than challenging them.  
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I suggest that in the Scandinavian context, a better way to think about this kind 
of comedy is to see it as a way to challenge not ethnic boundaries or ethnic difference, 
but to challenge their importance and significance. All the shows analysed above are 
based on pointing out the difference between the immigrant population in diaspora 
communities and the majority population in one way or another. Although this is done 
in a comical and often ironic way, it is nevertheless a way to stress how immigrants 
are unlike the majority that until now has made up the nation state. To some degree, 
this thus also foregrounds the nation state as an ethnonationalist state.  
The idea that a nation should be comprised of people of the same kind is of 
course a central premise in the modern ideas of nationalism and the nation state 
(Gellner, 1983). However, cultural traits do not have to be the central element of 
nationhood (Eriksen, 1997), although they often are, which is an important element in 
the construction of immigrants as someone who needs to be integrated into society – 
but also as someone who is unable to do so (Wallerstein & Balibar, 1991). This 
conception of immigrants’ relationship with the nation is at work all over Europe 
(ibid). However, it can be argued that it enjoys an especially strong position in 
Scandinavia, where a relatively ethnoculturally homogenous past has contributed to 
different conceptions of ethnonationalism that pose the cultural difference of 
immigrants as a major problem (Eriksen, 1997; Gullestad, 2002a; Hervik, 2004; 
McIntosh, 2015). Some readers would perhaps object to the classification of Sweden 
as a country characterised by ethnonationalism, but this is due to its peculiar nature: 
Swedish nationalism does not explicitly draw on ancient tradition, historical glory or 
unique nature, but is based on seeing Sweden as the most modern country in the world 
– as the end of history, so to speak. This nevertheless entails a strong emphasis on 
cultural values, like feminism and social equality, and it has been argued that even this 
peculiar nationalism, like many other nationalisms, has its roots in the attempts in the 
19th century to construct a peculiar national “geist” connected to shared land and 
history (Angell, 2002, pp. 97-99; Berggren & Trägårdh, 2006). In addition, the state – 
and hence the nation – has a special position in Scandinavia, especially in Sweden, as 
it is seen as a primary place of social belonging that guarantees individual freedom 
(Berggren & Trägårdh, 2006).  
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Thus, the difference the diaspora humour stresses is at first glance a 
problematic difference, which draws a strict boundary between the immigrants and the 
majority, and thus nationhood. What these shows do through their humoristic 
treatment of these differences is to recognise the difference between immigrants and 
the majority, but also challenge that this mean that immigrant cannot belong to the 
nation. This is not done by seriously refuting the interpretive frames of sameness and 
ethnonationalism. As Gullestad (2002a) argues, this can be problematic as it is both 
hard to avoid reproducing these frames when seeking to rationally modify them, and 
easy to be seen as an adversary if explicitly challenging them by for example 
advocating radical multiculturalism. The comedy shows in this chapter avoid these 
traps by using play over reason. Difference here is not negated nor explicitly rejected 
as being important or valid, but rather played with, a strategy humour and comedy is 
especially well equipped to do.  
In the logic of play, it is possible to denote difference, and at the same time 
not denote what would be denoted by difference, which in this case is danger to social 
cohesion and nationhood – just like the playful nip denotes a bite, but not combat or 
pain (Bateson, 1972, pp. 179-180). According to Bateson, this seemingly logical 
fallacy should in fact be seen as a way to communicate about the rules of 
communication itself, which in this case would be to communicate about the frames 
and understandings through which we communicate and understand nationhood and 
cultural difference. These ‘rules’ govern who can be recognised as a part of the nation.  
As mentioned in chapter 2, the theory of recognition, as it has been developed 
by Taylor (1994) and especially by Honneth (1995), is an attempt to describe the 
grammar of social conflict through different social groups’ demands of and struggles 
for recognition from society at large. As one can see from the title of Honneth’s 
seminal work, The Struggle for Recognition, recognition is to a significant degree 
understood in terms of conflict. To connect play, humour and recognition thus seems 
slightly paradoxical. Nevertheless, I would argue it is a useful exercise that says 
something fundamental about the role humour and comedy can play in the public 
sphere. In countries where the problematisation of difference, and indeed a struggle to 
be seen, or even to feel, belonging is the rule; the comedy shows that are discussed in 
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this chapter provides an alternative logic, the logic of playfulness. They thus take part 
in the boundary struggles of the public sphere connected to the exclusionary 
mechanisms ethnic minorities are subject to, but they do so in a way that has not been 
described by Midtbøen et al. (2017): Instead of countering the exclusionary 
mechanisms of ethnonationalist and problematising representation in the serious 
debate, the shows address them in an alternative sphere, the cultural and comical 
public sphere, where the problems can be played with instead of countered directly. 
This is nevertheless also a possible strategy in the struggle for recognition: By 
following the rules of comedy and play, but still addressing and negotiating what goes 
on in the serious public sphere, the diaspora comedy shows are more than just 
escapism: they are rooms of one’s own where the rules of the serious debate are 
refuted and thus fought. The carnival becomes an alternative to the official public 
sphere (Habermas, 1992, p. 427), where diaspora comedy shows playing with 
difference in relation to immigrants and the nation state perform recognition of 
immigrant identities by showing how difference can be imagined as less significant, 
even as non-threatening. Thus, the shows become a strategic means in the struggle to 
maintain the dignity of immigrant’s inner self (Taylor, 1994) by being a space for 
recognition of cultural difference instead of problematisation.  
There is also another symbolic level at play through the shows location in the 
public sphere, which can be seen as a demonstration of recognition from the majority: 
being broadcast on national television following a narrowcasting logic where 
immigrants are treated as a part of the diverse makeup that constitutes the national 
public. This is the playful recognition of Scandinavian diaspora comedy, where 
difference can be emphasised but at the same time be treated with indifference.  
The shows discussed in this chapter do this in very different ways, from how 
Khadidje ridicules the pious Muslim view of gender and family in order to be 
recognised as a part of the Swedish norm, to Svart Humor’s constant transformation of 
difference from being something to be debated and stressed over, to something that 
can be played with and used to bond. In line with Fraser (1997), one can perhaps 
understand Khadidje as an example of affirmative recognition, where unjustly 
devalued group identities are revalued (in this case young Swedish Muslims), and 
 
 222 
Svart Humor as an example of transformative recognition, changing the underlying 
cultural-valuational structure so that everyone’s sense of self would be changed, with 
Det Slører Stadig and Lilla al-Fadji on each side of the same scale, but not as 
pronounced as the two others. For lack of space, this is not the place to discuss this 
further, but it does point towards possibilities of further research on playful 
recognition. What can be said at this point, however, is that all the four diaspora 
comedies discussed in this chapter have shown how a variety of comedy techniques 
can be used to address ethnic difference, play with what the meaning and significance 
of this difference is, and thus play a role in the public sphere through participating in 
the ongoing negotiation of modern nationhood by being a rare place in the public 
sphere where immigrants are recognised as being different but still part of the nation.  
This is also a reminder of how the shows are diaspora spaces, in the meaning 
that they negotiate immigrant culture as an in-between-space, not as something pure or 
essential that needs to be kept safe from integration or cultural appropriation. They do 
not envisage a multicultural vision in the sense of first and foremost encouraging 
minority rights and basing society on deep diversity (Taylor, 1991), where all different 
kinds of belonging both to different groups as well as the nation as a whole is seen as 
equal. Quite the opposite, these shows seek to address their publics in different ways 
than what is typical for both nationalism and multiculturalism, and seek to present a 
different solution to the classical problem of accommodating diversity by negotiating a 
different kind of civic identity (Kymlicka, 1995): that of hybridity. The comedians 
themselves are the clearest examples of this, as their enunciative position is that of the 
trickster who mediate between cultures and thus ultimately brings about something 
new: a proof that one can be both immigrant and Scandinavian. The playful 
recognition of Scandinavian immigration comedy is hence not a recognition of 
minorities per se, and especially not of ethnic boundaries, but of interaction, interplay, 
diversity and fusion – the melting pot rather than the salat bowl.  
Again, we see how this is done through working with humour’s inherent 
tension between the conservative and the creative: What is established as existing, 
important, and even problematic cultural differences are reproduced, but also played 
with and thus used to create something new. The reworking of negative emotions into 
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positive is also an important part of this: Fear and alienation is turned into joy and 
communitas. Finally, all this can be done because it is done through play, which is 
fundamentally unserious, but nevertheless has a reference to the serious world by 
addressing real talking points and themes from the immigration discourse. At the same 
time, by being playful, the diaspora comedy shows create their own space and signal 
that they are not to be taken seriously. This do somehow disconnect them from the 
serious world and its concerns, which begs the question of how efficient they really are 
and can be. This question of causality is of course the hardest question to answer when 
researching opinion formation processes in the public sphere, at least on stages like 
this, before the formal and semi-formal procedures of deliberation. It can probably 
only be answered tentatively and based on theory: By being an alternative space, 
breaking with the boundaries set by the serious discourse, comedy has the power to do 
things which cannot be done in the serious public sphere, and to address the 
immigration issue in a more free and fundamentally different way. If we accept the 
premise that the different parts of people’s lifeworld all contribute to how they think 
















































Chapter 7: Concluding remarks 
 
In this dissertation, I set out to answer How can TV comedy thematising immigration 
contribute to public opinion formation on immigration in the larger public sphere? I 
did this from the perspective of public sphere theory, through a text-focused, case 
based historical study of comedy shows, actors and events in the three Scandinavian 
countries – Norway, Sweden and Denmark. 
Common for all my cases were that they can be considered as manifestations 
of boundary struggles in one way or another. Scandinavian immigration comedy, and 
the debates around it, have worked to preserve boundaries in this respect, as moral 
guards against anti-immigrant positions in the public sphere; but also worked to 
challenge boundaries by being means of access for immigrants. Furthermore, as 
attempts of politicisation of the issues of symbolic racism and the limits of humour, 
debates about immigration comedy have worked to both challenge and maintain 
boundaries. Finally, immigration comedy shows made by and for immigrants 
themselves, diaspora humour, have through their playful recognition of ethnic 
difference worked as alternative spaces to the more problem-oriented serious public 
sphere, thus challenging its boundaries in a different, and perhaps more radical, way 
than usually described in the literature on boundary struggles.  
These different forms of boundary work were all done through the special 
characteristics of the comedy genre that stems from its dominating element: the 
humorous mode. I have conceptualised these characteristics as unsolvable and 
productive tensions: Between humour’s unseriousness and its use for serious means, 
between humour as conventional, conservative and suppressive and creative, radical 
and subversive, and finally between humour as a facilitator of both emotional 
investment and emotional detachment – which also includes a tension between positive 
and negative emotions. These tensions are intertwined and tend to depend on each 
other in various ways. My most central argument has been that humour is not 
inherently conservative nor inherently radical, but works politically through balancing 
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these two aspects, often by using conservative, or conventional, impulses to do 
something new, or radical. Scandinavian diaspora humour does for example frequently 
use well established ethnic stereotypes, but instead of using them to problematise the 
existence of ethnic difference, the stereotypes are played with in such a way that ethnic 
difference appears less dramatic.  
In this concluding chapter, I will first sum up how the analyses of my cases 
have answered my research questions, before I address some limitations of this study. 
Finally, I revisit the three main arguments I advanced in the introduction, in order to 
make clear the contribution of this dissertation.  
 
7.1. The research questions revisited. 
 
My overarching research question, how can TV comedy thematising immigration 
contribute to public opinion formation on immigration in the larger public sphere, was 
divided into three sub-questions, which again have been answered by analysing four 
sets of cases, of which two sets consisted of comedy shows and two sets consisted of 
comedy reception – and all sets were in different ways viewed as comedy events. My 
discussions in each chapter will here be synthesised under the heading of each research 
question. 
 
1. How can comedy events be historicised as parts of changes in the public 
sphere and its treatment of the immigration issue in Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden? 
 
The rationale behind this sub-question was that public opinion formation ultimately 
has to be thought of as a historical process, a process of change – or lack thereof. With 
the multitude of comedy shows, actors, and events in mind, it was necessary to 
establish a strategy behind my selection of cases. Hence, this research question was 
important to qualify that the comedy events I selected indeed were historically and 
theoretically interesting, but it was also paramount for advancing my methodological 
argument, defending a textual-historical view of public opinion formation. 
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The core idea behind this, drawing on Foucault’s discourse theory, is that any 
text at the same time depends on, stages, and alters the relevant discourse system. 
Immigration comedy is dependent on the existing rules and conventions governing 
both comedy and the broader immigration discourse, and different aspects of these 
discourses are brought to the forefront in each instance of immigration comedy. Since 
there always will be something new and unique with each single text, or enunciation, 
they will also slightly change the discourses they are a part of. Viewed from a more 
rhetorical perspective, inspired by Warner, Hauser, and Skinner, comedy texts, and the 
discourses about them, can thus be viewed as interventions in the processes of opinion 
formation regarding immigration in the public sphere, and their character as such are 
discussed by answering RQ 2 and RQ 3, which I will return to shortly.  
That being said, it is unlikely that each and every one of all the comedy shows 
that can be termed immigration comedy were equally interesting as parts of processes 
of public opinion formation. I therefore looked for cases that could be seen as 
discursive events where comedy intervened in the public sphere’s treatment of the 
immigration issue in a new way. Inspired by Foucault, I was interested in ruptures in 
immigration comedy, when different discourses, or different series of texts, started to 
interact in a new way. For my purpose, this meant identifying instances when the 
relationship between the public sphere and immigration comedy changed in one way 
or another – especially if changes in the public sphere and changes in comedy 
happened seemingly independently of each other but nevertheless intersected and 
created second-order changes.  
I identified four such ruptures that also were useful to think with, in terms of 
theory development, about the relationship between comedy and politics. The first, 
discussed in chapter 3, was how the so-called hardening of humour, an aesthetical 
development in public service comedy connected to the development of a broader 
Western sensibility where transgressive aesthetics and a special use of irony were 
central features, intersected with new political and discursive roles of anti-immigration 
right wing populist parties. Satirical instances of the new, harder humour thus became 
a part of the moralistic mobilisation against these parties.  
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The second rupture, the topic of chapter 4, consisted of how another 
aesthetical development of comedy, the advent of stand-up comedy, intersected with 
the emergence of immigrant voices in the Scandinavian public spheres. This led to 
immigrant comedians gaining personal access to the public sphere, but also to their 
moulding into certain enunciative positions that made it possible to understand them as 
legitimate immigrant voices. Stand-up thus became a tool for access and voice into the 
serious public sphere. 
The third rupture, which is treated in chapter 5, pertain to when immigration 
comedy itself became politized when it was accused of being racist. As a humour 
controversy, such debates are clear instances of the intersection between the unserious 
realm of comedy and the serious realm of debate, since comedy itself becomes the 
issue of debate. However, such controversies happen regularly, and are thus harder to 
understand as ruptures. My solution was to analyse how they actually worked as 
politicisation and contrasting them with earlier and later humour controversies about 
racist representations. Following this, my Swedish and Danish case could thus clearly 
be seen as ruptures, since they had different character than earlier controversies of the 
same kind regarding the plurality of participants and the temperature of the debate. 
They also had traceable outcomes, especially the Swedish case, which had legal 
consequences that again can be traced in how Swedish immigration humour later was 
more cautious in the treatment of ethnic stereotypes and especially racial slur. 
The fourth rupture, discussed in chapter 6, was the intersection of the gradual 
developments of narrowcasting and of immigrant audiences, and perhaps even publics, 
in the Scandinavian countries. Growing immigrant populations, together with the new 
public service logic – and commercial logic – behind narrowcasting, were new 
material and ideological traits of the Scandinavian public spheres that made possible 
what I call diaspora comedy: comedy made by immigrants, about immigrant 
characters, and clearly with an immigrant audience in mind.  
All these ruptures were historical processes that per se are broader than public 
opinion formation, but they also altered the constraints and opportunities of opinion 
formation in the public sphere. Thus, it is interesting to see how these new 
opportunities and constraints were used by the means of public opinion formation: 
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texts and their interaction. To analyse the texts that were a part of these changes, is 
thus a fruitful strategy to understand how they could do special work, intervene, and 
contribute to the treatment of the immigration issue.  
 
2. How are questions of immigration addressed and negotiated in the comedy 
texts that are part of such events? 
 
In chapter 3 and 6, I analysed two types of comedy shows that have been important in 
Scandinavian immigration comedy: Satire ridiculing xenophobia in its various guises, 
and diaspora comedy, shows made by immigrants, about immigrants, and with an 
imagined immigrant audience in mind. The shows I discussed in these chapters 
addressed and negotiated two important issues in the immigration debate:  The 
position of anti-immigration right-wing populist parties and the status of ethnic 
difference. Both types of shows can be seen as participating in boundary struggles, but 
of two very different characters: While the satirical shows reinforced existing moral 
boundaries in the immigration debate, the diaspora comedy worked around the ethnic 
boundaries in the public sphere by creating an alternative space where ethnic 
difference was represented as less significant. 
Common for both types of shows was how they used the humorous mode to 
do things that rarely is done by serious genres, although with almost opposite logics: 
The satirical shows, O.J. – En utstrakt hånd and Grotesco, was a means to carry out 
not only aggression, but joy through aggression, towards right-wing populist parties. 
Thus, they were placed outside the moral boundaries of the public sphere, a common 
exercise in the immigration debate. The two shows nevertheless contributed something 
special since they added an affective texture to this by means of their joy through 
aggression, which can make the process of putting the right-wing parties outside the 
moral boundaries feel good, and thus make the boundary work appear more morally 
self-evident. It is also worth noting that the shows’ aggression was directed not only 
towards the narratives and talking points of the two parties, i.e. their policy and 
ideology, but to a large degree towards the persons behind the parties –politicians and 
electorate. This adds to the level of aggression performed through these satirical 
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shows, and demonstrate how satire and humour can do things other genres and mode 
(typically) cannot: While harsh condemnation of policy is not only common but also 
accepted in the serious debate, personal attacks and ridicule of people is viewed as 
more problematic – it will at least not be actively facilitated in prime time by public 
service broadcasters, something harsh satire actually is.  
The two shows worked with the tensions inherent in the humorous mode: 
Their transgressions were made possible by using irony to balance commitment with 
detachment, and they did their boundary work by joining in on common and dominant 
tendencies in the public sphere – the condemnation of right-wing populist parties – but 
nevertheless adding something new: affective texture through ridicule. This also points 
towards their play with emotions: Negative and positive emotions were combined, not 
only in the form of joy through aggression, but also by aiming at different affective 
responses in different audiences, as ridicule at least presupposes that the butt of the 
joke feels embarrassed, and those who laugh feel morally superior.  
This play with emotions, and the other tensions of humour, was also central in 
the diaspora comedy. The central contribution of these comedy shows can be termed 
playful recognition, where ethnic differences that normally are framed as problematic 
were played with, and thus saturated with emotions of joy and communitas. One 
important strategy here was to address ethnic stereotypes that often are connected with 
fear in the serious debate, like the criminal immigrant or the veiled woman, and play 
with it in order to diminish this fear. Play is of course also a fundamentally unserious 
way of approaching the world: Instead of following conventional rules, acting goal-
oriented and with logical outcomes in mind, one abolishes all these concerns and 
creates one’s own logic. Nevertheless, this kind of play had a serious aspect because it 
addressed and negotiated something serious, the immigration debate, and in order to 
do so had to follow some of its conventions, with in this respect mainly was ethnic and 
cultural stereotypes and their relation to concerns in the immigration debate, like 
questions on Norwegian values, the tension between different view on love and family 
or the immigrant-dense suburb. This points towards how the diaspora shows worked 
with humour’s tension between conservative and radical: To some degree, it 
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reproduced stereotypes by heavily relying on them to create funniness, but at the same 
time, the shows can be interpreted as subverting them by different means. 
The outcome of this subversion can from a public sphere perspective be 
analysed as playful recognition, where ethnic difference is made less important and 
immigrant comedians thus put forward a statement, but also create a space, where 
immigrants are parts of the Scandinavian nations on equal terms as majority Danes, 
Norwegians, and Swedes – not because their ethnocultural difference is rejected, but 
because its significance as a boundary for belonging to the nation is downplayed. 
Thus, also these kind of shows participate in boundary struggles, but in a particular 
way: Through play, comedy can do something unique by creating an alternative space 
with different rules than the serious public sphere, but a space that nevertheless feeds 
into the mainstream since play always mirrors the serious world in one way or another.  
 
3. How are questions of immigration addressed and negotiated in the public 
comedy reception that are part of such events? 
 
In chapter 4 and 5, I analysed the reception of two different kind of comedy events: 
The advent of stand-up comedians with an immigrant background, and humour 
controversies over racism and humour. Both these sets of cases should be regarded as 
meta-discussions about immigration and the public sphere, where respectively matters 
of immigrants’ access to the public sphere and the problem of racist representations 
were the questions addressed and negotiated. Common for both these sets of cases 
were that different interpretive repertoires regarding the political and cultural value of 
comedy were mobilised to do so. Both in press coverage of the stand-up comedians, 
and in the defence of comedy shows accused of racism, a repertoire I have termed 
Humour as a special form of truth-telling was frequent. The manifestation of this 
repertoire did of course depend on each specific situation, where they in different ways 
addressed and negotiated the serious immigration discourse by interacting with, and 
being coloured by, repertoires, issues and talking points that were prevalent in the 
current debate. Shared traits in the manifestations of the repertoire were how 
transgressive humour is valuable because it is a way to bypass taboos and prejudice in 
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different way and thus arrive at a more correct picture of immigrant life and 
multicultural Scandinavia. This repertoire was also clearly connected to freedom, both 
when it was used to understand stand-up comedians as underdogs, and when used to 
understand transgressive humour as liberatingly politically incorrect. It thus 
emphasised how the unseriousness of humour, here in the form of rule-breaking, has a 
serious value. In addition, it often worked in tandem with a different repertoire, Islam 
as a killjoy, of which the idea that Muslims do not have humour often is an important 
part. The prevalence of these repertoires, and their foundation in cultural ideas with a 
long history in the Western world, points towards an interesting manifestation of the 
tension between the conservative and the radical aspects of humour: It is mainstream 
to expect and endorse that humour should be transgressive, taboo-breaking and give 
new insights. This again could serve subversive ends, as the background for 
establishing new enunciative positions in the public sphere, when comedians like 
Shabana Rehman and Omar Marzouk gained access to the public sphere as well as 
legitimacy as immigrant voices. That being said, it could also serve conservative ends, 
when used as a power mechanism against minorities who attempt to politicise 
symbolic racism, as criticism of comedy tended to be refuted with accusations of 
political correctness.  
This points towards how the two sets of cases were different forms of 
boundary struggles where immigrants manoeuvred themselves into the public sphere: 
The cultural value of comedy became a means for individual immigrant actors to 
access the serious public sphere and become legitimated as immigrant voices. 
However, they also eventually got their enunciative position moulded and to some 
degree reified – the way they manoeuvred to get access would also form constraints 
that at times have made their positions in the public sphere difficult to have. The 
criticism of comedy, on the other hand, worked as attempts to politicise symbolic 
racism, but often also turned into debates about the limit of humour and how 
transgressive comedy and satire should be allowed to be. Thus, both cases illustrate, in 
different ways, how the cultural understandings of comedy can be used to address and 
negotiate meta-questions of the relationship between immigration and the public 
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sphere and thus serve as strategical tools, but also how these cultural understandings 
create constraints for the actors making use of comedy – or opposing it. 
 
Taken together, these three sub-questions can be summarised to answer my main 
research question, how can TV comedy thematising immigration contribute to public 
opinion formation on immigration in the larger public sphere. I mentioned in the 
introduction of this dissertation that the word “how” should be read as referring to 
both what kind of contribution comedy did, and by which means it did so. The kind of 
contribution all my cases did in the Scandinavian public sphere can be summarised as 
boundary struggles, and the comedy events were part of these boundary struggles by 
means of the productive tensions that are the most important particularities of humour. 
I will return to these two answers soon, when discussing they and this dissertation as a 
whole is a contribution to the fields of humour studies and public sphere studies, but 
before doing that, I will address some limitations of the thesis.  
 
7.2. Limitations of the study 
 
The main limitation of this study is that it cannot establish any causal relationship 
between what goes on in the cultural public sphere and the outcome of opinion 
formation, meaning of changed attitudes and, more importantly, substantive political 
decisions. However, this is a general limitation of research on public opinion and on 
the public sphere. The empirical reality of the public sphere is messy, and it is 
regardless of genre hard to establish how all the published opinions that are part of it 
contribute to the theoretical construct that is public opinion – and how this again has 
policy consequences. In my view, researching how specific published opinions – texts 
– can be understood and conceptualised as parts of the historical processes of opinion 
formation, is the theoretically soundest way to go. 
That being said, to be able to do such conceptualisations require the support of 
other types of research, which looks at audiences, institutions, and production 
processes – perhaps even on media effects. In this regard, I do side with Young (2018) 
and Holbert and Young (2012) in their call for looking across discipline and method in 
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research in political humour. My contribution to this has been to combine social and 
democratic theory with textual analysis, cultural history, and more aesthetically 
oriented perspectives from the humanities. Moving further on from this, many of my 
theoretically motivated claims can be significantly substantiated, some of them 
perhaps even tested empirically, by studies using other perspectives and methods. The 
concept of playful recognition does for example call for interview studies investigating 
if minority audiences really experience this kind of recognition when watching 
diaspora comedy. I have also already mentioned that expert interviews and more 
sociologically oriented studies of institutions would be useful to better understand how 
the first immigrant stand-up comedians gained access to the public sphere. Finally, 
effect studies could yield interesting results regarding the moral boundary work 
conducted by satirical shows discussed in chapter 3, as it is possible to deduce multiple 
hypothesis from the discussion in this chapter. The problem is of course that the 
process of opinion formation moves swiftly, and these shows and the socio-political 
context they were part of are already long gone.  
Another possible strategy could be to backtrack a specific piece of legislation 
and show how different mechanisms in the public sphere were instrumental in arriving 
at it. This approach could perhaps more clearly establish the empirical relationships 
between the workings of the public sphere and their outcome as policy, and thus point 
towards a possible limitation of this thesis. This different kind of historical method has 
been used by Engelken-Jorge (2018) in a study on abolition of military service in 
respectively Spain and Germany, from the perspective of deliberative systems theory. 
Engelken-Jorge focuses on how conscription was problematised in public discourse, 
meaning looking at when actors explicitly reject the necessity and desirability of 
conscription (2018, p. 146). The impact of workings in the public sphere are then 
established by backtracking from a specific political outcome, abolition of military 
service, by inspecting how this issue has been problematised through history. This 
way, the study seeks to establish that problematisation indeed played a role in not only 




While this study is empirically rigorous and makes a convincing case for the 
validity of its claim, it only covers a tiny tab of everything that goes on in the 
processes of will and opinion formation. It also conflates public opinion formation 
with its desired outcome, will formation, and therefore falls short in understanding 
how opinion formation is a process on its own merits, with different outcomes and 
functions than mere policy making. Furthermore, despite the study’s home in a 
systemic perspective, it pays little attention to how the mechanism of problematisation 
interacts with other parts of the deliberative system. This is probably how it needs to 
be in order to firmly indicate causal relations, but problematic when it comes to 
complex issues like the immigration issue, which cannot be reduced to the outcome of 
one single law-making process or one single topic subject to problematisation. Issues 
like immigration are central issues for late modern democracies, and knowledge about 
the opinion formation around them are relevant for both communication theory, social 
theory and social practise. For this kind of issues, departing from the empirical 
processes of opinion formation rather than backtracking from their outcome seems 
more promising.   
 
7.3. The dissertation’s main contributions 
 
In the introduction, I presented the three main arguments of the thesis, which are my 
main contribution: The methodological argument, the empirical argument and the 
theoretical argument.   
The methodological argument has been that the relationship between the 
cultural and the political public sphere best can be analysed through a textual-
historical view of public opinion formation. This has been my core methodical 
approach and consists of viewing public opinion formation as a process of change (or 
lack thereof), of which texts, or the content of the public sphere, plays a pivotal role. 
To understand public opinion formation, and thus also how expressive can be 
understood as an input to politics, it is useful to analyse how texts are active parts of 
this changes. This is founded on two basic assumptions: That texts should be analysed 
as interventions into current debates in the public sphere, and that such interventions 
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will both stage and alter the relevant discourses they are part of. Thus, any text can 
potentially contribute to the process of opinion formation, and it should be payed 
attention to both the particularities of each text as well as its context to understand how 
it does so.  
That being said, the difference between my textual-historical view of opinion 
formation and more traditional approaches within textual analysis, rhetorical criticism 
or discourse studies, lies in how I suggest identifying ruptures, moments of change in 
the public sphere where different discourses started to interact in novel ways, in order 
to establish interesting cases for researching public opinion formation. This is 
especially the case when interested in text who are not part of explicitly deliberative 
debates. Such changes should be established in a positive way, meaning starting from 
observing the empirical features of the texts themselves and their relations to the 
material world rather than departing from theoretical concepts or textual 
interpretations. This kind of changes would mean that the texts of the public sphere, 
including expressive culture and comedy, is given new constraints and opportunities to 
intervene in the public sphere’s treatment of different issues. To depart from this kind 
of changes, and analyse how specific, empirical instances of text are parts of them by 
intervening in debates that go on in the public sphere, constitutes the textual-historical 
view of public opinion formation, and is a new approach for understanding how 
expressive culture can contribute to the serious public sphere, or to put it more boldly: 
how the arts can play a political role.  
In this dissertation, I have advanced my empirical argument by showing that 
one way that comedy can play such a role is by contributing to boundary struggles, the 
various contestation and negotiations of the borders and boundaries of the public 
sphere. Such boundary struggles pertain to many different processes, from drawing up 
the boundaries of what kind of speech acts or positions that are legitimate in the public 
sphere to the borders governing the inclusion and exclusion of actors and social 
groups. I have shown that comedy has contributed to a variety of these processes in the 
Scandinavian public spheres: Satirical shows have worked around the boundaries 
regulating aggression in the public sphere, and by this contributed to the making of 
moral boundaries that mark right-wing populist parties as delegitimate. The cultural 
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value of comedy and the easy access to the stand-up scene have together been means 
of access for individual immigrants to the public sphere, and also for their legitimation 
as immigrant voices. Humour controversies are occasions for the politicisation of 
symbolic racism as well as boundary struggles about the limits of offensive comedy. 
Finally, diaspora humour forms an alternative space of playful recognition to the 
problem-oriented framing of ethnocultural difference dominant in the serious public 
sphere.  
Taken together, these findings demonstrate why comedy has been an 
important part of the treatment of the immigration issue in the Scandinavian public 
sphere. First, the particularities of the humorous mode of communication has been 
done to do things other modes and genres cannot do, or at least to provide alternative 
opportunities for contributing to the public sphere. Satirical comedy is a very 
particular way of communicating that seems to license aggression that otherwise 
would not have been acceptable, and play is a way of communicating and 
experiencing the world that is if not unique for, at least strongly associated with 
comedy and humour. Stand-up as a way of access and comedy controversies, on the 
other hand, are alternative but efficacious ways to strategically overcome borders in 
the public sphere. Hence, comedy has been used to do work in the public sphere and 
even to do so better than other means in some respects.  
Second, the processes of boundary struggle I have discussed in this thesis 
touch upon central questions in public sphere theory as well as the immigration debate: 
Questions like racism, political correctness, the role of right-wing populist parties, 
incivility and aggression, access for marginalised group and civic identity in the 
multicultural era. This shows that the contributions comedy has made are highly 
relevant for how the question of immigration has been treated in the Scandinavian 
public spheres, as well as for their continuous self-thematisation.  
I have been reluctant to identify specific functions that comedy has in the 
public sphere, both because humour and comedy are very complex forms of 
communication and because I think it is more useful to identify contigent functions in 
light of the specific contexts where comedy is put to work. Nevertheless, it seems like 
it is possible to analytically generalise and claim that boundary work is a central 
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function comedy plays in the public sphere. To some degree, this is a loose claim, as 
the concept boundary work is very wide and encompasses many different processes, as 
I have made clear by resorting to them in my analysis. Nevertheless, there is some 
theoretical backing to substantiate the claim, as well as making it more interesting: 
Since humour as a mode balances on many different boundaries in itself, or exists on 
the edge of transgression, so to speak, it might be especially well suited to conduct 
boundary work of many different kinds. 
This leads me to my last argument, the theoretical argument, which I also 
view as the main contribution of this dissertation. This regards how humour is able to 
do the special contribution it does do, by looking at its particularities as a 
communicative mode. I suggest that we should approach these particularities as 
unsolvable but productive tensions, and have worked with three (and a half) such 
tensions in this thesis: The tension between humour as conventional, accepted, 
conservative and perhaps even suppressive; and as novel, complex, creative, 
transgressive, radical and perhaps even subversive; the tension between humour as an 
unserious mode and its use for serious means; and finally the tension(s) between 
humour as emotional investment and humour as emotional detachment, which also 
includes how it works with both negative and positive emotions. 
These tensions should be understood as ways to describe what humour is and 
what it can do, but not as mutually exclusive forms of appearance or alternatives for 
action: The core of these tensions is that humour are all these things at the same time. 
As I have discussed in my theory chapter, research on the social and political aspects 
of humour and comedy tends to understand comedy as either a 
conventional/conservative or as a creative/radical force, and that can lead to begging 
the question in empirical analyses of the politics of humour. I have shown in this study 
that it is more fruitful to depart from the assumption that comedy is both these things 
at the same time, and that it often uses its conventional and conservative aspects to do 
creative and radical things, that again can feed into more conventional or hegemonic 
processes in the public sphere or to creative and subversive ones. This tension has 
been most central in my work, but I have also shown how this is intertwined with the 
tensions between serious-unserious and the tensions regarding emotion and affect. 
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Regarding the latter, this thesis also gives a contribution: Different versions of 
superiority theory, for example, tends to be most interested in either the feeling of 
“sudden glory” or the feeling of being ridiculed, but as I have argued in my chapter 
about hard satirical shows, their political function cannot be fully understood if we 
don’t assess how these two affective dimensions both are put to work in the public 
sphere and depend on each other.  
To approach humour’s particularities as unsolvable and productive tensions is 
thus a contribution to humour studies in general and research on the political and 
social role of humour and comedy in particular. More indirectly, it is also a 
contribution to public sphere theory, as it demonstrates that texts, and other 
phenomena for that matter, that appear as messy, complex and ambiguous nevertheless 
can be interesting in the process of public opinion formation, which at least by some 
tends to be viewed as a goal-oriented, formulaic and rule-governed process.  
In sum, this point towards at least three lines of future research. One would be 
to use the textual-historical view of opinion formation to investigate other contexts, 
issues, modes and genres, preferably taking of the challenge and investigating how 
other messy things in the public sphere work by being messy, like other forms of 
expressive culture but also complex social movement like the women’s movement, the 
gay movement, working class movements and the environmental movement. Another 
line of research would be to depart from my findings regarding how comedy has 
contributed to the boundary struggles of the Scandinavian public sphere, by using 
different kinds of perspectives and methods and thus contributing to a rich, 
interdisciplinary understanding of public opinion formation. Finally, how the 
productive tensions of the humorous mode work in other contexts would be an 
interesting line of research, which can significantly develop our understanding of why 
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